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Abstract. 
This thesis analyses and quantifies the environmental impacts of trade 
liberalisation and economic growth. The history and development of the 
GATT/WTO's treatment of the environment is considered, together with 
the environmental implications of trade liberalisation in general. 
The thesis then considers the relationship between economic growth and 
the environment, particularly since economic growth is often claimed to be 
an environmentally damaging feature of trade liberalisation. The manner in 
which economists have treated the relationship between economic growth 
and the environment is examined and the relationship is then subjected to 
an empirical investigation. The thesis estimates the reduced form 
relationship between per capita GDP and a wide range of environmental 
indicators, using cross-country panel data sets and improves on the 
traditional methodology for estimating environmental Kuznets curves 
(EKCs). Results suggest that meaningful EKCs exist only for local air 
pollutants whilst indicators with a more global, or indirect, impact either 
increase monotonically with income, or else have predicted turning points 
at high per capita income levels with large standard errors 
- 
unless they 
have been subjected to a multilateral policy initiative. Two other findings 
are also made; that concentrations of local pollutants in urban areas peak 
at a lower per capita income level than total emissions per capita; and that 
transport generated local air pollutants peak at a higher per capita income 
level than total emissions per capita. 
The thesis also estimates the impact of the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations on a wide range of environmental indicators. The impact is 
estimated in terms of the composition effect and combined scale and 
technique effects associated with the Uruguay Round. Results suggest that 
in the developing and transition regions most indicators will increase as a 
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CHAPTER 1. 
INTRODUCTION. 
This thesis examines and quantifies the various ways in which trade 
liberalisation, particularly that originating from the Uruguay Round of 
trade negotiations, can affect the environment. In addition, the 
environmental impact of economic growth is analysed and quantified, 
including the growth which stems directly from the Uruguay Round. 
The recent increase in the public awareness of environmental issues has 
coincided with a change in the nature of these issues. In the late 1960s and 
early 1970s the predominant concern was the depletion of the world's stock 
of non-renewable resources. 1 However, for today's environmentalists it is 
the earth's ability to assimilate growing levels of pollutants which is the 
primary concern and issues such as the depletion of the ozone layer and the 
build up of greenhouse gases are now high on the political agenda. This 
recognition that many current environmental problems have transborder 
features, and thus may be global in nature, has meant that global activities 
such as world trade have been increasingly linked to such problems 
- 
both 
as a possible cause of them and as a means to remedy them. 
There are, however, two other factors which have brought the relationship 
between trade and the environment to public prominence. The first of these 
was the announcement by the US government in late 1990 of plans to sign 
a trade agreement with Mexico and Canada, since known as the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Many environmentalists were 
alarmed at the possible ecological consequences of America, a country 
with relatively high environmental standards, trading freely with Mexico, a 
1 The depletion of fossil fuels remains a secondary concern. The United Nations 
Environment Programme estimates that at current levels of utilisation, known reserves of 
oil will last 40 years, gas 60 years and coal 200 years (UNEP (1993)). 
1 
country with negligible standards. It was feared that an agreement of this 
nature would seriously hamper the ability of the US to implement 
environmental protection laws, as well as putting the US at a competitive 
disadvantage. Such alarm was heightened by Presidential candidate Ross 
Perot who dwelt on the possible consequences to the US workforce if 
fierce competition forced American firms to relocate in Mexico due to the 
latter's low environmental standards. 
The second event responsible for raising public awareness of the links 
between trade and the environment was the result of a 1991 GATT dispute 
panel on tuna trade between Mexico and the US. In 1988, in accordance 
with the US Marine Mammal Protection Act, the US banned the 
importation of Mexican tuna which was being caught in drift nets and, as a 
result, killing many dolphins in the eastern Pacific Ocean. However, the 
GATT dispute panel judged that the US import ban inappropriately 
discriminated against Mexican tuna and, as a result, violated GATT's 
'national treatment' provision as set out in Article III. As Dunoff (1992) 
states, "Article III requires a comparison between products of the exporting 
and importing nations, and not a comparison between different nations' 
production processes that have no effect on the product qua product. " 
(Dunoff (1992) pp. 1407-1454). These findings, as Esty (1994) points out, 
effectively prohibit unilateral trade actions aimed at reducing 
extraterritorial environmental damage and seem indicative, to many, of 
GATT's inability to deal with trade-environment conflicts in a balanced 
manner. Perhaps not surprisingly, the decision caused outrage amongst 
environmental groups the world over and many became convinced that 
GATT was inherently anti-environmental. The newly formed World Trade 
Organisation, which contains all those nations who accept the full Uruguay 
Round Agreement, at least addresses the environmental impact of trade 
liberalisation, something the GATT did not do. 2 However, 
2 For example, the WTO has created a Committee on Trade and the Environment. 
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environmentalists still claim there to be little evidence of any real 
commitment in this direction. 
A key objective of the liberalisation of international trade is the generation 
of economic growth. Indeed, most economists claim that the removal of 
tariff and non-tariff barriers will provide nations with greater market 
access which will, in turn, lead to an increase in GDP. This therefore 
introduces the second key theme of the thesis 
- 
the relationship between 
economic growth and the environment. In contrast to the study of trade 
liberalisation and the environment, the roots of the economic growth and 
the environment debate can be traced back several centuries. Indeed, many 
classical economists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries stressed the 
existence of possible limits to human activity. 3 This link between the 
environment and economic growth was generally neglected by neoclassical 
economics and it was not until the `limits to growth' debates of the 1960s 
and 70s that the issue really caught the public imagination. Those who 
believed in the existence of environmental limits to economic growth 
stressed the 'possibility of natural resource exhaustion and the limited 
ability of the environment to assimilate pollution. Those opposed to this 
position pointed to our ability to overcome such limits using technological 
advance, changes in the composition of production and resource 
substitution. 
In the 1980s the 'limits to growth' debate was replaced by the notion of 
sustainable development 
-a notion in which the precise relationship 
between economic growth and environmental well-being remains 
uncertain. The mainstream ('weak') interpretation of sustainable 
development, as provided, for example, by the Brundtland Report (WCED 
(1987)), still believes growth and environmental health to be 
complementary, thus illustrating the 'limits to growth' debate's failure to 
3 See, for example, Thomas Malthus (1970), written in 1798, or John Stuart Mill (1871), 
written in 1848. 
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challenge the orthodoxy. Proponents point to evidence which suggests that 
energy use per unit of output is falling and claim that the existence of 
inverted U-shaped curves, which have been estimated for several local air 
pollutants, indicate that it is possible to `grow out of environmental 
problems 
.4 Others provide a 'stronger' interpretation of sustainability 
which, like the anti-growth position held by many in the 1970s, posits the 
existence of environmental limits to growth. However, in contrast to the 
anti-growth position of the 1970s, the environmental limits discussed by 
the strong sustainability school do not arise from the exhaustion of natural 
resources. Rather, the relevant environmental constraints to growth stem 
from 'sink' limits ie. the limited ability of the biosphere to absorb and 
assimilate waste. Proponents of the strong sustainability hypothesis also 
stress the importance of the scale of the economy (e. g. Daly (1991)) and 
generally advocate a multi-disciplinary, or co-evolutionary, approach to 
sustainability issues, integrating ecology with economics. 
With this background in mind, the thesis is organised as follows: 
Chapter 2 examines the nature and development of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade, from its inception in 1948 to the creation of the 
World Trade Organisation at the Uruguay Round. Particular attention is 
paid to the development of the (limited) environmental provisions 
contained within the GATT, including the environmental credentials of the 
WTO. 
Chapter 3 examines the different ways in which trade liberalisation can 
affect the environment, both positively and negatively. In addition, the 
GATT/WTO environmental provisions raised in Chapter 2 are assessed 
and their implications for the environment are considered. Whilst trade 
4 Known as environmental Kuznets curves after the inverted-U shaped relationship 
between income and income inequality postulated by Simon Kuznets (1955). See, for 
example, World Bank (1992). 
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liberalisation may allow nations to overcome resource constraints; 
facilitate the transfer of environmentally clean technologies and products; 
and remove environmentally damaging trade distortions, it may also prove 
detrimental to the environment. The environmental case against free trade 
is reduced to four key issues; first, trade liberalisation is likely to generate 
economic growth (the environmental implications of which are dealt with 
in later chapters); second, free trade, as it is implemented through the 
GATT/WTO, may limit the ability to implement national and 
international environmental regulations; third, trade liberalisation may 
provide an incentive for nations to lower environmental standards; and 
finally, free trade may prevent the use of trade restrictions to protect the 
environment. The strength of each of these claims is assessed. 
Chapter 4 examines the historical development of the relationship between 
economic growth and the environment in economics and environmental 
literature. Beginning with the classical economists, the chapter then 
progresses through the neoclassical economists and then focuses on the 
`limits to growth' debates of the 1960s and 1970s. The arguments 
proposed by both sides of this debate are discussed. Attention then turns to 
the rise of sustainable development in the 1980s and 90s and a distinction 
is drawn between `weak' and `strong' forms of sustainability 
- 
the 
difference between the two stemming from differing opinions of the nature 
of the capital stock that is to be maintained. It is seen that, generally, 
weaker forms of sustainable development consider economic growth to be 
crucial if sustainability is to be achieved. Stronger forms consider 
economic growth to be detrimental to the objective of sustainable 
development. The chapter then turns to the actual implementation of 
sustainable development and assesses the need to develop new indicators 
of production and welfare. It is claimed that GNP is deficient as an 
indicator of production and welfare. Chapter 8, Policy Implications, 
returns to this issue. 
5 
Given the uncertainty which surrounds the theoretical relationship between 
economic growth and the environment, Chapter 5 attempts to estimate this 
relationship empirically. Specifically, this chapter estimates the reduced 
form relationship between per capita GDP and a wide range of 
environmental indicators using cross-country panel data sets. These 
estimated relationships are otherwise known as environmental Kuznets 
curves (EKCs). Several other studies have also estimated EKCs, although 
this chapter uses a wider range of environmental indicators and improves 
on the traditional estimation procedure. 5 A number of hypotheses are 
tested: first, it is suggested that due to the disincentives for individual 
nations to tackle global pollutants, pollutants with a local short-term 
impact (e. g. suspended particulate matter) will have estimated turning 
points at lower per capita income levels than those environmental 
indicators with a more global impact (e. g. carbon dioxide). 6 A subsidiary 
hypothesis is that a global air pollutant will only have an estimated turning 
point within the observed income range if it has been subjected to a 
multilateral policy initiative. Second, since for local air pollutants it would 
appear easier to reduce urban air concentrations than total emissions, it is 
suggested that turning points for concentrations will be at lower per capita 
income levels than turning points for emissions per capita. Third, it is 
suggested that due to the growth of the transport sector, emissions from 
that sector will prove more difficult to control than emissions in other 
sectors. It is therefore hypothesised that emissions per capita of transport 
generated local air pollutants will have turning points at higher levels of 
per capita income than total emissions per capita of the same pollutants. 
Finally, the chapter estimates the relationship between economic growth 
5 For other studies which estimate EKCs see Seldon and Song (1994), Grossman and 
Krueger (1995), and Shafik (1994). 
6 Since local pollutants have a strong impact on the locale in which they are emitted, 
governments often feel obliged to take action to control them. In contrast, global 
pollutants have a much more widespread impact and, in addition, individual countries can 
benefit from other nations' abatement efforts. 
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and certain indirect indicators of environmental quality, such as energy use 
and traffic volumes. Even though these indicators may be responsible for 
serious environmental problems, it is suggested that turning points will be 
high or non-existent, due to the lack of incentive for government action. 
Although Chapter 5 provides a framework for analysing the relationship 
between per capita GDP and a wide range of environmental indicators, it 
does not include a time trend due to several complicating factors which 
arise when a time trend is included. The chapter therefore fails to take into 
account any factors which are common to all countries or regions but 
which change over time, such as the level of technology. Chapter 6 
therefore discusses the implications of using a time trend and re-estimates 
the regressions from Chapter 5 including such a time trend as a proxy for 
the level of technology. The hypotheses tested in the previous chapter are 
re-examined to assess whether the inclusion of a time trend affects their 
results and, finally, the chapter identifies those environmental indicators 
which have benefitted from technological change, and those which have 
not. 
The results of Chapter 5 then contribute to Chapter 7's attempt to estimate 
the environmental impact of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. 
Specifically, this impact is estimated in terms of three mechanisms 
associated with trade liberalisation; namely the composition effect, the 
scale effect and the technique effect. The composition effect refers to the 
fact that the composition of industry may change, following trade 
liberalisation, due to changes in comparative advantage. The scale effect 
refers to the increase in economic activity which is likely to result as 
nations obtain greater market access. The technique effect states that the 
manner of production may change as nations have more access to 
environmentally clean products and technologies and also because 
individuals may demand a cleaner environment as per capita incomes 
7 
increase. US sectoral pollution intensities from Hettige et al. (1994), 
modified by the EKC results from Chapter 5 to allow for regional 
differences, together with the results of Francois et al. (1995) who estimate 
the impact of the Uruguay Round on sectoral output levels, are used to 
estimate the composition effect. Scale and technique effects are estimated 
directly from Chapter 5's results, given Francois et al. 's estimates of the 
Uruguay Round's impact on regional income levels. The likely monetary 
cost associated with the Uruguay Round environmental impact is also 
provided. 
Chapter 8 provides the policy implications which arise from the results and 
discussions of the previous chapters and distinguishes between policy 
implications for the WTO, implications for the creation of a World 
Environmental Organisation and those which relate to national 
environmental policy. 
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF GATT AND ITS TREATMENT OF THE 
ENVIRONMENT. 
2.1 Introduction. 
This chapter examines the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade from 
its creation in 1948 to the formation of the World Trade Organisation at 
end of the Uruguay Round. The development of the GATT through each 
negotiating round is examined, with particular attention paid to the limited 
environmental provisions contained within the General Agreement. It will 
be seen that the GATT has achieved a' significant degree of success 
regarding tariff liberalisation, although the reduction of non-tariff barriers, 
particularly in the agricultural sector, has been more modest. Furthermore, 
achievements relating to the protection of the environment have been even 
less substantive. 
2.2 The Creation of GATT. 
The principles on which the GATT is based may be seen to be a direct 
reaction to the economic crises of the 1920s and 30s and the high levels of 
protectionism associated with that period. 
The impact of the First World War was to fragment the economy of 
Europe, thus dislocating many channels of trade and, as a result, 
effectively halting the development of free trade. This situation was 
exacerbated by the Great Depression, one of the effects of which was to 
sharply reduce the volume of world trade and turn the attention of 
governments further inward. Levels of protection now grew in virtually all 
industrialised nations, particularly in response to the 1930 Hawley-Smoot 
9 
Act which raised US tariffs on dutiable items to an unprecedented 52%. 
Trade warfare and economic nationalism became the hallmarks of the rest 
of the decade. 
The ashes of World War Two left the Allied leaders committed to a new 
regime. To avoid the mistakes of the past it was essential that any new 
world order could "bring about the fullest collaboration between all 
nations in the economic field" (Atlantic Charter, 14th August 1941). The 
resultant Bretton Woods conference of 1944, although primarily 
concerned with establishing the IMF and the World Bank to deal with 
monetary and banking issues, did recognise the need for a comparable 
institution to deal with world trade matters. 
In December 1945, the United States and United Kingdom produced a 
number of proposals which outlined the formation of an International 
Trade Organisation (ITO) 
- 
the purpose of which being to liberalise and 
oversee international trade. The ITO charter was finally agreed upon in 
Havana, Cuba in March 1948 (hence often referred to as the Havana 
Charter), but was less trade liberalising than had been initially intended. 
Many delegates to the ITO negotiations grew reluctant to cede sovereignty 
over trade issues to an international organisation and forced numerous 
modifications and exceptions into the charter. 
However, while the ITO was pending ratification, an interim measure was 
developed to deal with trade issues entitled the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The GATT was completed by October 1947 
and many negotiators felt it should be introduced before the ITO for two 
reasons. Firstly, as expounded by Jackson (1990), many negotiators were 
concerned that the content of the supposedly secret tariff concessions 
would begin to 'leak' and as a result, a wait of any duration prior to 
implementing the new tariffs, might disrupt world trade patterns. 
10 
Secondly, US negotiators were acting on the authority of US trade 
legislation, under which the GATT would not have to be submitted to 
Congress. Since this legislation expired in mid 1948 a degree of urgency 
entered the proceedings. 
The result was the adoption of the 'Protocol of Provisional Application', by 
which eight nations agreed to apply the GATT after Ist January 1948, 
whilst the remaining 15 members would do so in the near future. The 
GATT therefore came into being on 1st January 1948 with the aim of 
providing a temporary framework for trade liberalisation during the ITO's 
gestation period. 
However, events did not go according to plan and despite the fact that it 
was the US who made the first initiative regarding the ITO, the US 
Congress repeatedly failed to approve the Havana Charter. In December 
1950 the US State Department announced that it was withdrawing the 
Charter from further consideration. This effectively signalled the end for 
the ITO. Hudec (1975) argues that this happened because the Charter was 
actually facing opposition from both sides of the free trade argument. 
Opposition from the pro-protection lobby was expected, but what proved 
to be more pernicious was the lack of support from free traders, many of 
whom believed the charter to be too weak. More generally, Hudec 
suggests that there may have been a loss of faith in the post war regime as 
a whole, with interest waning for all international institutions, not merely 
the ITO. Finally, Esty (1994), emphasises the lack of support from the 
business community which undermined the efforts of Congress to 
establish a multinational trade organisation. 
Nevertheless, for whatever reason, the GATT now found itself exposed 
and standing alone 
- 
something it was never designed to do. The new 
world order as envisaged by the Allied leaders and as supposedly provided 
11 
by the Bretton Woods system, was now incomplete, with no institution to 
deal with issues of international trade. Jackson (1990), therefore claims 
that it is not surprising that the framework that did exist, the GATT, found 
its purpose changing as nations now expected it to, at least partly, fill the 
role of the erstwhile ITO, albeit in a different guise! 
As a result, the GATT was now forced to take centre stage in all 
international trade disputes and has survived well, despite the fact that it 
was only intended to be a temporary arrangement. 
The precise role of GATT will now be considered, followed by an 
examination of GATT's provisions for agriculture and the environment. 
2.3 The Role of GATT. 
Having examined the historical foundations behind the GATT and the 
reasons for its development, the actual aims and functions of the 
agreement can now be analysed so as to ascertain how the GATT's 
supervisory role is performed. 
The stated objective of the GATT is to "provide a secure and predictable 
international trading environment for the business community and a 
continuing process of trade liberalisation in which investment, job creation 
and trade can thrive" (GATT (1991) p. 1). 
The set of rules which constitute the GATT can be seen to consist of 3 
distinct elements. Firstly, there is the General Agreement itself together 
with its 38 articles. Secondly, there are a number of associated agreements 
which have been added at various stages since the GATT's inception. 
1 It became essential that the GATT did not look too much like the TTO since many of the 
criticisms aimed at the ITO were sharpened by its seemingly permanent institutional 
nature. Consequently, any talk of transforming the GATT into a more 'solid' organisation 
was to be avoided. 
12 
These agreements generally cover anti dumping and other non tariff 
issues, with membership for these being much less than for the General 
Agreement. Finally, there is the Multi-Fibre Arrangement which allows 
the clothing and textile sectors to be exempt from the normal rules of the 
General Agreement. 
Whilst complex in appearance, the General Agreement is actually based 
on a number of relatively simple principles. The first such principle is 
trade without discrimination i. e. there must be nondiscrimination by each 
participating country in its trade with others. This is generally referred to 
as the 'most-favoured-nation' clause and is found in Article I. This clause 
forbids any country from granting a trade advantage, favour, privilege or 
immunity to another contracting party without providing it for all. In 
particular, tariff reductions granted to one contracting party must be 
extended to all GATT parties. Thus if two countries agree on a bilateral 
reduction in tariffs, the tariff concession should immediately be extended 
to all other contracting parties. This principle provides a degree of 
certainty to contracting parties since they know that any bargain which 
they strike will not be undermined by a subsequent agreement between 
other contracting parties which does not apply to them. Furthermore, all 
tariff reductions are 'bound' such that they can be reduced but not 
increased, thus parties can reasonably expect any tariff concession to be 
permanent. These features were designed to ensure stability and to end the 
economic warfare of the 1930s. The most-favoured-nation clause is 
supported by the national treatment provision which states that imported 
goods should be treated no less favourably than 'like' domestically 
produced goods, once they enter the country of importation. This 
provision is found in Article III. 
A second basic principle is that customs tariffs should be the only means 
for affording protection to domestic industries. The General Agreement 
has always prohibited the use of quantitative restrictions on imports, even 
though such quotas are now far less widespread than they used to be, at 
least in developed countries? Thus, the GATT does not prohibit the use of 
protection as long as it is in the form of a tariff, thereby making the extent 
of any protection clear and hence minimising the trade distortion caused. 
Due to the fact that the General Agreement allows a degree of protection, 
GATT claims it is misleading to be referred to as a'free trade organisation' 
since its real goal is to achieve fair and undistorted competition (GATT 
(1991) p. 8). 
The final principle underlying the GATT is to afford an international 
forum for discussing and settling mutual problems of international trade. 
Hence, parties must try to settle any disputes through consultation and 
negotiation. 
All other issues addressed by the General Agreement can be seen to 
support the above principles. However, in order to examine how such aims 
are brought to fruition, if indeed they are, it is necessary to analyse the 
institutional framework of the GATT. 
It is important to realise that, as Dam (1970) points out, the trade policy 
provisions of the ITO formed the General Agreement, but were stripped of 
any procedural and institutional framework which the ITO may have 
possessed. Hence, any such framework that exists within the GATT was 
merely designed to facilitate the long term survival of a multi-lateral trade 
agreement. Nevertheless, it is still possible to talk in terms of a framework 
when dealing with the institutional nature of the GATT and certain 
procedural and organisational structures may be isolated. As examples of 
procedural factors, Dam emphasises the general provisions on consultation 
and 'nullification or impairment' and claims the latter constitutes the core 
2 GATT does allow the use of quotas in the event of severe balance of payments 
difficulties, although they must be applied without discrimination. 
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of the GATT remedies section. If the General Agreement is violated by, 
for example, the nullification of a concession, the GATT will not actually 
act to punish the offender, but will instead grant the injured party the right 
to withdraw any concessions from which the offending party may have 
benefited. Dam claims that a remedy of this type illustrates how the 
GATT represents a balance of advantages for each party, whereby tariff 
concessions are made only in return for equivalent reciprocal concessions. 
Indeed, reciprocity is a key principle underlying the working of the GATT 
and is a fundamental element in multilateral trade negotiations whereby 
nations attempt to minimise free-riding. Essentially, the GATT is a 
convention of contractual obligations which governments agree to adhere 
to when applying their national regulations to international trade. Indeed, 
the significance of the contractual nature of the GATT is illustrated by the 
fact that its members are referred to as Contracting Parties. By early 1995 
there were 128 nations acting as contracting parties and their business is 
carried out with the help of numerous committees, working parties and 
panels, with perhaps the most significant being the 'Council'. With regard 
to organisational factors, the GATT makes no provision for any of the 
usual attributes of international organisations, such as a governing body or 
an executive board, but does provide the opportunity for the contracting 
parties to act collectively in certain circumstances. So, for example, if 
there is uncertainty between countries regarding the interpretation of part 
of the agreement, a majority vote of the contracting parties could be held 
to provide an authoritative judgement' It is provisions of this sort which 
allow the GATT to function effectively to settle international trade 
disputes, despite the fact that the agreement does not form an international 
organisation in the mould of the IMF or the World Bank. 
3 As stated by Jackson (1990), majority voting is generally avoided in favour of a 
'consensus' approach, with the former only being used in the case of waivers, 
membership and treaty amendments. 
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Having analysed the nature and role of the GATT, its development since 
1948 will now be considered, paying particular attention to its treatment of 
the environment. 
2.4 GATT's 1948 Stance on the Environment. 
The implications of GATT with respect to the environment will be dealt 
with in Chapter 3, with present attention being restricted to GATT's initial 
provisions for environmental issues. The environment receives no explicit 
attention in the General Agreement, reflecting the lack of importance 
attached to ecological issues in the 1940s. However, Article XX provides 
numerous exceptions to Articles I and III (the 'most-favoured nation' 
clause and the national treatment provision) including provision for a 
degree of environmental regulation. ` Article XX provides exemptions for 
normally 'illegal' actions which are designed to protect public morals or 
preserve national heritage, and although not mentioning the word 
'environment', sections XX(b) and XX(g) allow a degree of flexibility 
when implementing GATT's rules, thus facilitating an element of 
environmental protection. XX(b) allows exception to GATT's principles 
for measures "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health", 
while XX(g) provides dispensation for measures "relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made 
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption"! However, it should be noted that all actions taken in the 
name of an Article XX exemption must not "constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
4 See Appendix A. 
s Article XX started life as Article 45 of the Havana Charter, and as Pearce points out, 
clause 45 originally contained an additional exception to Articles I and III, namely for 
measures taken in pursuance of any intergovernmental agreement which relates solely 
to the conservation of fisheries resources, migratory birds or wild animals and which is 
subject to the requirement of paragraph 1(d) of Article 70... " 
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conditions prevail, or (act as) a disguised restriction on international 
trade". 
In addition, as Esty (1994) claims, it is likely that a number of hurdles 
would have to be cleared before a party's claim of exemption from Articles 
I or II would be accepted. In particular, Pearce (1992) points out a number 
of ambiguities which exist within the two clauses, thus preventing ease of 
interpretation and hence complicating the procedure. Specifically, Pearce 
claims the use of the word 'exhaustible' in XX(g) is ambiguous, since all 
resources are exhaustible, even renewable ones if they are not managed 
sustainably. It is therefore unclear whether GATT has considered the 
distinction between renewable and non-renewable resources. Another 
example of ambiguity, this time in XX(b), is the use of the word 
'necessary'. Measures undertaken must be 'necessary' for the protection of 
health; but does 'necessary' mean there is no other choice or is it simply 
referring to the most suitable measure? Furthermore, on the same point, 
Esty states that recent GATT cases have defined 'necessary' to mean 'least 
GATT-inconsistent' i. e. presumably 'least trade-restrictive'. This is a major 
obstacle in itself since a less GATT-inconsistent policy can almost always 
be conceived. 
An important point concerning these provisions of Article XX, is that they 
are only concerned with what is produced and not how it is produced. 
Differential treatment is not allowed for 'like' products, and no distinction 
is drawn between similar goods even though they may be the result of very 
different production processes. Esty elucidates the obvious drawback with 
such a situation "... to say that a nation must accept an imported 
semiconductor because it physically resembles a domestically produced 
semiconductor is absurd if the product was made in violation of the 
Montreal Protocol, restricting the use of chemicals harmful to the ozone 
layer. " (Esty (1994) p. 51. ). This issue was addressed, to a certain extent, 
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by the Uruguay Round by extending the scope of the Technical Barriers to 
Trade Agreement. 
2.5 The Development of GATT Since 1948 (With Relation to the 
Environment). ' 
2.5.1 1948 
- 
1963. 
From its very inception in 1948 the GATT has allowed exceptions to its 
prohibition of quantitative trade restrictions. Indeed, Article XIX provides 
a rationale for the use of quantitative import restrictions on all goods 
(including agricultural goods) if rapidly growing imports are seen to 
jeopardise domestic production, whilst Articles XII, XIII, XIV and XV 
allow the use of quotas for balance of payments reasons. Most notably, 
Article XI which provides the general rule prohibiting the use of import 
quotas, grants a permanent exemption for import quotas on agricultural 
commodities 
- 
subject to certain qualifications. That is, import restrictions 
are allowed on agricultural commodities; firstly, providing domestic 
production or marketing of the commodity is also restricted; secondly, 
providing that imports are permitted the share of the domestic market 
which would have been theirs in the absence of any restrictions on 
production; ' and finally, if the quotas are used to remove temporary 
domestic surpluses. 
One of the first matters which had to be tackled by GATT was the use of 
quantitative import restrictions by many countries, under the guise of 
balance of payments difficulties. As Schwenger (1958) points out, it is by 
no means clear whether GATT rules permit greater levels of protectionism 
under balance of payments quotas than under agricultural quotas, but 
6 See appendix B. 
7 Several factors must be considered when determining this share; (a) the representative 
historical share that imports have had, (b) changes in relative productive efficiency and (c) any other factors which may affect trade. 
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nevertheless such quotas went generally unchallenged. However, by 1950, 
many contracting parties were concerned by this use of quotas, especially 
since it was widely believed that many countries were no longer 
experiencing balance of payments problems. A report was consequently 
prepared documenting the extent of their usage and additionally, methods 
were suggested to remove such quotas as rapidly as possible! In 1952, the 
contracting parties began annual reviews of the operation of Article XI 
(the Article eliminating the use of quantitative restrictions), in order to 
keep the use of quotas under close scrutiny. 
In 1954 a review session was held specifically to appraise the performance 
of the GATT. One of the main outcomes concerned the use of subsidies 
which were still 'legal' under GATT provisions. The initial stance adopted 
by GATT was simply that countries applying subsidies were requested in 
Article XVI to notify all other contracting parties. No provision was 
therefore made to outlaw the use of such subsidies. Furthermore, the initial 
treaty made no separate provisions concerning export subsidies. In 1954 
however three paragraphs were added to Article XVI which allowed the 
use of export subsidies for agricultural goods whilst prohibiting their 
usage for any other goods. GATT rules now merely stated that export 
subsidies for agricultural goods should be avoided but that if they are 
applied they should not result 'in a more than equitable share of world 
trade'. Already agriculture can be seen to be receiving differential 
treatment from the GATT 
- 
regarding the use of both quantitative import 
restrictions and subsidies. 
A problem developing in the US concerned Section 22 of the US 
Agricultural Adjustment Act (1933). This required the use of quotas or 
special fees whenever "any article or articles are being or are practically 
certain to be imported into the United States under such conditions and in 
8 The report was entitled GATT, The Use of Quantitative Restrictions for Protective and 
Commercial Purposes. (Geneva, July 1950). 
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such quantities as to render or tend to render ineffective, or materially 
interfere with" any US farm programme or "to reduce substantially the 
amount of any product" subject to such a farm programme (7 USCA s. 
624 (1964) from Dam (1970) p. 260). As such then, Section 22 can be seen 
to conflict with GATT rules, with the former requiring quotas whenever 
US domestic farm policy is threatened, whilst the GATT requires all 
agricultural import quotas to be matched by domestic restrictions. US 
Congress made it clear that in any actual conflict which may occur, 
Section 22 was to take precedence over GATT commitments. 
This situation was obviously unsatisfactory as far as GATT was concerned 
with both the US and many European nations operating in flagrant 
violation of GATT rules. The US was imposing quotas on agricultural 
commodities with no domestic production constraints, whilst the European 
importers were operating balance of payments quotas without having the 
balance of payments difficulties to justify them. (Schwenger (1958)). 
The United States was aware that the implications of such a large power 
acting in defiance of GATT rules, would be to seriously threaten GATT's 
authority. As a result, the US tried to legalise its position at the 1954-55 
Review Session. The outcome was that the US was granted a waiver from 
GATT obligations for any action required by Section 22, subject to certain 
qualifications. ' Also at the 1954-55 Review Session, the GATT granted a 
temporary waiver allowing parties to maintain quotas after any balance of 
payments difficulties have vanished, again subject to strict qualifications. 
This so called 'hardcore' waiver recognised that industries having received 
protection from balance of payments quotas may need further short term 
protection to ease adjustment when such quotas are suddenly removed. 
9 Namely, as outlined by Schwenger, the US must review any quota at the request of the 
government of a GATT member; give notice of the consideration of, and decisions 
regarding, any new or modified restrictions; remove or relax restrictions as soon as 
circumstances permit; and provide an annual report which will act as the basis for an 
annual review by the contracting parties. 
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Zietz and Valdes (1988) believe that although such waivers may not have 
been of great importance quantitatively, they have been significant in a 
qualitative sense. By weakening the power of Article XI relating to the 
agricultural sector, and thus facilitating the growth of quantitative 
restrictions, such waivers have obviously hampered the trade liberalisation 
process in general. Furthermore, the granting of the Section 22 waiver 
illustrates the priority given to domestic interests by the US. Such actions 
by the architect of the trading system itself, are by no means conducive to 
the creation of a liberalised international trading environment. Indeed, the 
sixth GATT review (1961) claimed that the Section 22 waiver "... probably 
caused more serious damage to the fulfilment of the objectives of the 
General Agreement than any single factor". (Basic Instruments and 
Selected Documents, 3/S (1961), p. 261 
- 
Quoted in Warley (1976) p. 347). 
The late 1950s saw the GATT reach an impasse. Little progress was being 
made in terms of the reduction of tariffs, whilst agricultural protectionism 
was growing steadily and the problems of the less developed countries 
were not being tackled. A panel of experts, consisting of four leading 
economists, was therefore established to address these problems, the result 
of which being the 1958 Habeler Report. On the basis of the report's 
findings three committees were set up to deal with each of the above 
issues. Committee I was to plan the negotiations for the reduction of 
tariffs; Committee II was to address the growing use of non-tariff barriers 
in the agricultural sector; and Committee III aimed to develop the export- 
earnings of the less developed countries (Kock (1969)). According to Dam 
(1970), Committee II's most important consultations were held with the 
EEC regarding the formation of the Common Agricultural Policy in 1962 
and its extension in 1965 to cover new products. It would appear, 
however, that Committee II's achievements lacked any real substance. 
Warley reinforces this point when he states that "the political will" of 
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Committee II "to change, moderate and harmonise agricultural 
programmes was lacking". 
Nevertheless, the period 1948-63 saw the achievement of a considerable 
degree of non-agriculture liberalisation, with tariff concessions on 45,000 
items being agreed at the initial Geneva Round and concessions on over 
58,000 individual items in existence after the Annecy (1949) and the 
Torquay (1951) Rounds. However, it appears that this initial momentum 
began to falter during the 1950s, largely as a result of the cumbersome 
nature of negotiations at this time, whereby concessions were granted 
item-by-item. In addition, as Greenaway (1983) points out, the granting of 
such concessions faced increased political opposition. Nations had 
typically granted concessions on goods which had a degree of tariff 
redundancy, thus minimising any adjustment required. However, as the 
number of concessions grew, nations found it increasingly difficult to find 
such goods. The implication of this being that any further tariff 
concessions granted necessitated a greater degree of adjustment and hence 
faced increased political opposition. 
Warley provides a number of conclusions regarding the treatment of 
agriculture prior to the Kennedy Round (1963 
- 
67) and firstly concurs 
with Dam in stating that the GATT's attempts to liberalise the agricultural 
sector had achieved very limited success. However, Warley does not 
attribute this failure to the actual design of the GATT, but merely to the 
fact that the contracting parties were unwilling to apply the rules of the 
General Agreement to the agricultural sector in the same way as they had 
for the industrial sector. Warley points to a general lack of commitment 
regarding the reduction of agricultural protectionism, and although 
contracting parties spent much effort condemning each others' actions, 
very little tangible action was taken. Additionally, as previously 
mentioned, the poor example set by the US should be emphasised. Whilst 
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simultaneously advocating the free trade goals of the GATT, and yet 
prioritising domestic agricultural objectives, US policy was clearly 
ambiguous and provided a confusing example for smaller nations to 
follow. Warley concludes that throughout this period there was generally 
"no strong common interest in promoting agricultural trade liberalisation 
in GATT under the terms of the Agreement, and few opportunities for 
reaching pragmatic agreements outside it to which the contracting parties 
could accommodate the operation of the Agreement. " (Warley (1976) 
p. 355). 
2.5.2 The Kennedy Round 1963 
- 
67. 
"The Kennedy Round is a test, with the world watching, of how this new 
entity of six European nations, growing and prospering rapidly and 
implementing with gratifying determination the great dream of European 
unity, will respond to the exciting call for major trade liberalisation in 
world commerce. " (Blumenthal (1965) ). 
Warley (1988) echoes this sentiment and claims that the overriding goal of 
the Kennedy Round was to respond to the challenge of the Habeler Report 
by reducing the level of agricultural protectionism. However, as 
Greenaway (1983) points out, the Kennedy Round was more ambitious 
than previous Rounds, partly because of thd'problems it addressed, partly 
because of the larger number of contracting parties involved in the Round, 
and partly because the nature of granting tariff concessions changed, with 
the abolition of item-by-item negotiations and the introduction of across- 
the-board reductions. 
With regard to the industrial sector, it can be seen that a reasonable degree 
of success was achieved in the reduction of tariff levels during the 
Kennedy Round. According to Winham (1986), when approximate general 
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averaging procedures are used, it is likely that the major players in the 
Round made reductions of around 35% on non-agricultural tariff rates. 
Furthermore these reductions cover about 80% of total world trade. To 
illustrate the relative success of the Kennedy Round, the average reduction 
in the Dillon Round was around 10% for the US and the EEC, and the 
supposedly hugely successful Geneva Round in 1947 achieved average 
reductions for the US of only about 20%. 
However, four years of negotiations achieved very little for the 
agricultural sector and it appeared that generally "the Community was not 
ready to accept external constraints on its emerging common agricultural 
policy". (Warley (1988) p. 308). During the period covered by the Kennedy 
Round the extent of agricultural protectionism actually increased 
- 
not 
merely with the emergence of the CAP, but also in the US and Canada, 
with the former introducing quantitative import controls on ruminant 
meats in 1964, and the latter implementing its highly protectionist dairy 
policy in 1965. Nevertheless, Winham (1986) suggests that some progress 
was made in the agricultural sector due to the Kennedy Round. Using data 
compiled by Preeg (1970), Winham states that total dutiable agricultural 
trade (other than grain) of industrial countries amounted to $1650 million 
on which tariff reductions were made on $861.9 million or 52%. In 
addition, the average tariff reduction on dutiable imports was 20%. As 
Winham points out though, the extent of tariff reductions in the 
agricultural sector is somewhat irrelevant when the bulk of agricultural 
protectionism is in the form of non-tariff barriers. Such barriers received 
little attention in the Kennedy Round. 
2 
. 
5.3 The Tokyo Round 1973 
- 
79. 
Like the General Agreement itself, the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations 
arose as the result of economic crisis and the breakdown of the 
24 
international trading system. Specifically, the Round was instigated 
largely due to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange 
rates, the advent of 'stagflation' and the general instability of the world 
economy in the early 1970s. Indeed, as Warley points out, "The Tokyo 
Round was seen as a rededication to multilateral co-operation in 
stabilising the international economy, as a means of reversing the drift to 
protectionism, and as a vehicle for making a liberal response to the 
demands of the developing countries". (Warley (1988) p. 309). 
The scope of the Tokyo Round was to be wider than previous Rounds, 
with 99 contracting parties involved, and a far more ambitious agenda. Of 
specific concern was the growth of non-tariff barriers and, in particular, 
the increased use of subsidies 
- 
issues generally neglected in previous 
GATT Rounds. Largely in response to efforts by the US to restrain the use 
of subsidies, a Subsidies Code was added to the General Agreement which 
widened the definition of 'more than equitable share' of the world market, 
to cover the displacement of exports in third-country markets. However, 
this Code is supplementary to the General Agreement and, in fact, only 
approximately a quarter of GATT members have signed it. In addition, 
although the Subsidies Code applies as much to the industrial sector as to 
the agricultural sector, Zietz and Valdes (1988) point out that it has been 
in the latter sector that a number of disputes has arisen. As a result Zietz 
and Valdes claim that the Subsidies Code has been the least effective of 
the codes negotiated at the Tokyo Round. 
With regard to tariff liberalisation in the industrial sector, Table 1 below 
illustrates that the Tokyo Round achieved a significant degree of success. 
It should be noted, however, that tariff reductions outlined in Table 1 did 
not apply to all industrial goods, with many (e. g. textiles, footwear, 
leather) receiving zero or substantially lower than average concessions. It 
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was this fact that led many less developed countries to express dismay at 
the outcome of the Tokyo Round. 
Table 1. Tokyo Round Tariff ChanLyes: i 
Pre-Tokyo 
Tariff averages 
Post-Tokyo % reduction 
Total industrial products W 7.2 4.9 33 
S 10.6 6.5 38 
Raw materials w 0.8 0.4 52 
S 2.6 1.7 36 
Semi-manufactures w 5.8 4.1 30 
S 9.7 6.2 36 
Finished manufactures w 10.3 6.9 33 
S 12.2 7.4 39 
Negotiations concerning the agricultural sector occurred separately from 
the other issues in the Tokyo Round and, in addition to the Subsidies 
Code, two multilateral agreements and a series of individual bilateral 
agreements were made. A significant bilateral agreement between the US 
and the EC resulted in an exchange of concessions estimated at $168 
million to the EC and $106 million to the US. The agreements reached 
following multilateral negotiations were the Bovine Meat Arrangement 
and the International Dairy Arrangement. Both were primarily designed to 
increase the exchange of information between signatories, with little 
economic effect on actual trade intended. (Winham (1986). 
Despite these advances, Winham argues that the Tokyo Round achieved 
no substantial results in the area of multilateral agricultural negotiations. 
Indeed, "the participating nations ended the Tokyo Round about as far 
1° Note: W= weighted (by MFN imports) average, S= simple average. Source: GATT 
(1979) p. 120. 
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apart on agricultural trade policy as they were at the beginning of the 
negotiation". (Winham (1986) p. 255). 
An achievement of the Tokyo Round, was the creation of the Standards 
Code 
- 
or the GATT's Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
- 
designed to oversee the application of standards in international trade and 
to minimise their use as non-tariff barriers. The Code is a free-standing 
agreement which therefore applies only to its signatories. Such signatories 
are obliged to follow set guidelines in formulating and applying standards, 
with prior notification to other signatories required. The Code supports the 
idea of harmonised standards (i. e. internationally agreed), although as 
Pearce (1992) points out, nations may impose stricter standards than other 
countries, in order to protect "human, animal or plant life and the 
environment. " The Code, therefore, does refer specifically to the 
environment 
- 
something Article XX does not do. However, as Pearce 
demonstrates, there exist many areas of confusion within the Standards 
Code, including whether nations are allowed to maintain lower standards 
than the international norm; whether a nation can insist on imports having 
the same standard as domestic products; and the fact that the post-Tokyo 
Round Standards Code, like the GATT's main articles, appears to refer 
only to products as distinct from process and production methods. This 
point, however, is by no means clear. This is illustrated by the fact that 
when attempting to justify its ban on hormone-fed beef from the US 
(1989), the EC claimed its actions were outside the scope of the GATT 
since the Code did not cover processes and production methods. In 
contrast the US claimed that it did. GATT was unable to resolve the issue. 
2.5.4 The Uruguay Round 1986 
- 
94. 
As expected the Uruguay Round was more ambitious than previous 
Rounds, although the number of contracting parties, at 103, was only 
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slightly higher than at the Tokyo Round. The key objective of the Round 
was to address the differential treatment received by the agricultural 
sector, relative to the industrial sector, and to reduce the use of non-tariff 
barriers in both sectors. Finger and Olechowski (1987) outline the general 
objectives of the Uruguay Round as follows: 
(1) To prohibit, or at least reduce, the use of non-tariff barriers. 
Whilst the Uruguay Round also aimed to reduce the level of tariffs, it is 
non-tariff barriers which are deemed the most problematic by the GATT. 
(2) To broaden and extend the coverage of GATT, particularly with 
respect to the agricultural sector, and the production and trade of services. 
The issues covered by the Round were to be extensive with new issues 
such as Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights being considered. " 
(3) To ensure that the developing countries participate in the Round and 
the more advanced of them undertake more GATT obligations than they 
do at present. 
Specifically, GATT feels that since several 'developing' countries have 
now experienced a significant degree of economic development and are 
hence major world competitors in numerous manufactured products, 
greater access should be allowed to the markets of such countries. 
(4) To restore respect for the GATT system. 
Finger and Olechowski believe that the success of the negotiations rested 
on the ability of the GATT to restore its credibility, "in the public mind 
and in political circles". (Finger and Olechowski (1987) p. 11). In 
particular, they believe a comprehensive review of all GATT articles, 
would serve to update the General Agreement, thus earning it more 
respect and a greater degree of observance. 
See Appendix C. 
28 
The post-Tokyo Round era saw agriculture become more and more distinct 
in relation to other sectors as illustrated in the following tables drawn from 
Zietz and Valdes (1988). 
Table 2. Average applied tariffs for 11 developed market economies, 
by product group. 198312 
Product Group Tariff Application 
(on all imports). 
Food 5.3% 
Agricultural materials 0.5% 
Fuels 0.6% 
Chemicals 3.1% 
Other manufactures 4.7% 
All items 3.0% 
Table 2 shows that the level of food protection was considerably higher 
than in other sectors. In addition, Table 3 provides evidence of the high 
level of non-tariff barriers in the agricultural sector, relative to the 
manufacturing sector and in particular, relative to one of the most 
protected industries within the manufacturing sector 
- 
the iron and steel 
industry. It can be seen that the extent of non-tariff protection in the 
agricultural sector was similar to that in the iron and steel industry. 
As Rayner and Colman (1993) point out, this high level of agricultural 
protectionism was largely the result of two factors; firstly, the rapid 
growth of market distorting domestic agricultural programmes, and 
secondly the differential treatment which the agricultural sector received 
from the GATT, relative to the industrial sector. The inability of previous 
GATT rounds to reduce the level of agricultural protectionism meant that 
12 Source: Based on data from Laird and Finger (1986). 
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Table 3. Percentage of industrial countries' imports subject to NTBs, 
by product group, 198313 
Country Imports 
from: 
Agriculture Manuf- 
acturing 
Iron and 
Steel 
Australia Developing 21.6% 28.6% 42.5% 
Developed 47.7% 22.7% 57.8% 
EC Developing 26.9% 29.9% 31.9% 
Developed 47.7% 15.2% 51.8% 
Japan Developing 53.3% 4.4% 0.0% 
Developed 36.8% 9.7% 0.0% 
Norway Developing 15.4% 20.9% 20.6% 
Developed 27.0% 3.2% 0.0% 
USA Developing 25.1% 18.6% 48.9% 
Developed 23.5% 16.5% 35.6% 
agricultural trade was largely shaped by domestic policies. However, the 
early 1980s saw a reduction in the growth of the worldwide consumption 
of agricultural products. The US, in particular, found that its share of 
global agricultural exports fell quite considerably during the 1980s, whilst 
its domestic agricultural trade was suffering from increased market 
competition, lower farm prices and rural depression (Hillman (1994)). 
Consequently, the US began to place pressure on the GATT to force such 
issues onto the international trade agenda. 14 As a result, agricultural issues 
were promised a high priority in the Uruguay Round. Specifically, the 
negotiations aimed to address GATT's past neglect of agricultural trade 
and to rectify its failure to reduce the level of agricultural protectionism to 
the same extent as industrial protectionism. 
13 Upper numbers refer to imports from developing countries, lower numbers to imports 
from developed countries. Source: Selected data from Nogues, Olechowski and Winters 
(1986). 
4 As Hillman (1994) notes, this represented something of a watershed since the US had 
always been reluctant to link its agricultural policy with its international trade policy. 
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Seven and a half years of complex negotiations were concluded at the 
Marrakesh ministerial conference on April 15th 1994, with the result being 
a treaty over 22,000 pages long and 170 kilos in weight. (The Times, 16th 
April 1994). However, despite the sheer size of the agreement, it appears 
that its agricultural provisions fall short of expectations 
- 
expectations 
which may have initially been unrealistically high due to the US's so 
called zero-option, whereby all trade distorting agricultural support and 
protection was to be removed within 10 years. Clearly, such a stance by 
the US was overly ambitious, with the result that it was implicitly dropped 
after the 1989 Geneva Accord. This now provided scope for agreement 
with the EU, whose reaction to the zero-option had been largely defensive. 
However, disagreements between contracting parties arose throughout the 
negotiations and by 1991 the talks appeared to have reached stalemate. As 
a result GATT Secretary-General Dunkel intervened by tabling a draft 
'Final Act' which included the actual amount by which agricultural 
support and protection should be reduced. Whilst the US and many Cairns 
Group countries were prepared to accept the substance of the 'Final Act', 
the EU was not, and as a result Dunkel abandoned plans to conclude the 
Uruguay Round by 15 April 1992. This inability to agree on issues 
affecting agriculture would therefore appear to be largely responsible for 
both the duration, and the weakened results of the Round. 
Nevertheless, the Uruguay Round Agricultural Agreement does contain 
some major contributions to the liberalisation of agricultural trade. 
Breakthroughs were made in all three areas of agricultural support and 
protection, namely, domestic support, market access and export subsidies. 
With reference to the first of these achievements, contracting parties from 
the developed world are committed to a 20% reduction in total Aggregate 
Measurement of Support, over 6 years, using Fixed External Reference 
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Prices from 1986-88. `s A notable exception to this ruling is the case of 
direct payments made under production limitation programmes 
- 
such as 
the EU's post-Macsharry compensation payments and the deficiency 
payments used in the US since the 1970s. 
However, perhaps the most significant achievements of the Round 
occurred in the area of market access requirements. The Agricultural 
Agreement brings the agricultural sector in line with the industrial sector 
by 'outlawing' all forms of protection other than tariffs. Indeed, the 
Agreement states that no new non-tariff barriers are to be created, whilst 
all existing non-tariff barriers are to be converted into tariffs. All base 
period tariffs (including converted NTBs) are then to be reduced by an 
unweighted average of 36%, over 6 years, after which time all tariffs will 
be bound. "' In addition, market access is enhanced by the minimum access 
provisions 
- 
3% rising to 5% of domestic consumption in the base period. 
This provision is operationalised via tariff quotas, whereby within-quota 
tariffs are set at a low level (32% of the basic tariff in the EU). As stated 
by Ingersent, Rayner and Hine (1995), countries do not have to ensure that 
the level of imports meets the minimum access level, merely that they are 
capable of doing so, given the required access opportunities. 
A significant feature of the market access provisions is Article 5 of the 
Agricultural Agreement, which provides special safeguards in the event of 
an exceptionally high volume of imports, or an unusually large fall in 
import prices. Should either eventuality arise, and the volume or the price 
of imports reaches a'trigger' level, then the contracting party is entitled to 
raise normal tariffs by an additional duty. The size of this duty is 
proportional in size to the difference between the volume or price of 
15 This reduction is 13.3% of total AMS for developing countries, whilst those nations 
classed as 'least developed' are not required to make any reduction. 
16 In addition, a key result of the Blair House Agreement (November 1992) between the 
US and the EU, was to allow the EU's tariff equivalent calculations to include a 10% 
Community Preference margin. 
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imports, and the level of the trigger. However, as Ingersent, Rayner and 
Hine (1995) point out, the operation of this special safeguard is not 
equivalent to a variable import levy, since the additional duty does not 
fully compensate for the increase in volume, or the fall in price, of imports. 
Nevertheless, the overuse of this provision could, at least in theory, 
seriously hinder the tariff reduction process. 
The final area of reform concerns the use of export subsidies. Article XVI 
of the General Agreement made the use of such subsidies 'illegal' 
- 
with 
the exception of the agricultural sector. However, following the Uruguay 
Round, agricultural export subsidies still receive differential treatment 
relative to other sectors, but are now to be reduced by 36% (relative to 
1986-90 levels) over a6 year period. In addition, the actual volume of 
subsidised exports is to be reduced by 21%. " As Tangermann (1994) 
notes, a key effect of the Agriculture Agreement on export subsidies is to 
redefine the term 'equitable market share', as referred to in Article XVI: 3 
of the GATT, as the actual market share which prevailed in the base 
period, 1986-90. 
With regard to industrial sector tariff liberalisation, a key achievement of 
the Uruguay Round was a significant increase in the number of tariff 
bindings. Prior to the Uruguay Round developing countries had received 
special treatment allowing them not to offer concessions at negotiating 
rounds. However, the Uruguay Round aimed to limit this differential 
treatment and the formation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
committed all members to submit tariff schedules. This was not required 
under GATT rules. Whilst the product coverage of these schedules for 
developing countries is not stipulated by the WTO, Table 4 below clearly 
17 For the developing countries export subsidies are to be reduced by 24%, the volume of 
subsidised exports by 14%, and the transition period is 10 years. 'Least developed' 
nations are exempt from such commitments. 
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illustrates that the extent of tariff bindings increased significantly as a 
result of the Uruguay Round. 
Table 4. Tariff bindings for industrial products (excludinguetroleum 
before and after the Urug uay Round. '8 
Type of no. of import % of tariff % of imports 
economy lines value lines bound under bound 
or region (US $bn) rates 
Economies: Pre- Post- Pre- Post- 
developed 86,968 737.2 78 99 94 99 
developing 157,805 306.2 22 72 14 59 
transition 18,962 34.7 73 98 74 96 
Regions: 
N. America 14,138 325.7 99 100 99 100 
S. &C. America 64,136 40.4 38 100 57 100 
W. Europe 57,851 239.9 79 82 98 98 
C. Europe 23,565 38.1 63 98 68 97 
Asia 82,545 415.4 17 67 36 70 
As has already been mentioned, a notable feature of the Uruguay Round 
was its extension to cover three new areas; trade in services, trade-related 
intellectual property, and trade-related investment measures. By 1994 
trade in services accounted for approximately 20% of global trade 
(European Commission (1994)) and hence pressure had been mounting to 
bring the sector under the umbrella of the GATT. The General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS) therefore introduces the principle of non- 
disrimination to trade in services, through the most-favoured nation and 
national treatment rules. Exemptions to the most-favoured nation rule will, 
however, be granted in specific circumstances. In addition, Hoekman and 
'$ The data cover 26 developing economies and account for four-fifths of total 
merchandise imports of all developing country participants in the Uruguay Round. 
Source: GATT (1994). 
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Kostecki (1995) outline certain market access obligations which members 
undertake. Specifically there are limits on; the number of service suppliers 
allowed; the value of transactions or assets; the total quantity of service 
output; the number of natural persons that may be employed; the type of 
legal entity through which a service supplier is permitted to supply a 
service; and the extent of foreign shareholding. Finally, the GATS also 
addresses issues such as domestic regulation, transparency and the 
behaviour of public monopolies. 
With regard to trade-related intellectual property (TRIPs), the trade in 
goods containing intellectual propertyhas increased substantially in recent 
years and so too has dissatisfaction with the existing intellectual property 
regulations. 19 Industrialised nations generally felt that inadequate 
protection of intellectual property was eroding the competitive advantage 
of their industry, and in particular the high-technology sector. The 
negotiations often proved arduous, however, as many developing nations 
expressed the concern that a strengthening of intellectual property rights 
would increase the monopoly power of multinational companies and also 
have the effect of raising the price of medicines and food. Nevertheless, as 
the European Commission (1994) point out, the Uruguay Round will 
strengthen intellectual property rights in a number of areas; there will be 
stronger protection of trade marks; industrial designs will receive more 
protection and especially the products of the textile and clothing industry; 
patent protection will be introduced in all countries for pharmaceutical and 
chemical products; and new rules will prohibit the incorrect use of 
geographical appellations. Finally, the establishment of a clear set of 
principles will ensure that intellectual property rights will be enforced 
through national courts. 
19 Hoekman and Kostecki define intellectual property as "information with a market 
value". (Hoekman and Kostecki (1995) p. 144. ) 
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The third and final new area which GATT rules have been extended to 
cover is trade-related investment measures (TRIMs). The TRIMs 
agreement generally aims to clarify the rules concerning such investment 
measures and to provide a framework for future actions. Many measures 
have been declared non-permissible and must be phased out over a two-to- 
seven year period, depending upon the stage of economic development of 
the country concerned. 
Turning now to environmental considerations, the Uruguay Round 
extended the scope of the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement 
by relating it to processes and production methods. Article 2 of the TBT 
Agreement states that "technical regulations shall not be more trade 
restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective", with one such 
legitimate objective being "the protection of human health or safety, 
animal or plant life or health, or the environment. " Article 2 goes on to 
state that "relevant elements of consideration are 
.... 
available scientific 
and technical information, related processing technology or intended end- 
uses of products. " As already stated, it appears that the post-Tokyo Round 
TBT Agreement applied only to the actual product, with no consideration 
of how it was produced. Now, such processes and production methods are 
covered by the agreement providing they leave a trace in the final 
product. 2° If, for example, the production of a good leaves traces of a 
banned chemical in the final product, the importation of this final product 
may be prevented even if it is not in itself made from the chemical 
concerned 
- 
providing it is judged that a less trade restrictive solution is 
not available. However, the Agreement states that all standards set must be 
considered to be proportional to the problem they are trying to solve. 
The Uruguay Round also contains other environmental provisions. The 
Agreement on Agriculture allows direct payments under environmental 
20 This point was clarified by personal correspondence with Steve Charnovitz. 
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programmes (subject to conditions) and makes them exempt from WTO 
members' commitments to reduce domestic support for agricultural 
production. Secondly, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures treats government assistance to industry, to cover up to 20% of 
the cost of meeting environmental legislation, as a non-actionable subsidy. 
The Uruguay Round's Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures bears a strong resemblance to the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade and is specifically concerned with food safety 
and animal and plant health regulations. The Agreement is designed to 
prevent the use of such regulations as a means of covert protectionism and 
encourages greater transparency. In addition the use of international 
standards and thus harmonisation are advocated based on the 
recommendations of a number of international scientific organisations. 
Finally, the Agreement provides for the World Trade Organisation to 
establish a Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures to 
generally oversee the realisation of the above objectives. 
A key achievement of the Uruguay Round was indeed the development of 
the World Trade Organisation. The WTO is not intended as a successor to 
the GATT 1947, but is a new organisation for all those prepared to accept 
the entire Uruguay Round Agreement. As an organisation, it therefore 
oversees the functioning of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994, as it relates to trade in goods, the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services and the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property. As the 
European Commission point out, the creation of the WTO should 
introduce more certainty into the international trading system due to the 
fact that to be a member of the WTO, a country must have signed the 
entire Uruguay Round Agreement, thereby making its exact obligations 
known. Those countries who do not accept the entire agreement will 
remain within the old GATT framework which will be frozen in its pre- 
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Uruguay Round situation. In the preamble of the Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organisation it is claimed that the WTO recognises that 
"relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be 
conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full 
employment, and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and 
effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and 
services, while allowing for the optimal use of the worlds resources in 
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to 
protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing 
so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at 
different levels of economic development. "
Additionally, although the main text contains no reference to a trade and 
environment committee, Annex III. 11 of the final act states that "the first 
meeting of the General Council of the WTO is to establish a Committee on 
Trade and the Environment. "21 Appendix D provides a timetable for 
further WTO negotiations. The remit of the Committee will include; 
an examination of the relationship between trade measures and 
environmental measures in promoting sustainable development, and the 
need for rules to enhance that positive interaction; 
- 
an examination of the relationship between the multilateral trading 
system and trade measures used for environmental purposes, including 
those in multilateral environmental agreements; 
- 
an examination of the relationship between the multilateral trading 
system and environmental measures with significant effects on trade; and 
21 As the European Commission (1994) states, a trade and environment committe "was 
resisted by developing countries worried about hidden protectionism and the lack of 
clarity over the form or powers of such a committee. " (European Commission (1994) 
p. 28). 
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- 
an examination of the environmental effects of trade liberalisation. 
(From Anderson (1995) p. 15). 
The creation of the WTO sees the institution transformed into a global 
organisation with the same status as the World Bank or IMF. Most 
decision making will still result from negotiation and consensus between 
the Members, although the WTO has been strengthened relative to the 
GATT, particularly with regard to dispute settlement whereby it is now 
more difficult for the parties to a dispute to block the process. The WTO is 
headed by a Ministerial Conference of all Members which will meet at 
least once every two years. 22 Furthermore, it is intended that trade 
ministers will enjoy greater participation in the WTO's activities, thereby 
boosting its international standing and enhancing its credibility in 
domestic political arenas (Hoekman and Kostecki (1995)). The WTO is 
managed by the General Council in which each member can participate. 
This strengthened WTO may well result in a more rigorous and efficient 
enforcement of trade rules, perhaps hastening the process of trade 
liberalisation. The formation of the WTO sees the original goal of the 
Bretton Woods conference of 1944 come to fruition, and allows world 
trade matters to be dealt with in a manner as prominent and authoritative 
as global monetary and banking issues have been dealt with by the IMF 
and World Bank. 
2.5.5 Post-Uruguay Round. 
The Committee on Trade and the Environment (CTE) was formally 
established on Ist January 1995, with the implementation of the WTO 
Agreement. On 8th November 1995 the CTE adopted a Report which was 
then forwarded through the General Council to Ministers at the 1996 
u By early 1995 there were 128 members of the GATT/WTO. These are listed in 
Appendix E, together with the date of each country's accession to the GATT. 
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Ministerial Conference in Singapore. A number of issues are contained in 
the CTE's work programme, as laid out in the Report. 
One issue to be addressed is the relationship between WTO provisions and 
trade measures contained in multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs), an issue discussed in Chapter 3. Discussions on this subject have 
confirmed that the WTO prefers members to tackle transboundary or 
global environmental problems via such multilateral agreements and that 
unilateral action is to be avoided. The CTE Report notes that trade 
measures are often not the most appropriate or the most effective policy 
instrument, but admits that they can play an important role. Also noted is 
the fact that few MEAs contain trade measures and no conflict of this 
nature has yet arisen under the WTO. Nevertheless, the potential is there. 
Several policies have been discussed to make MEA trade measures 
compatible with the WTO, including the creation of an 'environmental 
window' to allow discriminatory trade measures against non-signatories to 
MEAs. As yet, this proposal has not received consensus support in the 
CTE. 
Also discussed is the appropriate dispute settlement procedure were a 
dispute between an MEA and the WTO to arise. The WTO states that in 
the first instance a dispute of this nature should attempt to be settled under 
the dispute settlement mechanisms contained within the MEA. If the 
dispute concerns a non-signatory to the MEA, then settlement would occur 
under the WTO. 
A further issue addressed by the CTE Report relates to the export of 
domestically prohibited goods. Concern was expressed in the mid-1980s 
by developing country GATT contracting parties, that hazardous 
substances were being exported to them without them knowing the 
dangers or the implications of receiving such substances. Since then the 
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Basil Convention has been established to deal with trade in hazardous 
substances and the WTO has made it clear that it does not wish to 
duplicate the work of the Convention. In the CTE Report WTO members 
agree to support the provisions of the Basil Convention, and it is noted that 
the WTO may be able to pursue a role which is complementary to the 
Convention. This role is to be investigated by the WTO. 
In May 1997 a WTO Symposium with non-governmental oganisations 
was held on the subject of trade, environment and sustainable 
development. The aim of the Symposium was to undertake constructive 
dialogue between representatives of WTO member governments and 
business, development and environmental organisations. Topics discussed 
were mostly quite general although specific details were discussed with 
regard to the relationship between WTO rules and MEAs. Some 
representatives proposed amending GATT Article XX, including adding 
the term 'the environment' to Article XX(b) or allowing exceptions for 
trade measures taken in accordance with MEAs. Also suggested was the 
reversal of the burden of proof so that a trade measure in support of an 
MEA was considered acceptable unless a complainant proved otherwise. 
The relationship between WTO rules and the Convention on Biodiversity 
and was also discussed and it was noted that more work was needed to 
understand the full linkages between the two. 
Whilst the non-governmental organisations welcomed the opportunity to 
interact with the WTO, little constructive progress would appear to have 
been made, with no attempt made to summarise views or identify 
consensus positions, throughout the Symposium. 
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2.6 Conclusion. 
To summarise, the GATT has achieved a considerable degree of success in 
its efforts to reduce the both the size and number of tariffs in international 
trade. This success has even been extended to the developing world as a 
result of the Uruguay Round. With regard to the agricultural sector, until 
the Uruguay Round, little progress had been made in terms of agricultural 
trade liberalisation, with non-tariff barriers still widely in use. However, as 
a result of the Uruguay Round agricultural protection is being reduced, and 
so too is the differential treatment received by the agricultural sector 
relative to the industrial sector. There is, though, a long way to go. 
Concerning the prospect of further agricultural trade liberalisation, this 
would seem to depend largely on the success achieved in reforming 
domestic agricultural policy. According to Ingersent, Rayner and Hine 
(1995), this reform should aim to replace price support with direct income 
support whilst at the same time decoupling this income support from the 
level of current production. It is extremely likely that agricultural trade 
reform will take a prominent role in the next round of GATT talks. 
The GATT's provisions for the protection of the environment are minimal 
and there has been little progress since the GATT's inception. Perhaps the 
most significant development in this area is the fact that the new WTO at 
least recognises the need to preserve the environment, something the old 
GATT did not. Nevertheless, the creation of the WTO and the Committee 
on Trade and the Environment does represent a step in the right direction. 
However, the CTE and the Symposium with non-governmental 
organisations have yet to deliver any concrete results despite addressing 
the key issues. It therefore remains to be seen whether the new WTO will 
deal with the issue of the environment more effectively than the old 
GATT. 
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Chapter 3 analyses the impact of the GATT/WTO's treatment of the 
environment. 
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CHAPTER 3. 
TRADE LIBERALISATION, GATT/ WTO AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT. 
3.1 Introduction. 
The extent of the environmental concern arising from the formation of 
NAFTA, together with GATT's 'tuna-dolphin' decision, has meant that 
many environmentalists view proponents of free trade with deep rooted 
suspicion. Esty (1994) claims that the environmental case against free 
trade can be reduced to four essential points: Firstly, by promoting 
economic growth, trade may damage the environment through the 
unsustainable use of natural resources and pollution emissions that 
threaten the earth's assimilative capacity. Secondly, international 
environmental agreements may contain trade measures which are illegal 
under GATTIWTO rules, whilst the market access provisions associated 
with most trade agreements may, to some extent, limit the ability of 
nations to implement domestic environmental regulations. Thirdly, 
countries operating low environmental standards may have a competitive 
advantage over those countries with higher standards, thus creating 
pressure to lower standards. Finally, free trade, as it is being implemented 
through the GATT/WTO, may prevent nations from using trade 
restrictions to protect their environment. 
The suspicion displayed by environmentalists towards advocates of free 
trade is not one-sided, however, and free traders also view the 
environmental lobby with distrust. Whilst pointing to the potential 
environmental benefits of free trade, free traders also stress their fears of a 
growth of 'green' protectionism designed to prevent environmentally 
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harmful goods from entering a country and which can also be used as 
leverage to encourage other nations to comply with environmental 
agreements. Since environmental regulation is a potential vote-winning 
issue, the concern of free traders is that governments will find it politically 
difficult to refuse to implement such protection, and as a result, the 
efficiency gains from world trade will be reduced. Furthermore, it is feared 
that nations may shield domestic markets from the competitive force of the 
world economy by using protectionism in the guise of environmental 
measures. Advocates of free trade draw support from economic theory, 
and particularly the theory of optimal intervention, which suggests that it 
is not trade per se that damages the environment, but rather that the 
environment is harmed when trade occurs in the presence of externalities. 
As a result, free traders argue that the optimal solution to the problem is 
not to alter the global trade regime, but to tackle the externalities directly. 
Clearly, the potential for future conflict between the pro-trade and the pro- 
environment lobbies is considerable. The arguments advanced by each 
side of the debate will now be analysed in more detail. 
3.2 Trade and the Environment 
The traditional economic approach to the trade-environment relationship 
states that it is not trade per se that damages the environment, but rather, it 
is when trade occurs in the presence of market and government failures, 
or externalities, that the environment is harmed. Although market and 
governmental failures are interrelated, and are exacerbated by uncertainty 
and lack of information, it is nevertheless useful to distinguish between 
them. 
Market failures occur when the market fails to properly value and allocate 
environmental goods, with the result that prices do not cover the full social 
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cost of production. ' The OECD (1994) outline three causes of market 
failure. Firstly, if environmental costs such as pollution damage are not 
included in the prices of goods and services, then such costs have been 
externalised and are hence neglected by the market. Secondly, market 
failure can also occur if markets fail to take into account the total 
economic value which society places on environmental assets, where total 
economic value typically consists of the use value, option value and 
existence value associated with an asset? Finally, the lack of property 
rights for environmental assets can also lead to market failure. If property 
rights cannot be defined then it is likely that the resource will be treated as 
if it were 'free', thus leading to the over-consumption of the asset. A 
common fourth cause of market failure, not discussed by the OECD, is the 
case where markets do not exist even when property rights are defined, 
such as the case of capital markets in less developed countries., 
Government failures occur when government policy creates, exacerbates 
or simply fails to remove, market failures. An example would be the EU's 
Common Agricultural Policy, as already mentioned. The design of 
government policy is often heavily influenced by producer interest groups 
and political factors with the result that the attainment of economic 
efficiency is not the prime motivation behind such policy. As a result, 
government, or intervention, failures are prevalent. 
1 The social costs of production consist of private costs (e. g. wages, rent etc. ) plus 
external costs (e. g. pollution). When prices only cover the private cost, they do not cover 
the full cost of production and as a result an externality is said to exist. 
2 Use values derive from the actual use of an environmental asset, for example, the 
revenue obtained by selling timber grown in a forest would constitute part of the use 
value of that forest. Option values reflect our preference to use an environmental asset in 
the future. An asset may not be used at present, but it is still valued since it provides the 
opportunity for use at a later date. An existence value is a value which does not derive 
from the use of an asset. It expresses the value attached to an asset simply because that 
asset exists. For example, the vast majority of people do not derive any use from 
Antarctica, but would still value it simply for its existence. Finally, bequest value is often 
included in total economic value and can represent either a use or non-use value. Bequest 
value represents the value placed on an environmental asset as a bequest for future 
generations. It therefore constitutes a future use or non-use value for our descendants. 
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This traditional approach to the trade-environment relationship which sees 
environmental damage as resulting from the existence of externalities and 
not from trade itself, states that the 'first best' solution to environmental 
problems is not to alter the system of world trade but, instead, to tackle the 
externalities directly. Indeed, economists generally believe that such 
externalities should be internalised, that is, prices should be made to cover 
both private and social costs. As an example, consider the pollution 
produced by a coal mining company in the process of extracting coal. If 
the price of coal does not reflect this pollution, then society pays for these 
costs, for example through increased hospital bills due to pollution 
induced asthma. The internalisation of social costs, and the `polluter pays' 
principle on which it is based, means that the producers of coal have to 
pay these costs, since it is they who caused them. Furthermore, if social 
costs are fully internalised, consumers decrease consumption of higher 
priced environmentally damaging goods, instead switching to cheaper, 
environmentally cleaner goods, thus reinforcing the principle of 
internalisation. 
A distinction has to be drawn, however, between externalities which are 
global in nature and those which are merely local. Externalities which 
affect only the immediate environment in which they occur are known as 
local externalities, an example of which would be noise pollution. At the 
other extreme are global environmental problems, such as ozone depletion 
or the greenhouse effect. Externalities of this kind are generally known as 
global, or pervasive, externalities. This distinction between the two is of 
relevance to the process of intemalisation. The internalisation of a local 
externality requires the national government to tax, for example, the 
i 
emissions of the guilty firm. Since the externality is local, it should prove 
relatively straightforward to identify the affected parties and to estimate 
the level of taxation necessary to internalise the external cost of the 
pollution. Whilst this process can prove far more difficult in reality, this 
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difficulty pales into insignificance compared to that encountered when 
trying to internalise a global externality. As Runge (1994) notes, when 
externalities are global in nature, their internalisation would result in 
extremely high implementation and enforcement costs and matters of 
jurisdiction and sovereignty also have to be considered. Daly (1989) asks 
us to consider the problems that would be encountered when trying to 
arrive at the level of taxation necessary to internalise the greenhouse 
effect. Whilst the physical effects of the build up of greenhouse gases are 
themselves uncertain, placing a monetary value on the associated 
economic losses is subject to even greater uncertainty, and would require a 
calculation that involves a large degree of guesswork. As Runge states, "In 
short, it is far easier to recommend that environmental externalities be 
'internalised' than it is to implement and enforce internalisation. " (Runge 
(1994) p. 26). 
3.3 How Trade Liberalisation May Help the Environment. 
The perceived benefits of free trade stem from the fact that it allows 
individuals and nations to specialize in those sectors in which they are 
relatively more efficient. Adam Smith is generally seen as the originator of 
this viewpoint, although it is David Ricardo who is associated with the 
principle of comparative advantage itself. Writing in 1817, Ricardo sums 
up the theoretical argument for free trade; 
"Under a system of perfectly free (international) commerce, each country 
naturally devotes its capital and labour to such employments as are most 
beneficial to each. This pursuit of individual advantage is admirably 
connected with the universal good of the whole. By stimulating industry, by 
rewarding ingenuity, and by using most efficaciously the peculiar powers 
bestowed by nature, it distributes labour most effectively and most 
economically: while, by increasing the general mass of productions, it 
diffuses general benefit, and binds together, by one common tie of interest 
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and intercourse, the universal society of nations throughout the civilised 
world. " (Ricardo (1973) p. 81). 
In a fully liberälised global trade regime resources will be allocated to the 
least-cost and highest return production activities thus ensuring that 
production occurs in the most efficient manner possible. This obviously 
implies that natural resource use will also be efficient, thus minimising the 
quantity of input needed per unit of output, and thereby also keeping 
associated wastes to a minimum. Furthermore, as the OECD (1994) point 
out, if trade maximises allocative efficiency in this manner, then economic 
activity should be allocated in accordance with the environmental 
capacities and conditions of different countries, thus, theoretically, 
keeping environmental stress to a minimum. However, as Hudson (1992) 
argues, free trade will only efficiently allocate natural resources if 
environmental externalities are fully internalised. Clearly, this is not the 
case, and it is uncertain whether policy should proceed as if all external 
costs were internalised. 
A related issue is the environmental impact of the composition effect 
associated with trade liberalisation. After trade liberalisation, countries 
will specialise to a greater extent in those sectors in which they possess a 
comparative advantage. As Grossman and Krueger (1993) point out, if 
comparative advantage arises due to differences in factor abundance and 
technology, each country will shift resources into sectors which make 
intensive use of these factors. The resultant impact on the environment is 
difficult to predict and will depend on whether pollution intensive 
activities expand in those countries with greater pollution legislation. 
However, if comparative advantage arises due to differences in 
environmental legislation, then the composition effect associated with 
trade liberalisation is likely to prove detrimental to the environment as 
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countries will specialise in those sectors in which their own environmental 
legislation is weakest. 
Liberalised trade should, however, enable nations to overcome resource 
constraints which may previously have limited their growth potential. As 
the scale of economic activity expands, then so too do the financial 
resources available to protect the environment. Indeed, there is evidence 
that increases in income are essential if the developing world is to improve 
the quality of the environment. Voigt (1993) states that the environmental 
problems currently facing Mexico can all be traced to a common source, 
"That source is the lack of economic resources available to adequately 
control the environmental effects of development in the border region. " 
(Voigt (1993) p. 329). Thus, by raising the level of national income 
through economic growth, trade can facilitate environmental 
improvements at both the level of the firm and at the level of government. 
A further means by which trade liberalisation may benefit the environment 
is through the exchange of environmentally clean products, services and 
technologies. According to the OECD (1994), the worldwide market for 
environmental equipment and services is valued at $200 billion and 
growing at a rate of 5.5% per year. If trade allows this market to expand, 
then countries will have greater access to both ecologically cleaner 
products and resource efficient production methods, thereby ensuring that 
their own future production will be environmentally improved. Thus, 
output may not be produced in the same manner following trade 
liberalisation. This so-called technique effect may also arise as a result of 
the increase in incomes associated with trade liberalisation. As incomes 
grow and more basic needs are met, individuals may start to demand a 
cleaner environment. This suggestion, that the environment may be 
considered a luxury good, implies that governments may have to respond 
to these increased demands by increasing legislation and generally 
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ensuring that output occurs in a manner which is more beneficial to the 
environment. 
Finally, trade liberalisation will remove many trade-distorting policy 
measures which, themselves, have proved to be environmentally 
damaging. The very existence of such measures means that resources are 
not being allocated as efficiently as they could be, and thus both the 
location and intensity of technology, production and consumption are 
distorted. An example of protection of this nature is the EU's Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). The CAP's system of guaranteeing prices to 
farmers has resulted in increasingly intensive production methods and 
considerable overproduction of foodstuffs. 3 For example, Friends of the 
Earth (1992) estimated that there were 25 million tonnes of surplus cereals 
and over 800,000 tonnes of beef in storage in the EU in 1992. 
Furthermore, Friends of the Earth also state that in 1990 the EU spent nine 
billion pounds just disposing of and destroying this surplus production. 
The removal of a system of this nature would at least mean that there is no 
incentive to produce quantities which are considerably in excess of the 
market's requirements. 
The above arguments are typically advanced by advocates of free trade in 
response to claims that the impact of trade liberalisation on the 
environment is likely to be of a pernicious nature. The foundation behind 
such claims will now be considered. 
3 The CAP provides an incentive for farmers to produce as much as possible with the 
resultant environmental impact stemming from the removal of hedgerows and the 
increased use of artificial inputs, for example. 
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3.4 How Trade Liberalisation May Damage the Environment. 
3.4.1 Trade Liberalisation and Economic Growth. 
The prevalence of externalities, due in part to the difficulty of 
internalisation, means that trade liberalisation may exacerbate 
environmental damage. One reason for this is the scale effect associated 
with free trade. It was stated above that perfectly free trade will ensure that 
resources are utilized in the most efficient manner possible, thus 
minimising inputs per unit of output. Indeed, this is the case in a static 
framework. However, once we enter a dynamic framework then it is likely 
that liberalised trade will lead to an expansion of markets and hence 
economic growth. The increase in income associated with such growth 
may mean that nations now find themselves with greater resources to 
protect the environment, but the environmental impact of such an 
expansion in the scale of production may be considerable. This 
relationship between economic growth and the environment is analysed in 
detail in the next three chapters. 
However, one way in which trade liberalisation, and the resultant increase 
in the volume of world trade, directly affects the environment is through 
increased product transportation. Madeley (1992) has estimated that the 
transport involved in international trade already accounts for one eighth of 
world oil consumption. Pearce (1992) states that this is likely to worsen 
since the EU's Single Market is predicted to increase transfrontier lorry 
traffic by 30-50%. As long as fuel prices continue to externalise most 
environmental costs, product transportation will continue to expand, 
further damaging the environment. Clearly, as international markets 
expand as a result of trade liberalisation, the environmental impact of the 
resultant increase in transportation looks set to become an issue which 
receives increasing attention. 
52 
3.4.2 The Ability to Implement Environmental Regulations. 
An additional charge which environmentalists often level against 
advocates of free trade is that trade liberalisation limits the ability of 
nations to protect the environment, irrespective of whether the nations are 
operating in a unilateral or multilateral capacity. The abatement of global 
externalities has generally necessitated a multilateral response in the form 
of international agreements such as the Montreal Protocol (1987). A 
potential problem from the GATT/WTO point of view however, is that 
many agreements of this kind contain trade-based enforcement 
mechanisms to prevent free riders from undermining the effectiveness of 
the agreements 
.4 For example, the Montreal Protocol, which aims to 
protect the ozone layer by reducing the use of CFCs, forbids its signatories 
from trading with nonsignatories in products containing CFCs. 5 
Furthermore, as Pearce points out, the agreement also commits signatories 
to ban the trade of products made with CFCs, but not actually containing 
them. This is clearly a trade restriction due to the existence of a production 
externality and, as will be seen below, would therefore appear 
incompatible with GATT/WTO. It has been suggested, however, that trade 
restrictions to enforce compliance are fully justified since those nations 
who fail to sign the treaty would otherwise effectively obtain a 
competitive advantage by continuing to use CFCs rather than adopting 
more expensive alternatives (Esty (1994), Reinstein (1991) ). 
It is clear that if nations are signatories to both the GATT/WTO and the 
Montreal Protocol, then they are likely to be subject to conflicting 
4 Examples of other international environmental agreements which contain the threat of 
trade restrictions are the Basel Convention which regulates the trade of hazardous waste, 
and the CITES agreement on trade in endangered species. 
5 Hudson (1992) provides the example of South Korea, which is a party to the GATT but 
has not signed the Montreal Protocol. For several years South Korea has been expected to 
challenge the Montreal Protocol as illegal under GATT rules. 
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obligations. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) states 
that the obligations of whichever treaty is 'later in time' should prevail 
- 
providing the two treaties address the same subject matter, and providing 
that the later treaty does not specifically abrogate the earlier treaty. Whilst 
it could be reasonably argued that the two treaties are not concerned with 
the same subject matter, other potential problems arise. First, the GATT is 
technically not a treaty and, even if it is, it is not clear whether the creation 
of the World Trade Organisation makes this more recent than the Montreal 
Protocol. Furthermore, as Runge points out, Article 34 of the Vienna 
Convention states that even if the agreement is later in time it cannot bind 
a nonsignatory nation without their consent, unless the agreement becomes 
customary international law, 
At the time of the Montreal Protocol's signing it was felt that the 
agreement was GATT-consistent, due to the headnote to GATT Article 
XX. This states that exceptions to the GATT's rules are allowed providing 
that "such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail..... " (GATT Article XX from Pearce (1992)). 
Emphasis added). It was believed at the time (1987) that conditions in 
nonsignatory nations were different to those of signatory nations and thus 
trade restrictions were allowed. However, even if this is indeed the case, 
Esty suggests that it is unlikely that the GATT/WTO would dispute the 
imposition of a trade restriction if it were in response to a widely 
supported international environmental agreement. This is obviously far 
from certain, though, and the fact remains that the use of trade restrictions 
in support of such an agreement is illegal under GATT/WTO rules. 
As stated in Chapter 2, however, the issue of the relationship between the 
WTO and multilateral environmental agreements is now beginning to be 
discussed by the Committee on Trade and the Environment and was also 
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addressed by the Symposium on Trade, Environment and Sustainable 
Development. The outcomes of these discussions remain to be seen. 
This threat to international environmental agreements is another reason 
why environmentalists claim that trade liberalisation through the 
GATT/WTO is environmentally damaging. However, many also claim 
that the GATT/WTO limits the implementation of environmental 
legislation at a national level. In particular, it is feared that enforced 
market access agreements will have the effect of harmonising 
environmental standards at the lowest common denominator, thus 
preventing nations from implementing stricter standards, or from 
restricting the importation of environmentally harmful goods. In response, 
free traders fear the growth of 'green protectionism' and claim that, in 
actuality, the GATT/WTO does provide considerable scope for the 
protection of a nation's environment. Indeed, it is argued below that the 
existence of an externality which arises when the imported good is 
consumed (a consumption externality) is a legitimate reason for a trade 
restriction, providing certain conditions are met. However, 
environmentalists criticise GATT/WTO for its failure to allow trade 
restrictions in order to remove those externalities which arise during the 
production of the good in the exporting country (production externalities). 
This inability of nations to distinguish between 'like products', even if they 
have very different production methods, is very difficult to justify on 
environmental grounds. Indeed, environmentalists therefore claim that, by 
forbidding the restriction of imports in response to a product's method of 
production, the GATT/WTO is clearly failing to recognise the 
transnational nature of many of today's environmental problems. 
With regard to the harmonisation of standards, the post-Uruguay Round 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Code and the Technical Barriers to Trade 
Agreement both clearly state that nations should aim to comply with 
common standards. 6 Many environmentalists object to this notion of 
harmonisation, however, fearing a loss of sovereignty as nations lose 
control of their environmental regulations and standards fall to the 
baseline level. Interestingly, those in favour of trade liberalisation are not 
united in their support for harmonisation either. One claim is that 
harmonised standards will remove the comparative advantage that nations 
possess due to their high assimilative capacity (Rauscher (1994)). 7 
Alternatively, Nordhaus (1994) assesses whether the harmonisation of 
environmental policies is compatible with the goal of economic efficiency, 
and distinguishes between policies aimed at global externalities, and those 
aimed at local environmental issues. Using standard neoclassical analysis, 
Nordhaus argues that by treating global environmental problems as traded 
goods which will display price equalisation, economic efficiency requires 
that nations should harmonise their environmental regulations (see 
Appendix F, diagram 1). The reasoning behind this assertion is that if 
pollution is global, then the marginal benefits of emissions reductions are 
equal across regions (country 1 and country 2 face the same marginal 
benefit curve), whilst the marginal abatement costs are likely to vary. 
Abatement of emissions should occur up to the point where the marginal 
benefit of this abatement, in each region, is equal to the marginal cost. By 
setting the same tax level per unit of emissions (T*), both nations can 
equate their marginal benefit and marginal cost 
- 
hence harmonization. It 
should be noted that, for Nordhaus, harmonisation refers to all nations 
setting the same level of taxation per unit of emission and not the use of 
harmonized quantitative standards which, for example, force both nations 
to reduce a pollutant by a given percentage. 8 Indeed, if the level of 
6 See the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Code paragraph 9 and the Technical Barriers to 
Trade Agreement Article 2: 4. 
7 The assimilative capacity is the ability, or capacity, of the environment to break down 
waste and pollution. This capacity will vary from region to region due to differences in 
climate, topography etc. 
8 It can be shown that emissions fees or marketable permits are both least-cost ways of 
achieving a given level of emissions reduction and are hence more efficient than the use 
of quantitative standards (Pearce and Turner (1990)). 
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taxation is equated both nations will reduce emissions by a different 
amount, but this will be the optimal amount for each nation, and is hence 
efficient. With regard to local externalities, Nordhaus treats them as non- 
traded goods and thus their prices will vary across regions (see Appendix 
F, diagram 2). Since both marginal benefits and marginal costs now vary, 
economic efficiency requires that each region sets a different level of 
taxation (Ti for country 1 and T2 for country 2). The intuition behind this 
result is that some countries, e. g. low income countries, have higher 
abatement costs than others, whilst having lower levels of environmental 
damage. In terms of efficiency, a nation of this nature should have a lower 
level of emissions reduction and a lower pollution tax, than other 
countries. Thus, to summarise Nordhaus's conclusions, environmental 
policies (emissions fees or marketable permits, but generally not 
quantitative standards) designed to address global environmental problems 
should be harmonised across regions. On the other hand, policies to tackle 
local environmental externalities should not be harmonised (emissions 
fees, marketable permits or standards). 
It should be pointed out that Nordhaus's recommendations stem purely 
from his aim to attain economic efficiency. In reality, however, economic 
efficiency is just one of a number of criteria on which policy decisions are 
made, with the issue of equity being of great importance. It is therefore 
unlikely that policy recommendations made on economic efficiency 
grounds alone would ever come to fruition. Indeed, it could be expected 
that Nordhaus's recommendations would experience significant 
opposition, not least from lobby groups and developing country 
governments, if they resulted in the implementation of a global uniform 
carbon tax, for example. In reality, complex negotiations, particularly 
between developed and developing countries, are likely to be required if 
such a policy is to be implemented. 
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It is interesting to note however, that complete harmonisation of 
environmental standards is considered by some to be necessary to obtain 
economic efficiency. For example, Esty notes, 
"If... every nation and all their political subdivisions have complete 
autonomy to set their own radically different environmental standards, trade 
could grind to a halt. Inconsistent production, testing, labelling, packaging, 
and disposal requirements could become serious trade barriers, reducing the 
opportunities to achieve scale economies and gain market access 
- 
economic virtues that translate into broader product choice, better service 
and lower prices for consumers. " (Esty (1994) p. 173). 
It does not, therefore, appear that the harmonisation of only global 
environmental policies is accepted by all as compatible with the goal of 
economic efficiency. 
To summarise, it is clear that GATT/WTO based trade liberalisation has 
the potential to hinder the implementation of international environmental 
agreements, where such agreements include the threat of trade restrictions. 
With regard to national environmental legislation, it would appear that the 
Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement of the GATT/WTO seeks to 
harmonise all national environmental standards. However, as stated above, 
from an economic point of view Nordhaus does not believe this to be 
sensible. Such a policy may also be unwise from an environmental point 
of view, since standards aimed at local environmental issues are generally 
ill-suited to harmonisation and may be dealt with more effectively at a 
national level. This point is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8. The 
above clearly illustrates that, in the absence of the necessary 
environmental amendments to the GATT/WTO, trade liberalisation may 
hamper the implementation of national and international environmental 
legislation. 
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3.4.3 Will Trade Liberalisation Force Environmental Standards 
Downwards? 
Advocates of the harmonisation of environmental standards often claim 
that free trade in the presence of divergent environmental standards 
provides the nation with the lowest standard with a competitive advantage. 
As a result, it is feared that there will ensue a 'race to the bottom' as 
nations try to undercut the environmental standards of their competitors. 
This claim, however, is not accepted by all. 
Nordhaus (1994) dismisses the fear of a 'race to the bottom' by stating that 
it is not in a country's interests to lower the stringency of its environmental 
standards. Utilising the logic behind optimal tariff theory, Nordhaus 
claims that it would be optimal for a large country to tax its exports rather 
than subsidise them by lowering standards, since such a policy would turn 
the terms of trade in the country's favour by raising export prices. 9 As a 
result, Nordhaus claims that there is no economic incentive for a large 
country to enter a 'race to the bottom'. 
Although the subsidisation of exports is against national interests as 
Nordhaus claims, he concedes that nations will often subsidise exports due 
to the lobbying of producer interest groups or because nations do not 
always operate in an economically rational manner, either through choice 
or ignorance. 
Others have adopted a different approach by arguing not that it is 
economically irrational to lower standards, but that nations would not need 
to lower them. Indeed, many have argued that the loss of competitiveness 
9 In the case of small countries who are price takers and hence cannot affect their terms 
of trade, Nordhaus states that environmental policies will be set in the traditional way by 
equating marginal costs and marginal benefits. These countries cannot engage in any race 
since they are not in a position to set prices which undercut their competitors. 
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associated with environmental regulation is in fact minimal, and hence so 
too is the pressure to lower standards. Dean (1991) found that abatement 
costs are a small proportion of a firm's total costs and hence have little 
impact on the firm's competitiveness. In addition, Walter (1973,1982) 
found that abatement costs in US export industries were only 1.75% of 
total costs, whilst Tobey (1990) found environmental regulation costs 
were under 1.85% for forty industries, and between 1.85 and 2.89% for 
twenty four industries. Jaffe et al. (1995) also found little evidence that 
environmental regulations have had a significant adverse affect on 
competitiveness. A recent study by Janicke et al. (1997) found no 
empirical evidence to support the 'pollution haven' hypothesis i. e. that 
firms have relocated abroad in response to stringent domestic 
environmental regulations, again suggesting that such regulations have 
little impact on competitiveness. Finally, the 'Porter hypothesis' (Porter 
and van der Linde (1995)), actually suggests that properly designed 
environmental regulations will stimulate innovation that may partially, or 
more than fully, offset the initial compliance cost. If this hypothesis is 
correct then firms may not benefit from partaking in a'race to the bottom'. 
Esty, however, claims that the interstate competition for new investment 
experienced by the US in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s would suggest that 
competitiveness concerns associated with environmental regulation were a 
significant factor in where firms chose to invest. Furthermore, he provides 
evidence of the major role played by interstate competition in the push for 
the national harmonisation of environmental standards. Similarly Esty 
believes that intercountry competitiveness concerns which may provide 
incentives for nations to lower their environmental regulations, necessitate 
the international harmonisation of such regulations. 
Revesz (1992) finds little empirical evidence of a 'race to the bottom', but 
states that were such a race to take place, the harmonization of 
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environmental standards would not be the answer. Instead, this would 
simply have the effect of moving the downward spiral to another area of 
regulation. Esty, however, believes this would be a positive achievement 
since the environment "is more vulnerable than almost any other area of 
regulation to welfare-reducing market failures in the absence of 
government intervention. " (Esty (1994) p. 156). 
Clearly, the impact of environmental regulation on competition is 
uncertain and empirical study throws little light on whether a 'race to the 
bottom' will occur. 
3.4.4 The Use of Trade Restrictions to Protect the Environment. 
The GATT/WTO's environmental provisions have already been outlined 
in the previous chapter, but it will here be considered whether 
GATT/WTO rules allow a nation to restrict the importation of a product 
which subjects the importing country to an externality. There are two 
situations in which this may occur. Firstly, the importing country may be 
subjected to a consumption externality. For example, the EU considered it 
was subjected to an 'externality' when it consumed US beef containing 
growth hormones. Alternatively, the importing country may face a 
production externality, whereby injury is caused by the actual production 
of a good. 
With regard to consumption externalities, Pearce states that it would 
appear from various GATT disputes that the existence of such an 
externality would be a legitimate reason for a restriction under Article XX 
provided a number of conditions are met. Firstly, there must be evidence 
of the externality, and any resultant restriction must be universally applied. 
Secondly, the trade restriction must be justified through one of four tests 
which exist under GATT/WTO. The first of these is the 'necessary' test 
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which stems from Article XX(b) and essentially states that there must be 
no other way in which the party could remove the externality. Article 
XX(g) provides 
-a second test which assesses whether the trade restriction 
is'primarily aimed at' conservation and is not simply a means of protecting 
the domestic market. A third test originates from the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade which states that a trade restriction must be 
shown to be 'proportional' to the benefits which result from the removal of 
the externality. Finally, and differing little from the 'primarily aimed at' 
test, Article XX states that a trade restriction must not be applied in a way 
that constitutes a 'disguised restriction on international trade'. As Runge 
(1994) points out, all of these tests effectively weigh the environmental 
benefits resulting from the removal of the externality with the harm that 
stems from the disruption to trade. Providing the disruption to trade does 
not exceed the resultant environmental benefits, the trade restriction will 
generally be justified under GATT/WTO rules. 
The GATT/WTO, however, does not appear to allow trade restrictions in 
order to remove a production externality. Pearce suggests that the 
GATT/WTO has simply adopted the principle that an importing nation 
does not have the right to interfere with the production and processing 
methods of another country. Although, this principle has been criticised by 
environmentalists, the GATT/WTO does have its reasons for maintaining 
the distinction between consumption externalities and production 
externalities. Since the GATT's inception, the agreement has tried to limit 
the number of excuses that could be used to implement trade restrictions, 
preferring contracting parties to implement domestic policies instead. The 
GATT/WTO is clearly concerned that if nations are allowed to distinguish 
between 'like' goods which have different production methods there would 
be a risk of countries implementing blanket import restrictions. However, 
as already stated, the post-Uruguay Round Technical Barriers to Trade 
Agreement (TBTA) does allow trade restrictions for products whose 
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related processes and production methods do not conform to regulations 
- 
subject to strict conditions. To be covered by the TBTA, the processes and 
production methods must leave a trace in the final product, so, for 
example, a regulation stating that all bottles must be made from recycled 
glass would be covered by the Agreement, but a regulation stating that 
tuna must not be caught in drift-nets would not be covered. Any 
regulations which are not covered by the TBTA are subject to the 
generally less restrictive regular GATT rules, which in contrast to the 
TBTA, do not appear to allow nations to interfere with the processes and 
production methods of other nations. In this sense at least, the revised 
TBTA would seem environmentally beneficial, although it would appear 
that the outcome of the 'tuna-dolphin' dispute would not have been 
different had the amended TBTA been in place. Although the TBTA now 
considers regulations which concern product related processes and 
production methods, GATT Article XX still fails to allow a distinction to 
be drawn between 'like' products which are the result of very different 
processes and production methods. 
To summarise, GATT/WTO does appear to allow trade restrictions in 
order to prevent environmental damage which results from the 
consumption of a good. However, with regard to damage resulting from 
the production of a good or service, trade restrictions are generally not 
allowed under GATT/WTO. Whilst the Technical Barriers to Trade 
Agreement does allow processes and production methods to be regulated, 
this is only if they leave a trace in the final product. Thus, trade 
restrictions are not allowed in support of regulations which control those 
foreign production processes which are not detectable in the final product. 
Furthermore, GATT/WTO does not allow nations to implement trade 
restrictions in response to environmental damage which occurs outside 
their jurisdiction. Indeed, the US attempt to justify its ban of Mexican tuna 
in 1991 using GATT Article XX(b) was deemed inapplicable by GATT 
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since this exception does not cover damage which occurs outside the 
jurisdiction of the trade-restricting country. 10 
As outlined in Chapter 2, the emergence of the World Trade Organisation, 
which encompasses all those who accept the entire Uruguay Round 
Agreement, would, from an environmental point of view, appear to be a 
(small) step in the right direction. It remains to be seen, however, whether 
the WTO will address some of the environmentalists' criticisms, above. 
3.5 Conclusion. 
An analysis of the relationship between world trade and the environment 
clearly shows such a relationship to be a complex one. It is possible, for 
example, that free trade will prove to be environmentally beneficial. Trade 
liberalisation in a static framework should lead to efficiency gains which 
reduce the amount of environmental inputs used per unit of output. 
Furthermore, once a dynamic framework is entered, the generation of 
economic growth may mean that additional resources are available with 
which to tackle environmental problems, whilst the demand for a cleaner 
environment may also increase. A liberalised global trading system should 
also augment the exchange of environmentally beneficial products, 
services and technologies. Finally, by removing trade-distorting policy 
measures, free trade will ensure that the location and intensity of 
production is not distorted. 
However, trade liberalisation also contains the potential to damage the 
environment in the absence of appropriate (domestic) policy measures. As 
Esty points out, the environmental case against trade liberalisation can be 
reduced to four key issues. The first of these is the ability of the 
environment to deal with the economic growth which results from 
10 Presumably, the TBTA also forbids trade restrictions in support of standards aimed at 
extraterritorial environmental damage. 
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liberalised trade, in a dynamic framework. This, in turn, is a complex issue 
which is dealt with in Chapters 4,5 and 6. The internalisation of 
externalities would be a significant improvement but is likely to entail 
monumental difficulties, not the least being the fact that countries will not 
unilaterally internalise social costs, yet there is no mechanism to co- 
ordinate multilateral internalisation. I l 
The second issue is whether the GATTIWTO suppresses the 
implementation of environmental legislation, both at a national and 
international level. At present, any multilaterally accepted environmental 
agreements which contain the threat of trade measures to enforce 
compliance are illegal under WTO rules. With regard to national 
environmental legislation, the WTO aims to harmonise all environmental 
regulations, irrespective of whether they are aimed at local or global 
environmental problems. As stated above, such a policy may prove 
economically and environmentally damaging. In addition, the WTO does 
not allow nations to distinguish between 'like products' which have very 
different production methods. Nations have traditionally been allowed to 
do as they please within their own borders, but in an ecologically inter- 
dependent world, where production processes in one country can affect the 
global environment, such a notion may be out-dated. 
The third environmental grievance is the issue of whether trade 
liberalisation provides those nations operating low environmental 
standards with a competitive advantage 
- 
hence offering an incentive for 
nations to lower standards. It was seen that the extent of any competitive 
11 At present, very few environmental costs have been internalised in the price of goods. 
Warren (1995) gives the example of the EU's attempt to implement a Europe-wide tax, at 
ten dollars per barrel, to be levied on all energy consumption. Although most of the 
largest fuel using companies obtained concessions drastically reducing the impact of the 
tax, Warren claims that they also ran a successful lobby which resulted in the tax 
effectively being side-stepped. Furthermore, although some northern European countries 
have introduced such a tax domestically, this has generally been at a very low level and 
intended more to raise revenue than to change consumption habits. 
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advantage which results from low environmental standards is empirically 
uncertain, and hence so too is the strength of any pressure to lower 
standards. 
The fourth, and final, issue is whether GATT/WTO based trade 
liberalisation will allow the use of trade restrictions to protect the 
environment. It has been argued above that the GATT/WTO will allow 
trade restrictions to be implemented in response to a consumption 
externality, but not to tackle a production externality apart from in limited 
instances under the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement. Furthermore, 
trade restrictions are not allowed to be implemented in response to 
environmental damage which occurs outside the jurisdiction of the trade- 
restricting country, nor are trade restrictions to be implemented 
unilaterally. 
Whilst the above are the environmentalists' four key areas of conflict with 
those who advocate trade liberalisation, the foundations of this conflict 
stem largely from a clash of cultures and ideals. Although the goal of free 
traders is to maximise welfare, environmentalists tend to consider efforts 
to liberalise trade as being fuelled by the quest for profits and jobs 
- 
in 
short, purely anthropocentric, materialistic goals. In contrast, 
environmentalists consider their goals to be far more worthy, largely from 
an ethical or moral point of view. They concern themselves with the well- 
being of all species, not just humans, together with the protection of the 
earth in general. As a result of these ideals, the environmental case against 
the GATT/WTO is more fundamental than is perhaps suggested by the 
analysis of the four issues above. For instance, an inherent presumption 
within the GATT/WTO is that the gains from trade outweigh any losses 
from environmental damage which may occur as a result of trade. As 
Pearce (1992) argues, the implication of this presumption is that all trade 
restrictions are wrong and hence whichever party implemented the trade 
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restriction has to justify it. Environmentalists view this fact as evidence of 
the biased nature in which GATT/WTO deals with trade-environment 
disputes. Indeed, Friends of the Earth (1992) claim that the burden of 
proof should be shifted to those parties wishing to challenge the adoption 
of an environmental trade restriction. They argue that this would go some 
way towards showing that the GATT/WTO does not always put the 
interests of trade before those of the environment. Such a reversal in the 
burden of proof, however, would significantly increase the potential for 
countries to implement trade restrictions to protect domestic industries, 
under the guise of environmental protection. The GATT/WTO is clearly 
wary of increasing the ability of countries to distort trade patterns and 
reduce welfare. 
An additional criticism often raised against the GATT/WTO is the fact 
that the Agreement itself is effectively negotiated in secret. Environmental 
(or health or consumer) non-governmental organisations are typically not 
allowed to observe or participate in GATT/WTO meetings. As Shrybman 
(1990) states, "As trade negotiations take place, and are concluded, in 
private, democratic institutions that are increasingly willing to respond to 
public pressure to protect the environment, are circumvented. By 
characterising environmental regulation as a non-tariff trade barrier, 
discussion can be removed to a less public forum, and one more 
sympathetic to the interests of those opposed to environmental regulation. " 
(Shrybman (1990) p. 32). However, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the 
Symposium on Trade, Environment and Sustainable Development which 
took place with non-governmental organisations, illustrates that the WTO 
is willing to listen to the views of such organisations. Furthermore, these 
organisations can lobby national governments thereby indirectly 
influencing the decisions of the GATT/WTO. 
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The preceding analysis would seem to suggest that the GATT/WTO has 
the potential to have a major influence on the scale and character of 
international natural resource use and pollution. Chapter 8 discusses the 
numerous policy implications which arise from this discussion of the 
GATT/WTO's treatment of the environment. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT. 
4.1 Introduction. 
This chapter examines the historical treatment of the relationship between 
the economy and the environment in economics and the environmental 
literature. It will be seen that the classical economists of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries possessed an awareness of social and environmental 
limits to economic growth, although the rise of neoclassical economics 
generally neglected such factors. The'limits to growth' debate of the 1960s 
and 1970s brought the issue to the fore and questioned whether continued 
economic growth was feasible and whether it was actually beneficial to 
society and the environment. It will be seen that the potential 
environmental limits to growth are twofold; firstly they originate from, the 
possibility of natural resource exhaustion; and secondly, they stem from 
the limited capacity of the environment to assimilate pollution. There is 
much uncertainty surrounding both limits. The social limits to growth 
question the welfare which is derived from economic growth and suggest 
that an increase in the growth rate of GNP is not in fact synonymous with 
an increase in welfare. Despite the ferocity of the debate, the views of the 
political mainstream remained intact 
- 
technological advance will ensure 
that environmental limits are not reached and as such, economic growth 
unequivocally increases the welfare of society. 
The notion of sustainable development, which arose during the 1980s, will 
then be examined and, in particular, its treatment of the economy- 
environment relationship. A common theme in most definitions of 
sustainability is intergenerational equity, which is to be achieved by 
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maintaining the capital stock over time. A distinction will be drawn 
between `weak' and `strong' forms of sustainable development, the 
difference between the two stemming from differing opinions of the nature 
of the capital stock that is to be maintained. It is claimed that, typically, 
weaker forms of sustainable development take economic growth to be 
complementary to the environment, whilst stronger forms posit the 
existence of environmental limits to growth. The chapter then moves on to 
consider the adjustments necessary for the transition to sustainable 
development and, in particular, the modifications needed to transform 
GNP into a more successful indicator of welfare and production. 
4.2 The Classical Economists and Growth. An Awareness of Both 
Social and Environmental Limits. 
T. R. Malthus's Essay on the Principle of Population (1798) contains the 
central theme that the potential capacity for population growth is greater 
than the capacity for increased food production. As Malthus states; "... the 
power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to 
produce subsistence for man. ", (Malthus (1970) p. 71). 
Such a claim stems from Malthus's belief that population, as long as it is 
not restricted by a scarcity of resources, will increase geometrically, whilst 
agricultural production necessarily increases arithmetically. I He therefore 
concludes that the fundamental cause of poverty is the pressure which 
population growth places on resources. The unsavoury implication of 
Malthus's Essay is that since poverty is the consequence of the natural 
laws governing the growth of food and population, any attempts by the 
government or the people to remove such poverty will be futile. It is this 
fact which the critics of Malthus found most unpalatable. Marx, for one, 
I In later editions of the Essay the arithmetic nature of increases in food production was 
replaced (or accompanied) by the law of diminishing returns on land. 
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claimed that by blaming poverty on natural processes Malthus effectively 
exonerated social injustice and private ownership of any responsibility. 
Whilst the writings of Malthus clearly relate more to the growth of the 
population than to the growth of the actual economy, Malthus's 
importance stems from his recognition of the possible existence of natural 
constraints to human activity and his discussion of the relationship 
between natural resources and human welfare (poverty). 
A commentary on the social impact of rapid economic expansion is 
provided by the Swiss economist Sismondi who witnessed the effect of 
unrestrained economic activity during the British industrial revolution. As 
Wall (1994) points out, Sismondi was highly critical of the anti-human 
elements of such expansion. In 1819 he wrote; 
"In this astonishing country, which seems to be submitted to a great 
experiment for the instruction of the rest of the world, I have seen 
production increasing whilst enjoyments were diminishing. The mass of the 
nation here, no less than philosophers, seems to forget that the increase of 
wealth is not the end in political economy, but its instrument in procuring 
the happiness of all. I sought for this happiness in every class, and I could 
nowhere find it.... " (Sismondi (1847) p. 205 (written in 1819)). 
However, of the classical economists, the work of John Stuart Mill is 
perhaps the most relevant to the economic growth debate. Indeed, in 
tackling the social and environmental implications of continued industrial 
expansion, Mill echoes many sentiments expressed today. 
"I confess I am not charmed with the ideal of life held out by those who 
think that the normal state of human beings is that of struggling to get on; 
that the trampling, crushing, elbowing and treading on each other's heels 
which form the existing type of social life, are the most desirable lot of 
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human kind, or anything but the disagreeable symptoms of one of the 
phases of industrial progress. " (Mill (1871) p. 328 (written in 1848)). 
Mill is critical of the continual quest to increase production and 
accumulation and questions why such activity "excites the congratulations 
of ordinary politicians". 
"I know not why it should be a matter of congratulation that persons who 
are already richer than anyone needs to be, should have doubled their 
means of consuming things which give little or no pleasure except as 
representative of wealth.... It is only in the backward countries of the world 
that increased production is still an important object: in the most advanced, 
what is economically needed is a better distribution... " (ibid., p. 330). 
However, Mill's concern goes beyond the social effects of growth and the 
implications for the environment are duly considered. 
"Nor is there much satisfaction in contemplating the world with nothing left 
to the spontaneous activity of nature; with every rood of land brought into 
cultivation, which is capable of growing food for human beings; every 
flowery waste or natural pasture ploughed up, all quadrupeds or birds which 
are not domesticated for man's use exterminated as his rivals for food, every 
hedgerow or superfluous tree rooted out, and scarcely a place left where a 
wild shrub or flower could grow without being eradicated as a weed in the 
name of improved agriculture. " (ibid., p. 331). 
Whilst such a concern for the environment was rare in the mid-nineteenth 
century, in general, the classical economists, like the French physiocrats 
before them, stressed the importance of nature to the economic process. 
The advent of neoclassical economics generally neglected this link 
between nature and the economy, albeit with several notable exceptions. 2 
2 Alfred Marshall was, however, aware of nature's positive contribution. "In a sense, 
there are only two agents of production, nature and man.... But on the other hand, man is 
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One such exception was A. C. Pigou who, in 1920, became the first to 
analyse the impact of pollution on the economy. In his analysis, Pigou 
distinguished between the private costs of production (i. e. wages, raw 
materials etc. ) and what he called the social costs. The social costs are the 
full costs faced by society and consist of private costs plus external costs, 
or externalities, which arise from pollution. In later years, Pigou widened 
his analysis, and considered external costs to encompass far more than 
pollution. As Kapp (1950) points out, Pigou lists the following as 
examples of external costs, "the destruction of the amenities and lighting 
of neighbouring sites by the construction of a factory in residential 
districts,... the wearing out of the surfaces of roads by motor cars.. 
. 
and the 
increase in expenditures for police and prisons made necessary by the 
production and sale of intoxicants. " (Kapp (1950) p. 38). Although Pigou's 
analysis of social costs is clearly far-reaching, for Kapp, the fact that it 
takes place, not within the main body of value and price, but in the sub- 
discipline of welfare economics, illustrates that in neoclassical economics, 
"the phenomenon bf social costs is still regarded as the exception rather 
than the rule. " (ibid., p. 8). 
An additional exception to the neoclassical neglect of the environment was 
H. Hotelling, who, in 1931, provided an analysis of non-renewable 
resource use. Hotelling's main contribution was to show that, in certain 
circumstances, the rent on a resource (the price of the resource net of 
extraction costs) would increase over time at a percentage rate equal to the 
resource owner's discount rate. Indeed, this relationship has since become 
a fundamental principle of non-renewable resource use known as the 
Hotelling rule. 
The relative neglect of environmental issues within neoclassical 
economics, despite the above exceptions, meant that the implications of 
himself largely formed by his surroundings in which nature plays a great part. " (Marshall 
(1920) p. 116). 
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economic growth for the environment were largely ignored for many 
years. The 'Keynesian Revolution' of the 193 Os did little to change this. 
4.3 The Environmental Limits to Growth. 
Public awareness of the relationship between the economy and the 
environment increased considerably during the 1960s, due not least to the 
publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring in 1962. Carson examined the 
impact of man's indiscriminate use of chemicals, in the form of pesticides 
and insecticides, and predicted catastrophe if practices remained 
unchanged. 
In 1966, Kenneth Boulding produced his seminal article The Economics of 
the Coming Spaceship Earth, in which he examined the relationship 
between production, resource depletion and environmental degradation. 
Boulding highlighted the danger of steadily increasing production levels, 
both in terms of reducing finite resource stocks and in terms of 
environmental pollution. As a means to illustrate this danger, he refers to 
the current open economy as the 'cowboy economy' and believes it to be 
characterised by reckless and exploitative economic activity 
- 
activity 
undertaken as if the earth's resources were in limitless supply. The lifetime 
of this cowboy economy is limited, however, and will be replaced by the 
'spaceman economy' of the future; 
"... in which the earth has become a single spaceship, without unlimited 
reservoirs of anything, either for extraction or pollution, and in which 
therefore, man must find his place in a cyclical ecological system which is 
capable of continuous reproduction of material form... " (Boulding (1966)). 
The volume of production, or more accurately the throughput from factors 
of production (a proportion of which are from the finite stock of non- 
renewable resources) to output (and waste and pollution) is the cowboy 
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economy's measure of success, and should be maximised accordingly. In 
contrast, such throughput is to be minimised in the spaceman economy 
and hence the existence of economic growth is no longer indicative of a 
successful economy. Furthermore, in this economy of the future, it is the 
actual nature of the capital stock which is of importance, and in particular 
its quality, extent and complexity, including the state of human bodies and 
minds. 
It is also interesting to note that Boulding does not believe it will be very 
long before the cowboy economy is replaced by its new incarnation; "The 
shadow of the future spaceship, indeed, is already falling over our 
spendthrift merriment. " He also notes that, surprisingly "... it seems to be in 
pollution rather than in exhaustion that the problem is first becoming 
salient. " (ibid. ). 
With these concerns in mind, Donella and Dennis Meadows and a team 
from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology produced a report for the 
Club of Rome's Project for the Predicament of Mankind entitled The 
Limits to Growth. A world model was constructed to estimate the future 
impact of continuous exponential growth under a number of different 
assumptions. The 'standard' world model assumed that the physical, 
economic, or social relationships that have historically governed the 
development of the world system would remain effectively unchanged. 
Additionally this model assumed that population and industrial capital 
would continue to grow exponentially, leading to a similar growth in 
pollution and in demand for food and non-renewable resources. The 
supply of both food and non-renewable resources was assumed to be fixed. 
Perhaps not surprisingly given these assumptions, this model predicted 
collapse due to non-renewable resource depletion. The continual 
exponential growth of industrial capital necessitates an ever increasing 
supply of resources. However, as resources rise in price and stocks become 
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depleted, more and more capital is needed to obtain resources and hence 
less is available to invest for future growth. The result is the collapse of 
the industrial base and with it, the dependent service and agricultural 
sectors. Finally, population will fall due to the lack of food and medical 
services. Whilst Meadows et al. stress that the model is not capable of 
making exact predictions concerning time scale, indications are that 
growth would come to a halt before the year 2100.3 
The report claims that the credibility of such grave conclusions is 
strengthened by the fact that efforts were made "to make the most 
optimistic estimate of unknown quantities" and thus in actuality "the 
model is biased to allow growth to continue longer than it probably can 
continue in the real world. " (Meadows et al. (1972) p. 126). Furthermore, 
the nature of exponential growth meant that the finite limits placed on 
food and non-renewable resources could be quadrupled without changing 
the conclusions of the model. Meadows et al. were aware that a weakness 
of the model is its preoccupation with the physical aspects of man's 
activities at the expense of changes in social factors such as attitudes 
concerning family size or tastes in goods. It is due to this weakness that 
Meadows et al. emphasise the model's inability to make predictions. This, 
however, was not the object of the exercise which was simply to show the 
outcome of exponential economic growth under the assumption of no 
change in the present system, or under the assumption of any number of 
technical changes in the system. 
The radical nature of the report attracted much attention, not only in 
academic circles, but also in society at large. As a result, The Limits to 
Growth fuelled a debate which continued throughout the 1970s. As Ekins 
(1993) points out, a major critique of the report came from Cole et al. 
3 The 'standard' model was also run under the assumption of a number of technological 
changes. In each case the final outcome was the same 
- 
exponential growth of capital and 
population, followed by collapse. 
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(1973) who were based at Sussex University's Science Policy Research 
Unit. Their criticism firstly concerned the model's preoccupation with 
purely physical factors. As stated above, Meadows et al. recognised this 
weakness, but due to the uncertainty surrounding the emergence of new 
forms of societal behaviour, and in particular the exact nature of any new 
behaviour, felt unable to include such factors in their model. Secondly, 
Cole et al. questioned the model's assumptions, particularly the 
assumption of finite limits to non-renewable resource stocks. Indeed, Cole 
et al. re-ran the model with the assumption of continual exponential 
increases in resource stocks, through new discoveries and recycling, and 
produced altogether different results. 
The fundamental difference between the viewpoint of the Limits to 
Growth team and that of Cole et al. stems from their differing opinions 
concerning three factors: the rate of technical progress; future changes in 
composition of output and the possibilities of substitution (Lecomber 
(1975)). "If these three effects add up to a shift away from the limiting 
resource or pollutant equal to or greater than the rate of growth, then the 
limits to growth are put back indefinitely. " (Ekins (1993) p. 271). 
However, for Lecomber ((1975) p. 42) the point to be stressed is that "this 
establishes the logical conceivability, not the certainty, probability or even 
the possibility in practice, of growth continuing indefinitely. " He goes on 
to distinguish between resource optimists and pessimists; 
"The optimists believe in the power of human inventiveness to solve 
whatever problems are thrown in its way, as apparently it has done in the 
past. The pessimist questions the success of these past technological 
solutions and fears that future problems may be more intractable. " 
(Lecomber (1975) p. 45). 
An argument clearly originating from the 'optimist' camp comes from 
Wilfred Beckerman (1974) who, after expressing his faith in future 
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technological advance, then raises an additional defence of economic 
growth. Beckerman claims it to be important that we distinguish between 
the issue of how consumption is spread over time (i. e. growth) and the 
issue of how resources should be spent at one point in time. A 
misallocation of resources does not necessarily mean that the growth rate 
is inappropriate. Indeed, if externalities exist at one point in time due to 
the misallocation of resources, any resultant environmental damage could 
not be prevented by changing the rate of growth of consumption. 
However, as Ekins (1993) stresses, if externalities do persist, their impact 
will be greater in a large economy than in a small one 
.4 He continues, 
"Given that failures to remedy externalities are common, due not least to 
the power of the vested interests that are causing them, opposition to the 
economic growth that amplifies them would not seem an irrational 
position on the part of those adversely affected. " (Ekins (1993) p. 271). 
A different perspective on the growth debate is provided by considering 
the Second Law of Thermodynamics, also known as the entropy law. 5 
Georgescu-Roegen (1973) is primarily associated with work of this nature 
and utilised the Second Law to emphasise the physical limits to the 
economy. Rees (1990) clarifies the meaning of the Second Law; "The 
Second Law states that in any closed isolated system, available energy and 
matter are continuously and irrevocably degraded to the unavailable state. " 
Furthermore, "Since the global economy operates within an essentially 
closed system, the Second Law is actually the ultimate regulator of 
economic activity. " (Rees (1990) p. 19). As Daly (1973) states, entropy 
may be considered to be a measure of the unavailable energy within a 
4 If a good is produced such that its price is less than the marginal social cost of its 
production (i. e. there exists a positive marginal external cost) then the more of that good 
that is produced, the greater will be the total external cost. 
5 The First Law of Thermodynamics states that energy can neither be created nor 
destroyed, thereby implying that economic activity is not damaging to energy stocks. 
However, the Second Law clarifies the point by stating that, whilst energy cannot 
undergo a quantitative change, it can change qualitatively. Economic activity transforms 
free, or available, energy into bound, or unavailable, energy. 
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closed thermodynamic system. To use Georgescu-Roegen's (1973) 
example, a piece of coal contains available, or free, energy and therefore 
has low entropy. However, once that coal is burned the energy is no longer 
available, but has become dissipated in the form of smoke, heat and ashes. 
The energy is now bound and hence has high entropy i. e. the coal has now 
become waste. 
As Georgescu-Roegen states, man has access to two sources of free energy 
(low entropy). Firstly, there is the terrestrial stock of mineral deposits and 
secondly the flow of solar energy which allows - the 'production' of 
renewable resources. An economy fuelled by solar energy is constrained 
only by the limited flow of that energy, hence it is the fixed nature of the 
terrestrial stock which is the ultimate regulator of economic activity. 
Furthermore, "Growth in physical production and throughput that is not 
based on solar energy must increase entropy and make environmental 
problems worse, implying an eventual limit to such growth. " (Ekins 
(1993) p. 272). Attempts to increase the efficiency of energy use simply 
have the effect of reducing the amount of energy used per unit of output ie 
they economise on low entropy. Whilst this is clearly necessary, it is not 
sufficient. As Georgescu-Roegen (1976) points out, an unwelcome 
implication of the entropy law is that all of man's activities must result in 
the dissipation of energy, with less low entropy available after the activity 
than before it. "If there were not this entropic deficit we would be able to 
convert work into heat, and, by reversing the process, to recuperate the 
entire initial amount of work. " (Georgescu-Roegen (1976) p. 10). 6 
The physical constraints imposed on economic activity by the entropy law 
are an integral part of the writings of Herman Daly. However, Daly's 
(1973,1993) critique of economic growth is not restricted to purely 
6 As a result, Georgescu-Roegen claims that the entropy law is the root cause of 
economic scarcity; "Were it not for this law, we could use the energy of a piece of coal 
over and over again... " (ibid., p. 9). 
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physical considerations and growth is also analysed from an ethical or 
moral viewpoint. 
Daly begins his critique with reference to the ultimate means and the 
ultimate end of society and describes the ends-means spectrum which 
faces mankind (see Diagram 1). 
Diagram 1. The Ends-Means Spectrum. 
Theology Ultimate end? 
Ethics 
intermediate ends 
(health, education 
etc. ) Political 
Economy 
intermediate means (stocks of artifacts, 
Technics labour power) 
Physics Ultimate means 
(low entropy 
matter-energy) 
Daly explains the importance attached to growth in traditional economics 
in terms of an incomplete view of the total ends-means spectrum. For 
Daly, "humanity's ultimate economic problem is to use ultimate means 
wisely in the service of the Ultimate End. " (Daly and Townsend (1993) 
p. 20). "The ultimate end is that with reference to which intermediate ends 
are directed. It is that which is good in itself and does not derive its 
goodness from any instrumental relation to any other end. " (Daly (1973) 
p. 7). Daly is conscious that our perception of the ultimate end is vague but 
nevertheless believes such a perception to be essential since without this 
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"... it would be impossible to order intermediate ends and to speak of 
priorities. " (ibid., p. 8). At the opposite end of the spectrum is the ultimate 
means which consists of low entropy matter-energy. All intermediate 
categories are means with respect to the ultimate end, or ends with respect 
to the ultimate means. 
On the left of the diagram lies the traditional disciplines which cover each 
portion of the spectrum. Daly believes that the central segment occupied 
by economics is highly significant; 
"In looking only at the middle range, economics has naturally not dealt with 
ultimates or absolutes, which are found only at the extremes, and has falsely 
assumed that the middle-range pluralities, relativities and substitutabilities 
among competing ends and scarce means were representative of the whole 
spectrum. Absolute limits are absent from the economists' paradigm 
because absolutes are encountered only in confrontation with the ultimate 
poles of the spectrum, which have been excluded from the focus of our 
attention. " (Daly and Townsend (1993) p. 21). 
For Daly, any critique of economic growth should originate from both 
poles of the ends-means spectrum, thus encompassing ends-based (moral) 
and means-based (biophysical) considerations; 
"To crack the nut of growthmania, it is not enough to hammer from above 
with moral arguments, because there is sufficient 'give' underneath for 
optimistic biophysical assumptions to cushion the blow... Hammering only 
from below with biophysical arguments leaves too much room for elastic 
morality to absorb the blow (The interest rate automatically looks after the 
future; growth itself is the Ultimate End... etc. ) Growth chestnuts have to be 
placed on the unyielding anvil of biophysical realities and then crushed 
with the hammer of moral argument. The entropy law and ecology provide 
the biophysical anvil. Concern for future generations and subhuman life and 
inequities in current wealth distribution provide the moral hammer. " (Daly 
and Townsend (1993) p. 22-23). 
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In place of'growthmania', Daly's advocates the establishment of a steady 
(or stationary) state, defined as "a constant stock of physical wealth 
(capital), and a constant stock of people (population). " (Daly (1973) p. 15). 
For both stocks to remain constant, the rate of inflow must be equal to the 
rate of outflow i. e. the birth rate must equal the death rate and the level of 
depreciation must equal the rate of production. For a number of reasons, 
Daly believes that this throughput should be minimised. Firstly, if 
population throughput is low (i. e. a low birth rate and a similarly low 
death rate) then this necessarily implies that life expectancy is high. 
Secondly, if capital throughput is low (i. e. a low rate of production and an 
equally low rate of depreciation or consumption) then clearly goods are 
more durable and thus less time will be sacrificed to production. In 
addition, since by the First Law of Thermodynamics energy cannot be 
created or destroyed, all natural inputs in the production process must be 
returned to the environment in the form of waste. Therefore, a lower rate 
of throughput will lead to less resource depletion and less pollution. 
The economic and environmental implications of a steady state economy 
are likely to be numerous and far reaching. Daly claims that one such 
implication is that a steady state economy is likely to be more equitable 
than a growth-orientated economy for the simple reason that, in the 
former, the issue of income distribution can not be avoided. The existence 
of economic growth facilitates the neglect of relative shares in society by 
continually promising to increase absolute shares. Douthwaite (1992) 
takes up this argument, "The promise of jam for all tomorrow has eased 
our consciences about the unequal division of bread today. " (Douthwaite 
(1992) p. 3). Both Daly and Douthwaite claim that in an economy where 
the stock of capital is constant, and thus issues relating to absolute wealth 
are no longer of such relevance, greater emphasis is likely to be placed on 
the relative shares within society. 
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The term 'stationary state' (steady state) is borrowed by Daly from the 
classical economists, who generally believed it to be the state of affairs to 
which the world is evolving? However, it is John Stuart Mill who 
expressed a sentiment closest to Daly's, stating that a stationary state of 
capital and wealth "would be, on the whole, a very considerable 
improvement on our present condition. " (Mill (1871) p. 328). However, 
both Mill and Daly emphasise what is not constant in a steady state. Mill, 
for one, feels that; 
"It is scarcely necessary to remark that a stationary condition of capital and 
population implies no stationary state of human improvement. There would 
be as much scope as ever for all kinds of mental culture, and moral and 
social progress; as much room for improving the Art of Living, and much 
more likelihood of its being improved, when minds ceased to be engrossed 
by the art of getting on. " (ibid., p. 332). 
Similarly, Daly stresses that a steady state does not hold constant 
knowledge, technology, the distribution of income or the allocation of 
resources. He claims that in a steady state the economy will develop 
qualitatively rather than quantitatively ie. development will occur without 
an increase in the size of the economy. 
Daly's contribution to the economic growth debate is notable for two 
reasons. Firstly, he subjects growth to criticism using both ecological and 
social arguments. Daly therefore not only assesses the feasibility of 
growth, but also considers its desirability. As such, he concludes that 
sustained exponential growth is neither feasible nor desirable. Secondly, 
the fact that Daly goes some way to suggesting an alternative to what he 
refers to as 'growthmania' - the steady state economy - makes his 
contribution more valuable than a mere critique. 
7 Daly is careful to distinguish this interpretation of the stationary state from that used by 
neoclassical economists in which tastes and techniques are constant. 
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However, it will now be seen that, as valuable as Herman Daly's work is, 
he is not the only economist to point out the social impacts of economic 
growth. 
4.4 The Social Limits to Growth. 
In his defence of economic growth, Wilfred Beckerman (1974) asserted 
that growth was needed the world over. Very simply, he believed that for 
the third world, economic growth is essential in order to win the fight 
against poverty and deprivation. Moreover, in the first world, economic 
growth will continue to raise wealth and net welfare. As Ekins points out, 
with regard to the third world, it remains uncertain whether "economic 
growth per se is what poor people in poor countries need to improve their 
life prospects. " He continues "... entitlements such as ensured access to 
resources and capabilities to use those resources, neither of which are the 
automatic results of economic growth, may be even more important. 
Where these lead to more secure, but non-market subsistence, they will not 
even show up as economic growth. " (Ekins (1993) p. 273). However, it is 
Beckerman's claim that growth will increase net welfare in the developed 
world which has proved to be the most contentious. 
E. J. Mishan is perhaps the most well known of those who have contested 
the positive link between economic growth and human welfare. For 
Mishan, economic growth, and the scientific advance and technological 
progress on which it depends, have far reaching implications for society. 
Indeed, "despite the abundance of man-made goods produced by 
continued economic growth, its net effect on human health and happiness 
could be adverse and possibly disastrous. " (Mishan (1977) p. 9). In 
addition to ecological considerations, of which he is well aware, Mishan 
argues that the impact of continued growth has been to reduce the aesthetic 
quality of many of the world's cities and to dramatically increase traffic 
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congestion and associated noise levels 
- 
factors which all act to the 
detriment of society. Furthermore, according to Mishan, man's 
preoccupation with expansion has contributed to social disintegration, 
notably in the form of divorce, suicide, crime and violence, all of which 
have increased markedly throughout the post-war period. 
An additional consequence of growth Mishan refers to as 'the growing 
menace of obsolescence'. He describes its impact on society as follows; 
"Skills painstakingly acquired over many years may become obsolete in as 
many months. And it is not earnings alone that matter to a man. High 
unemployment pay and re-training opportunities do not suffice to 
compensate him for losing his position in the hierarchy of his chosen 
occupation, for seeing his hard earned skill and experience thrown on the 
mounting scrap-heap of obsolete tools. " Furthermore, "... everyone of us, 
manager, workman or scientist, lives closer to the brink of 
obsolescence... and... feels menaced in some degree by the push of new 
developments. " (Mishan (1969) p. 115). One implication of continued 
product innovation is the need for ever intensive advertising campaigns. 
Indeed, the perceived necessity of growth and the hence ubiquitous nature 
of advertising, constantly draws man's attention to the material "... by 
hinting continually that the big prizes in life are the things that only money 
can buy... leaves a man restless and discontented with his lot. " (ibid., 
p. 116). Moreover, tastes are also threatened by obsolescence "leaving 
fashion alone as the arbiter of moral behaviour. " (ibid., p. 116). 
Mishan expresses grave concerns about the direction in which Western 
civilization is heading, and mourns the loss of a social community 
- 
the 
result, he believes, of economic growth and continued technological 
advance. 
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Like Mishan, Hirsch (1976) stresses the social implications of growth. For 
Hirsch, the effects of growth are twofold: Firstly, growth is associated 
with the increasing importance of positional goods and secondly, 
economic growth leads to the systematic erosion of individual morality. 
With regard to the former, Hirsch asserts that a major determinant of 
consumer demand is scarcity, not scarcity of a physical nature, but social 
scarcity. For reasons expressed below, he believes that most individuals 
derive more utility from a scarce good or service than from one which is 
relatively common. As a result, any increase in the availability of such 
goods or services will cause a given amount of use to yield less 
satisfaction. Hirsch believes that such a situation is comparable to a 
limitation on absolute supply of a good, and hence refers to social scarcity 
as a social limit. 'Pure' social scarcity therefore refers to the situation 
where satisfaction is derived from the scarcity of the good itself. Hirsch 
argues "This social limitation may be derived, most directly and most 
- 
familiarly, from psychological motives of various kinds, notably envy, 
emulation, or pride. Satisfaction is derived from relative position alone, of 
being in front, or from others being behind" (Hirsch (1976) p. 20). 
However, not all social scarcity is 'pure'. Indeed, an individual's utility 
may be indirectly affected by the consumption of others due to congestion 
or crowding. This notion of an individual's satisfaction being impeded by 
the similar activity of others, does not merely refer to physical congestion, 
as experienced in cities for example, but also to congestion of a social 
nature. Hirsch gives the example of leadership positions "both in work 
relationships and in political or civic roles. Shared leadership neither 
fulfils the same function nor yields the same satisfaction as individual 
leadership. " He continues, "... top positions are regarded here... as valued 
primarily for their intrinsic attractions. Social scarcity in this case is 
primarily incidental, the outcome of social congestion" (ibid., p. 22). 
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Hirsch assesses the implications of social scarcity in terms of the 
positional economy. For Hirsch, the positional economy "relates to all 
aspects of goods, services, work positions, and other social relationships 
that are either (1) scarce in some absolute or socially imposed sense or (2) 
subject to congestion or crowding through more extensive use" (ibid., 
p. 27). As the material economy grows and incomes rise, Hirsch believes 
that the demand for positional goods increases. Ekins summarises the 
impact of this increase in demand; "... with fixed or very inelastic supply, 
the goods are either rationed through price (e. g. desirable resort properties) 
or criteria of eligibility (e. g. more stringent examinations) or their quality 
is degraded through overcrowding (e. g. roads). The effect is either to 
reduce growth, or the welfare to be derived from it or both" (Ekins (1993) 
p. 274). The impact of social scarcity is that economic growth fails to live 
up to its promises 
- 
"... economic growth in advanced societies carries 
some elements of built-in frustration" (Hirsch (1976) p. 175). 
Hirsch's second social limit originates from the depletion of individual 
morality which occurs in a growing capitalist economy. As he points out, 
"... the pursuit of private and essentially individualistic economic goals by 
enterprises, consumers and workers in their market choices - the 
distinctive capitalistic values that give the system its drive 
- 
must be 
girded at key points by strict social morality which the system erodes 
rather than sustains" (ibid., p. 117). Hirsch asserts that an individualistic 
contractual economy relies on certain social virtues such as truth, trust and 
acceptance. However, these very virtues are undermined by the 
individualistic ethos of the growth process. As such, "Economic growth 
undermines its social foundation" (ibid., p. 175). 
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4.5 The Rise of Sustainable Development. 
The advent of the 1980s saw attention turn from the limits to growth 
arguments of the 1970s towards the notion of sustainable development. 
The term 'sustainable development' appears to have been first advanced in 
1980 by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and 
Natural Resources (Ruttan (1994)) although it was the Brundtland 
Commission Report (World Commission on Environment and 
Development, 1987) which brought the concept to the top of the agenda of 
institutions like the United Nations and the World Bank. Since the 
Brundtland Report the goal of sustainability has been adopted by an ever 
increasing number of organisations and bodies. Indeed, the preamble to the 
agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation specifically states 
that its intentions will comply with the goal of sustainable development. 
The popularity of sustainable development would seem to belie, or is 
perhaps indicative of, the vagueness of the term. Pretty (1995) claims there 
have been over seventy definitions of sustainable development since the 
Brundtland Report, and comments "The implicit assumption is that it is 
possible to come up with a single correct definition, " (Pretty (1995) p. 11). 
Pretty clearly believes such a task to be impossible and quotes Campbell 
(1994) as stating "attempts to define sustainability miss the point that, like 
beauty, sustainability is in the eye of the beholder... " (ibid., p. 11). The 
amorphous nature of the concept means that it is impossible to state the 
precise relationship between sustainable development and economic 
growth although, as shall be seen below, certain general viewpoints may 
be defined. In addition, opponents of sustainable development use its 
ambiguity as ammunition, claiming such a vague concept to be 
meaningless. Wilfred Beckerman, continuing his pro-growth stance 
adopted in the 1970s, clearly holds such a view and believes sustainable 
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development to be "devoid of operational value" (Beckerman (1992) 
p. 491). 
Despite the countless definitions, Pearce argues that a key characteristic of 
virtually all versions of sustainable development is the principle of equity. 
Such a notion of equity includes not only providing for the needs of the 
least advantaged in today's society (intragenerational equity), but also 
extends to the needs of the next generation (intergenerational equity). 8 
Indeed, this is clearly in line with perhaps the most well-known definition 
of sustainable development, "... development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs" (WCED (1987) p. 43) 
- 
the definition which emanated 
from the Brundtland Report. As Pearce points out, it is generally agreed 
that the most appropriate mechanism for ensuring the well-being of future 
generations is to ensure that the next generation has access to a stock of 
capital at least as large as the current stock. There is, however, 
disagreement surrounding the precise nature of the capital stock which is 
to be maintained. Such disagreement has resulted in Pearce (1993) 
distinguishing between 'weak' and 'strong' forms of sustainability. In line 
with Pearce, it is here suggested that the different forms of sustainable 
development can be categorised as being 'weak' or 'strong'. The features of 
each will now be analysed, with particular reference to the stance taken 
regarding economic growth. 
4.5.1 Weak Sustainable Development. 
As argued above, intergenerational equity requires the maintenance of the 
capital stock. The capital stock is comprised of man-made capital (such as 
8 As Pearce notes, the two objectives of intragenerational and intergenerational equity are 
not necessarily compatible, "If the best way to help the poor is to industrialise rapidly 
using 'dirty' technology then that objective may conflict with the concern to improve the 
global atmospheric conditions for future generations. " (Pearce (1993) p. 10). 
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the means of production, the infrastructure, human capital etc. ) together 
with natural capital (such as fossil fuels, habitat, clean water etc. ). Weak 
sustainability simply requires that it is the aggregate capital stock which is 
to be maintained for the next generation, and thus any fall in the stock of 
natural capital can be compensated by an appropriate increase in man- 
made capital. Proponents of this form of sustainability therefore assume 
that the two forms of capital are fully substitutable for each other, an 
assumption which will be appraised when considering strong 
sustainability. 
Batie (1989) also distinguishes between two versions of sustainability 
which loosely conform to Pearce's weak and strong forms. The weak form 
of sustainable development she refers to as the constrained economic 
growth position, which advocates the pursuit of economic growth subject 
to certain environmental constraints. Such an approach has two stages: 
"first, the establishment of some contractual arrangement, incorporating 
ecological principles and environmental ethics to establish the 'rules' 
applicable to the development policy. Second, within those rules, the 
utilitarian stance of economic maximisation can be adopted" (Batie (1989) 
p. 1084). It is clear therefore that the weaker forms of sustainable 
development do not see an inherent conflict between environmental health 
and economic growth. Indeed, by this definition the recommendations of 
the Brundtland Report would fall into the weak sustainability category due 
to its perceived complementarity between growth and the environment. 
The Report itself actually called for "more rapid economic growth in both 
industrial and developing countries" (WCED (1987) p. 89). Whilst this 
growth must be forceful in nature, Mrs. Brundtland did realise that it must 
be "at the same time socially and environmentally sustainable" (ibid., 
p. xii). As will shortly be seen, the very concept of 'sustainable growth' is 
considered to be a contradiction in terms by those who favour a more 
ecocentric approach to sustainable development. 
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As Ekins (1993) argues, a key difference between the limits to growth 
debate of the 1970s and the post-Brundtland sustainable development 
debate is the involvement of the business community. Whilst abstaining 
from the debate in the 1970s, generally due to its failure to recognise an 
environmental problem, business in the late 1980s and 90s has been keen 
to embrace the concept of sustainability, albeit weak sustainability. Ekins 
highlights two international business initiatives, the 'Business Charter for 
Sustainable Development' and the 'Business Council for Sustainable 
Development' which were designed to give advice from a business 
perspective to the International Chamber of Commerce, and to the 1992 
UN Conference on Environment and Development, respectively. It is 
interesting to note that both initiatives posit that economic growth is 
compatible with a healthy environment, with the former initiative stating 
"Economic growth provides the conditions in which protection of the 
environment can best be achieved, and environmental protection, in 
balance with other human goals, is necessary to achieve growth that is 
sustainable" (ICC, 1990, from Ekins (1993) p. 275). 
Advocates of weak sustainability therefore typically argue that economic 
growth does not necessarily imply environmental degradation. Whilst 
Pearce (1992) claims that it is likely that growth will prove costly to the 
environment, he argues that it does not have to be so; "If energy inputs 
per unit of economic activity decline over time, as they have done in 
industrialised countries, then an expansion of output need not increase 
energy consumption. " (Pearce (1992) p. 7). The World Bank Development 
Report (1992) also claims that increasing the efficiency of energy usage 
means that economic growth can be decoupled from environmental 
damage. Similarly, Turner, Pearce and Bateman (1994) provide evidence 
of the falling level of energy use per unit of output in industrialised 
countries since the early 1970s, despite substantial increases in economic 
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growth in this period. They and the World Bank both conclude that 
economic activity can, in theory, be increased indefinitely without further 
harming the environment and thus the economy need not produce less, 
provided that it produces differently. 9 
Jacobs (1991) echoes this sentiment by arguing that GNP growth does not 
itself damage the environment: rather it is the 'environmental impact 
coefficient' (EIC) of that growth that is of relevance. Thus, as long as the 
EIC falls faster than GNP grows the overall environmental impact falls. 
It is interesting to note that the latest report to the Club of Rome (Von 
Weizsacker et al. (1997)) argues that technological advance has the ability 
to significantly reduce the environmental impact of production, whilst 
significantly increasing productivity. This is a notable change of position 
from the Club of Rome report which arguably triggered the 'limits to 
growth' debate of the 1970s (Meadows et al. (1972)), and which rejected 
technological advance as the answer to our environmental problems. 
Bernstarr (1991) also expresses faith in man's potential to decouple 
growth from the environment. For Bernstam, it is only when a nation's 
economy first starts growing that a negative relationship between growth 
and environmental health exists. Indeed, as the economy develops and 
growth continues, a positive relationship forms due to the increased 
efficiency of resource use and the corresponding fall in waste. He 
therefore argues that the pollution produced by the South, (for whom there 
exists a negative relationship between growth and the environment) must 
be offset by a reduction in pollution in the North. Thus, the upshot of 
Bernstam's argument is that the North must continue growing since only 
9 However, as Turner, Pearce and Bateman note, for there to be true decoupling, 
economic growth must occur without increasing the total amount of energy inputs and 
not merely the energy inputs per unit of output. This is obviously a far more demanding 
task. 
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with prolonged growth will pollution levels fall. Furthermore he argues 
that the rate of growth in the South depends on the rate of growth in the 
North, thus the more the North grows, the quicker the South will move 
beyond the peak level of pollution. This inverted-U relationship is known 
as the environmental Kuznets curve, and is examined in depth in Chapters 
5 and 6. 
The ability to decouple growth from the depletion of environmental assets 
is not accepted by all, however. As will be seen below, proponents of 
strong sustainability would question the extent of possible decoupling and 
would reject the notion that it will allow indefinite exponential growth. 
4.5.2 Strong Sustainable Development. 
Before considering the stance adopted by strong sustainability advocates 
regarding decoupling, their position concerning intergenerational equity 
will firstly be analysed. 
In contrast to the weak sustainability school, the strong sustainability 
interpretation questions the substitutability between natural and man-made 
capital and hence believes it insufficient to simply maintain the aggregate 
capital stock, whereby a fall in natural capital can be compensated by an 
appropriate increase in man-made capital. Daly, for one, is critical of the 
claim that man-made capital and natural capital are indeed substitutes, 
instead believing them to be complements. He asks, 
"Do extra sawmills substitute for diminishing forests? Do more refineries 
substitute for depleted oil wells? Do larger nets substitute for declining fish 
populations? On the contrary, the productivity of sawmills, refineries and 
fishing nets (man-made capital) will decline with the decline in forests, oil 
deposits and fish. Natural capital as a provider of raw material and energy is 
complementary to man-made capital. Natural capital as absorber of waste 
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products is also complementary to the man-made capital which generates 
those wastes. " (Daly (1990) p. 3). 
Those who doubt man's ability to substitute man-made capital for natural 
capital therefore propose that intergenerational equity will only be 
achieved by maintaining a non-decreasing stock of natural. The aggregate 
capital stock should also be maintained, but only by individually 
maintaining the levels of natural and man-made capital. This position is 
therefore in contrast to the weak sustainability hypothesis which advocates 
the maintenance of the aggregate stock, irrespective of the relative size of 
its constituents. An additional factor which supports the strong 
sustainability viewpoint is the problem of irreversibility associated with 
the destruction of natural capital assets. As Pearce (1993 p. 17) notes, 
"Once lost, such assets are lost forever. By contrast, man-made capital can 
be run down and then recreated... ". Rees (1990) argues that the extensive 
use of natural resources which has occurred since the industrial revolution 
implies that much of our wealth has simply been an illusion. Whilst man- 
made capital has been growing, it has done so at the expense of natural 
capital. "We have simply drawn down one account (the biosphere) to add 
to another (material wealth) 
... 
In short, the global economy is 
cannibalising the biosphere. " (Rees (1990) p. 20). Batie (1989) also equates 
a stronger form of sustainability with a constant stock of natural resources. 
For her, such resource maintenance "is a minimisation concept that 
implies minimising the use of the natural environment" (Batie (1989) 
p. 1085). Strong sustainability therefore implies the existence of limits to 
economic growth. 
Both schools of sustainability are in agreement concerning the need for 
reductions in the scale of materials and energy throughput. However, a key 
difference between the two positions is that those in favour of strong 
sustainability believe that such reductions in throughput will only arise if 
the scale of economic output (i. e. in economic growth) is reduced. By 
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questioning whether energy throughput can be substantially reduced in a 
growing economy, the strong sustainability school is clearly sceptical of 
the potential for decoupling. Daly and Cobb (1989) argue that the evidence 
suggesting that energy efficiency has improved in recent years by no 
means implies that economic growth can continue without impairing the 
environment. They point out that measurements of improvements in 
energy efficiency may be very misleading since they ignore the indirect 
energy costs of the technology used to increase energy efficiency. Gever et 
al. (1987) clarify this point; "In agriculture, for example, the amount of 
fuel used directly on a cornfield to grow a kilogram of corn fell 14.6% 
between 1959 and 1970. However, when the calculation includes the fuel 
used elsewhere in the economy to build the tractors, make the fertilisers 
and pesticides, and so on, it turns out that the total energy cost of a 
kilogram of corn actually rose by 3% during that period. " (Gever et al. 
(1987) p. 102-3). Whilst the precise extent to which gains in energy 
efficiency will be offset by indirect costs is unclear, Daly and Cobb 
conclude that "In the economy as a whole 
... 
net energy efficiency 
improvements (combining direct and indirect energy costs) are likely to be 
minimal. " (Daly and Cobb (1989) p. 409). 10 The World Bank (1992) 
provides evidence of a reduction of certain air pollutants, particularly lead 
and suspended particulate matter, between 1970 and 1988, despite 
substantial economic growth in this period. However, there is little 
evidence that decoupling has occurred for some pollutants such as carbon 
dioxide. Furthermore, as Ekins (1992) points out, energy use per unit of 
GDP actually rose for the US and several European countries in 1987 and 
1988. Given this conflicting evidence, Bernstam's (1991) claim that the 
environment only improves beyond a certain level of wealth is subjected 
to extensive empirical analysis in Chapters 5 and 6. 
10 Furthermore, the law of entropy means that production necessarily entails the 
consumption of some energy, and thus there is a limit to the extent of efficiency gains. 
Once this limit is reached, any further expansion of the scale of production will 
unequivocally mean an increase in resource depletion and associated waste. 
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In contrast to Bernstam, Hueting (1992) believes that any relationship 
between economic growth and environmental well-being is likely to be 
negative. After arguing that production growth in the economy is largely 
the result of increases in labour productivity, Hueting claims that between 
one-quarter and one-third of the activities making up national income 
(notably state consumption) do not contribute to its growth, since, by 
definition, no increases in labour productivity can result from them. Thus, 
a moderate growth rate of GNP will only be achieved by a much higher 
growth rate in the growth conducive activities. What this effectively 
means is that 70% of GNP growth is generated by 30% of the activities 
making up GNP. 11 The reason that growth has typically been detrimental 
to the environment is because this 30% represents the most 
environmentally intensive industries in the economy i. e. oil, 
petrochemical, mining etc. For decoupling to be successful, any reductions 
in the energy intensity of such industries will therefore have to be at least 
as large as the (high) rate of production growth. Hueting (1992) claims 
that such a task will be extremely difficult and states that, typically, 
technological improvements have provided little benefit to the 
environment as the growth of the activity has simply offset the effect of 
the advance. 
An additional point is that, even if substantial improvements in energy 
efficiency could be attained, to claim that such energy efficiency 
decouples economic growth from the environment assumes that resource 
depletion and pollution are the only environmental costs associated with 
increasing output. It therefore neglects other environmental costs such as 
the continued encroachment of industry into the countryside, and the 
exacerbation of noise pollution and congestion which is likely to result 
from increased product transportation. 
II Hueting has updated this analysis to 1986 with the same result. 
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The belief that sustainable development should recognise the existence of 
strict limits to material growth, and should therefore require output levels 
to be constrained accordingly, is held by William Rees (1990). For Rees, 
as sustainable development has been increasingly adopted by the political 
mainstream, its meaning has moved ever further from its true goal of 
achieving ecological sustainability. Indeed, Rees is critical of the 
interpretation of sustainability which is provided by the Brundtland 
Report. He comments, "To those who regard present levels of industrial 
activity as the root cause of global environmental decline, the 
Commission's appeal for a 'revitalisation' of economic growth 
... 
seems 
paradoxical at best. " (Rees (1990) p. 18). Continuing the work of 
Georgescu-Roegen from the 1970s, Rees analyses the economic process in 
terms of the laws of thermodynamics and considers the implications of 
present levels of production, not merely for the depletion of resources, but 
also for the assimilative capacity of the environment. He states that the 
impact of exceeding current limits is to damage the capacity of the 
biosphere to assimilate waste, thus reducing future limits to growth. Rees 
therefore concludes that sustainable development must be "development 
that minimises resource use and the increase in global net entropy. "(ibid., 
p. 19). 
However, having described the forms that sustainable development may 
take, the question of how to implement such sustainability must be raised. 
It has been suggested that making society pay the true costs of production 
would contribute to the attainment of sustainable development 
-a claim 
clearly stemming from Pigou's analysis of the divergence between private 
and social costs. If this analysis is accepted, then it follows that the correct 
price to charge would be one that covers the full social cost (i. e. includes 
external environmental costs). A comprehensive adoption of the 'Polluter 
Pays Principle', via taxation or otherwise, would be one means of making 
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producers charge this social cost, thus aiding the implementation of 
sustainable development. 
An additional factor which may aid the implementation of sustainable 
development is the development of new indicators of economic success to 
replace the current reliance on GNP. 
4.5.3 Developing New Indicators of Production and Welfare. 
The use of GNP as an indicator of economic success is widespread. 
Governments throughout the world gear their policies towards increasing 
the growth rate of their GNP, whilst the development policies of the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund are often only deemed 
successful if they too result in a similar outcome. However, many 
economists question the use of GNP as such a measure of success. 
Criticism is levelled at the use of GNP for two reasons; firstly its 
proficiency as an indicator of economic production is disputed, and 
secondly the ability of GNP growth to represent an increase in welfare is 
questioned. As a result, suggested reform measures have taken two forms; 
firstly, an adjustment of existing GNP to include environmental factors, 
thus in effect creating an indicator of sustainable income; and secondly to 
replace the use of GNP as an indicator of welfare with an indicator created 
specifically for this purpose. 
The deficiency of GNP as a measure of production (or income) stems, in 
part, from its failure to treat natural capital in the same way as man-made 
capital. In the system of national accounts, net national product is 
calculated from GNP by deducting that portion of output which is used up 
in the production process i. e. that level of man-made capital which is lost 
through 'wear and tear'. However, no similar calculation is made for 
natural capital. As Schmidheiny points out, "When a forest is felled for 
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timber, GNP includes the income earned, but no loss of future productive 
capacity is recorded. If countries were run like businesses, there would be 
an accounting for depletion of valuable assets such as forests, oil, topsoil, 
and water. " (Schmidheiny (1992) pp. 30-31). Indeed, as Schmidheiny 
notes, Repetto (1989) has shown that when depreciation for oil, timber, 
and topsoil were taken into account in the Malaysian economy, economic 
growth between 1971 and 1984 was only 4%, as opposed to the official 
7%. 
An additional deficiency of GNP concerns its treatment of defensive 
expenditures 
- 
the expenses incurred to protect society from the side 
effects of production, such as pollution control. Presently, and somewhat 
paradoxically, these expenses are not treated as intermediate costs, but are 
instead classed as final expenditures and hence included as an addition to 
GNP, therefore supposedly representing an addition to welfare. Thus as 
Daly (1973) notes, "We count the real costs as benefits... "(Daly (1973) 
p. 150. ) It is often argued (e. g. Pearce (1993)) that since this expenditure is 
not undertaken to enhance well-being, it should not be included in 
sustainable income 
Pearce (1993) consequently defines a measure of 'green' NNP in the 
following way; 
'green'NNP=GNP-DM-DN-DestrN 
Where; DM = Depreciation of man-made capital 
DN = Depreciation of natural capital (or the costs of 
replacing such depreciation with renewable substitutes) 
DestrN = Destruction of natural capital 
This is broadly compatible with Daly's (1989) measure of 'green' NNP, 
although instead of the destruction of natural capital, Daly includes the 
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level of defensive expenditures. The advantage of using defensive 
expenditures as a measure of environmental damage is the fact that there 
exist observable data which are already expressed in monetary terms. 
However, the danger is that most environmental damage is not restored 
and thus such defensive expenditure will vastly underestimate the extent 
of actual destruction. It may therefore prove necessary to include an 
additional variable to take account of residual environmental damage. 
In line with the definition of income provided by Hicks, the measure of 
'green' NNP, above, can be interpreted as a sustainable measure of income 
or production. 12 It indicates the level of income that a nation can afford to 
consume without running down its overall capital stock i. e. the income 
that it could produce indefinitely. As Ekins points out, if GNP was 
comprehensively adjusted in the manner suggested above, "then much of 
the context of the 'limits to growth' debate would disappear because the 
new adjusted GNP simply would not grow in an economy that was fast 
depleting natural capital or generating social and environmental 
externalities. " (Ekins (1993) p. 285). However, a constant or increasing 
level of 'green' NNP does not mean that an economy is environmentally 
sustainable. First, although 'green' NNP outlines the amount of 
expenditure needed to maintain environmental quality, it does not, of 
course, mean that this expenditure will actually be made. Second, 'green' 
NNP can actually grow even if environmental degradation worsens. As 
long as the growth rate of GNP is greater than the growth rate of natural 
capital depreciation, ceteris parabus, 'green' NNP will increase. Thus, 
12 In Value and Capital, Hicks wrote "The purpose of income calculations in practical 
affairs is to give people an indication of the amount which they can consume without 
impoverishing themselves. Following out this idea, it would seem that we ought to define 
a man's income as the maximum value which he can consume during a week, and still 
expect to be as well off at the end of the week as he was at the beginning. Thus, when a 
person saves he plans to be better off in the future; when he lives beyond his income he 
plans to be worse off. Remembering that the practical purpose of income is to serve as a 
guide for prudent conduct, I think it is fairly clear that this is what the central meaning 
must be. " (Hicks (1948), p. 172). This measure of 'green' NNP outlined by Pearce and 
Daly clearly conforms, at a national level, to Hicks's principle. 
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'green' NNP improves on some of the failings of GNP, but cannot be 
considered to be an indicator of environmental quality. 
Given the above possible amendments to GNP a sustainability test, or 
'savings rule', would be to assess whether an economy is saving at least as 
much as the sum of the depreciation of man-made capital, the depreciation 
of natural capital and the value of environmental degradation (or the level 
of defensive expenditures). If the resultant level of adjusted net savings, or 
genuine savings, is positive it indicates that the economy is developing 
sustainably. This is only a test for 'weak' sustainability, however, since it 
effectively states that the value of the depreciation of natural capital is of 
little consequence as long as this value is re-invested in other forms of 
income-generating assets. Hamilton et al. (1997) outline how 
technological change, human resources, resource discoveries and critical 
natural capital can be incorporated into the concept of 'genuine' saving. 
The inclusion of criticial natural capital thereby provides a measure of 
'strong' sustainability by recognising that such capital and man-made 
capital are not substitutes. 
The above methods of adjusting the existing stock of monetary accounts 
are not accepted by all, however. Tisdell (1994) questions the policy value 
of these adjustments, and argues that their sole purpose would be to warn 
that environmental conditions are deteriorating, or natural stocks are 
falling. Furthermore, "... by the time this becomes apparent from aggregate 
ex post figures damage is likely to have been irreversibly done. " (Tisdell 
(1994) p. 143). He therefore suggests that it may be more beneficial to 
concentrate on improving the physical measurement of environmental 
factors, particularly in the light of the difficulties associated with valuing 
natural resources and given the weaknesses of 'green' NNP as an indicator 
of environmental sustainability. Indeed, Norway has experimented with 
the use of physical accounts, whereby certain natural resources are 
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accounted in physical terms thus allowing an examination of their 
development over time. Whilst such an approach avoids the problems of 
adjusting the monetary accounts, as mentioned above, the use of physical 
accounts does suffer from the lack of a common unit of measurement and 
the inability to gauge the importance of different accounts relative to each 
other. However, to an extent this does not matter. Only by studying 
individual national accounts will policy makers be aware of whether the 
economy is operating in an environmentally sustainable manner and be 
able to gear policies towards those indicators which are deteriorating. 
Accounts of this nature would therefore appear to be essential if 
sustainability is to be achieved. Chapter 8 advocates the implementation of 
a system of physical accounts, which are common to all countries, thereby 
facilitating sustainable development at the global level. 
Attention will now be turned to the second criticism levelled against GNP 
- 
its inability to represent social welfare. The limits to growth arguments 
of the 1970s took economic growth and growth in GNP to be 
synonymous, and disputed the claim that an increase in growth (GNP) 
directly raised social welfare. However, a more recent development has 
seen the link between economic growth and production growth challenged. 
Both Ekins and Max-Neef (1992) and Hueting (1992) argue that the 
purpose of the economy is to provide welfare, and consequently an 
increase in economic growth should represent an increase in welfare. An 
increase in the scale of production, however, is simply one of many factors 
which may affect social welfare. Hueting (1992) outlines eight factors 
which play a role in determining the level of welfare, of which the level of 
production is just one. The other seven are the number of environmental 
goods, leisure time, income distribution, working conditions, employment, 
health, and the safety of the future. Thus, according to advocates of this 
argument, growth in GNP does not necessarily mean economic growth 
(welfare growth). 
102 
The perceived failure of GNP to represent social welfare has led to a 
number of attempts to construct an alternative indicator of welfare to 
replace the use of GNP in this role. Nordhaus and Tobin (1972) were 
arguably the first to create such an index (entitled the Measure of 
Economic Welfare (MEW)), although their attempt would now appear to 
be of only limited use due to their failure to consider environmental issues. 
Personal consumption, leisure and nonmarket work were major 
components of the index, with deductions made for necessary expenditures 
such as national defence, sanitation services, costs of commuting to work 
and 'urban disamenities' which were judged to be compulsory rather than 
contributing to welfare. The results of the MEW are considered below. 
Zolotas (1981) proposed the Index of the Economic Aspects of Welfare, 
which although similar to Nordhaus and Tobin's index, extended it to 
consider environmental factors. Personal consumption, leisure and 
household services again form the bulk of Zolotas's index, whilst private 
pollution control costs and resource depletion are deducted. The results of 
both Zolotas and Nordhaus and Tobin show that for the period 1947 (1950 
for Zolotas) to 1965 their indices of welfare increased by less than one- 
third of the growth of per capita GNP which rose by 2.2% per annum 
between 1947 to 1965. In addition, Zolotas's index remained much the 
same for the period 1965 to 1977. Whilst both indices indicate that welfare 
increased by a smaller proportion than GNP, both still show a positive 
correlation between GNP growth and welfare, thus implying that GNP 
growth is likely to be beneficial. However, as Daly and Cobb (1989) point 
out, both indices omit a number of social and ecological indicators which 
appear to be adversely affected by the growth of GNP. 
Daly and Cobb (1989) therefore attempted to provide a more 
comprehensive welfare index which they named the Index of Sustainable 
Economic Welfare (ISEW). The ISEW consists of personal consumption, 
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weighted by distributional inequality and adjusted upwards for: services 
from household 
-labour, consumer durables, and streets and highways, 
public current expenditures on health and education, net capital growth 
and the change in net international position. Downward adjustments were 
made for: water, air and noise pollution, loss of wetlands and farmlands, 
depletion of non-renewable resources, long term environmental damage, 
road accidents, urbanisation, commuting, advertising expenditure, 
defensive private expenditure on health and education, and expenditures 
on consumer durables. 
Although the ISEW increased consistently throughout the 1950s and 
1960s, there has been a downward trend since the mid 1970s, despite GNP 
growth throughout this period. Whilst the accuracy of a study of this 
nature is indeed contentious, and Daly and Cobb themselves are aware of 
the limitations of any attempt to estimate economic welfare over time, the 
ISEW is at least useful in illustrating the growing divergence between the 
traditional measure of welfare, GNP, and an alternative indicator of this 
type. 
The apparent existence of falling welfare, in the face of GNP growth 
would be further evidence to substantiate the claims of the anti-growth 
lobby. However, the 'heroic' assumptions admittedly made by Daly and 
Cobb in the compilation of the ISEW clearly weaken its results and, as 
Ekins and Max-Neef point out, cast doubt on a welfare index of this kind 
ever gaining enough support to be officially adopted. Indeed, Atkinson 
(1995) also criticises the ISEW by claiming that available data are not 
sufficient to perform this task, resulting in the use of a number of ad hoc 
methods. 
The development of alternative indicators of welfare does illustrate though 
that, like the limits to growth arguments of the 1970s and the sustainable 
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development debate in general, there remains little consensus over the 
precise relationship between economic growth (GNP growth) and the 
environment. 
4.6 Conclusion. 
An analysis of the 'limits to growth' debate of the 1970s illustrates that the 
arguments raised against economic growth generally fall into three 
categories: the existence of natural resource scarcity; the ability of the 
biosphere to absorb waste; and the development of social externalities. 
The social arguments against growth appear to have attracted little 
attention. However, the arguments relating to natural resource scarcity and 
waste absorption have proved to be contentious. Indeed, it has become 
apparent that many of the catastrophic claims made by the Club of Rome, 
for example, have proved to be wide of the mark. It appears that, by 
overstating their case, some of those in opposition to unlimited 
exponential growth may have effectively discredited what was in fact a 
credible stance, if stated in a milder form. This failure to convince society 
at large of the need to replace economic growth as the number one policy 
objective is illustrated by the fact that the Brundtland Report still 
interpreted growth as being compatible, even complementary, to 
environmental well-being. Indeed, this viewpoint is held by all mainstream 
advocates of sustainable development. 
The two sides of the economic growth debate can invariably be classified 
as technological 'optimists' or 'pessimists'. Placing great emphasis on the 
power of human intelligence, the former argue that the development of 
new technology will eliminate any future resource constraints that may 
arise, as has been the case in the past. In contrast, the 'technological 
pessimists' do not place such faith in future technological advance, and 
would argue that it is very dangerous to assume that because mankind has 
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not faced any real resource constraints in the past, we will not do so in the 
future. However, as Costanza (1989) points out, "Ultimately, no one 
knows. Both sides argue as if they were certain but the most insidious 
form of ignorance is misplaced certainty. " (Costanza (1989) p. 3). 
The inaccuracy of many of the claims made by 'limits to growth' 
advocates, and the ambiguous nature of sustainable development in 
general, would also seem to illustrate the uncertainty which exists and the 
lack of knowledge we have concerning the impact of the economy on the 
environment. Given this uncertainty, Chapters 5 and 6 estimate the 
historical relationship between per capita GDP and a wide range of 
environmental indicators in an attempt to clarify the economy- 
environment relationship. 
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CHAPTER 5. 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
- 
AN 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS. 
5.1 Introduction. 
The previous chapter has examined, from a predominantly theoretical point 
of view, the relationship between economic growth and the environment 
and has illustrated that this relationship is still subject to much uncertainty. 
It would therefore appear that this debate cannot be settled by theoretical 
arguments alone but must instead be subjected to empirical analysis, with 
the estimation of environmental Kuznets curves (EKCs). This chapter is 
based on Cole et al. (1997). 
The environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis is that there is an inverted-U 
relationship between economic growth and environmental damage (Stem 
et al. (1996)). Factors such as changes in the composition of output, the 
introduction of cleaner production technology and greater public demand 
for stricter controls on emissions (Grossman and Krueger (1996)) can lead 
to a declining, and eventually a negative, marginal change in pollution 
being associated with rising per capita incomes. A number of studies have 
estimated EKCs from cross-country panel data sets relating emissions per 
capita (Selden and Song (1994), Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1992)) or 
concentrations of pollutants (Grossman and Krueger (1993,1995), Shafik 
(1994)) to per capita income for certain air and water pollutants. As 
emphasised by Grossman and Krueger (1996), Arrow et al. (1995) and 
Stem et al. (1996), these estimated regressions are reduced form 
relationships; they reflect correlation rather than a causal mechanism by 
which the growth process affects the environment. Nevertheless, these 
studies provide evidence that, for at least those pollutants involving local 
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short-term health hazards, market and institutional mechanisms have 
eventually brought about a reduction in environmental damage during the 
course of economic growth. 
This chapter extends the previous empirical analysis of EKCs in a number 
of ways. First, it is more extensive in that it investigates a wider range of 
environmental indicators and it employs more recent data, thereby serving 
as a check on earlier results. The environmental indicators used in this 
analysis are: carbon dioxide, CFCs and halons, methane, nitrogen dioxide, 
sulphur dioxide, suspended particulate matter, carbon monoxide, nitrates, 
phosphorous, municipal waste, energy consumption and traffic volumes. In 
addition, emissions of nitrogen dioxide, sulphur dioxide and suspended 
particulate matter from the transport sector and energy use by the transport 
sector, are considered separately. Second, it utilises a generalised least 
squares estimation procedure to correct for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation so giving more efficient estimations in contrast to many 
earlier studies which rely on ordinary least squares. Third, standard errors 
at the estimated turning point level of income are calculated to indicate the 
accuracy of the estimates. Of the other studies, only Grossman and 
Krueger (1993,1995) also do this. Fourth, the possibility of 
contemporaneous feedback from environmental degradation to economic 
growth, which would lead to simultaneity bias in the estimation of EKCs, 
has been examined by testing the null of exogeneity of the income 
variables. Results indicate that simultaneity is not present. These 
refinements of earlier studies go some way towards meeting the strictures 
of Stern et al. (1996) regarding the problems surrounding the estimation of 
EKCs. 
The employment of a reasonably comprehensive data set permits the 
examination of a number of hypotheses relating to the association between 
economic growth and the environment. First, that pollutants with a local 
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short-term impact (e. g. suspended particulate matter) will have estimated 
turning points at lower per capita income levels than those environmental 
indicators whose impact is more global in nature (e. g. carbon dioxide). 
Grossman (1994) suggests that this distinction is due to the fact that 
individuals demand that governments address local pollutants due to their 
obvious anti-social effects. In contrast, governments have little incentive to 
unilaterally reduce global pollutants, since their impact is far more 
widespread. Indeed, Arrow et al. (1995) suggest that global pollutants may 
even increase monotonically with income. Thus, a subsidiary hypothesis is 
that a global pollutant will only have an estimated turning point within the 
observed income range if it has been subjected to a multilateral policy 
initiative. The second hypothesis is that, for local air borne pollutants, 
turning points for concentrations in urban areas will be at lower per capita 
income levels than for total emissions per capita. Seldon and Song (1994) 
suggest several reasons why this may be the case, including the point that 
it is more difficult to reduce total emissions than urban concentrations, 
since the latter could be reduced by simply building taller chimneys. The 
third hypothesis is that emissions per capita of transport-generated local air 
pollutants will have turning points at higher levels of per capita income 
than total emissions per capita of the same local air pollutants. The rapid 
growth of the transport sector in recent years, together with the reluctance 
of many governments to regulate its environmental impact, suggests that 
air pollution from transport will prove more stubborn to control than in 
other sectors. 
In order to throw further light on the relationship between economic 
growth and environmental quality, this chapter examines several 
environmental indicators which have only an indirect impact on the 
environment, namely per capita values of total energy use, energy use from 
transport, municipal waste and traffic volumes. Even though these 
indicators may be responsible for serious environmental problems, it is 
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hypothesised that they will exhibit a relationship with per capita income 
similar to that hypothesised for the global air pollutants 
- 
due to the lack of 
incentive for government action. 
5.2 The Environmental Indicators. 
Any study of this nature is constrained by the availability of environmental 
data. However, in recent years this availability has improved considerably, 
and data now exist for a wide range of environmental quality measures. 
Table 1 provides details of the data used. 
Table 1. Data Information. 1 
Environmental 
Indicator 
Time 
Period 
No. Countries/ 
Regions 
Unit Source 
Carbon Dioxide 1960-91 7 regions tonnes of 
carbon 
Marland, Andres, 
Boden (1994) 
CFCs and Halons 1986, 
1990 
38 countries ('86) 
39 countries ('90) 
tonnes UNEP (1993) 
Methane late 1980s 88 countries tonnes UNEP (1993) 
Nitrogen Dioxide 1970-92 10 countries tonnes OECD 1993 95 
Sulphur Dioxide 1970-92 11 countries tonnes OECD 1993 95 
SPM 1970-92 7 countries tonnes OECD 1993 95 
Carbon 
Monoxide 
1970-92 7 countries tonnes OECD (1993,95) 
Nitrogen Dioxide 
from Transport 
1970-92 9 countries tonnes OECD (1993,95) 
Sulphur Dioxide 
from Transport 
1970-92 9 countries tonnes OECD (1993,95) 
SPM from 
Transport 
1970-92 7 countries tonnes OECD (1993,95) 
Nitrates 1975-90 30 rivers in 15 
countries 
mgN/litre OECD (1993,95) 
Phosphorous 1975-90 28 rivers in 16 
countries 
mgP/litre OECD (1993,95) 
Municipal Waste 1975-90 13 countries tonnes OECD 1993 95 
Total Ener Use 1980-92 22 countries MTOE OECD 1993 95 
Energy Use from 
Transport 
1970-90 24 countries MTOE OECD (1993,95) 
Traffic Volumes 1970-92 22 countries kilometres OECD (1993,95)] 
1 The Data Appendix contains a sample of these data 
- 
namely, those for carbon dioxide, 
a key indicator in this thesis, and for nitrogen dioxide, as an example of the OECD data. 
Per capita income data are also included. 
2 Suspended particulate matter. 
3 Million tonnes of oil equivalent. 
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5.2.1 Indicators with a DIRECT Local Environmental Impact. 
(i) Nitrogen Dioxide. 
Man-made emissions of nitrogen dioxide stem mainly from the burning of 
fossil fuel, with motor vehicles responsible for a significant proportion of 
total emissions. The atmospheric deposition of nitrogen dioxide has 
resulted in the acidification of lakes, rivers and forests, particularly in 
northern Europe and eastern North America. Exposure to relatively low 
levels of nitrogen dioxide is believed to result in respiratory irritation and 
breathing problems and in animals has been shown to reduce resistance to 
bacterial and viral infection. Furthermore, vegetation growth may be 
suppressed and textile fibres, rubber products and polyurethanes can be 
degraded by exposure to nitrogen dioxide. 
(ii) Sulphur Dioxide. 
Like nitrogen dioxide, sulphur dioxide results from the burning of fossil 
fuel, particularly in electricity generation and home heating, and 
contributes to acid deposition in lakes, rivers and forests. Short term 
exposure to sulphur dioxide also affects the respiratory tract, causes 
coughing and deterioration of lung functions particularly amongst children, 
the elderly and asthmatics. Although both nitrogen dioxide and sulphur 
dioxide are responsible for transboundary acid deposition, they also pose 
serious health risks in the heavily populated urban areas in which they are 
emitted in high concentrations. Overall then, their impact is far more 
localised than that of carbon dioxide, thereby justifying the distinction 
which has been drawn between local and global pollutants. 
(iii) Suspended Particulate Matter. 
Suspended particulate matter is composed of solid or liquid particles which 
remain airborne once emitted and which originate from industrial activity 
and fossil fuel use, particularly the burning of coal. It is often the most 
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obvious kind of air pollution since its existence results in loss of visibility 
and the soiling of buildings, clothing etc. Exposure to high levels of 
suspended particulate matter results in respiratory problems, the irritation 
of mucous membranes, the aggravation of existing lung and heart disease 
and even death in severe cases, such as those which occurred in London in 
the 1950s and early 1960s. Furthermore, the combination of suspended 
particulate matter and sulphur dioxide exacerbates the health effects 
associated with each. 
(iv) Carbon Monoxide. 
Carbon monoxide is generated predominantly by motor vehicles and has 
become a significant health hazard in many of the world's larger cities. 
The adverse effects on health associated with carbon monoxide stem from 
its ability to interfere with the absorption of oxygen by red blood cells. 
(v) Emissions of Local Air Pollutants From Transport. 
Carbon monoxide, however, is not the only pollutant generated in large 
quantities by the transport sector. In 1991, for example, the transport sector 
was responsible for almost 20% of carbon dioxide emissions from energy 
use (OECD (1993)). It has also been estimated that transport is responsible 
for 29-32% of world-wide anthropogenic emissions of nitrogen dioxide, 
10-20% of suspended particulate matter, and 2-6% of sulphur dioxide 
(Faiz et al. (1992)). For each of the above local air pollutants, the 
relationship between income and the level of emissions resulting from the 
transport sector is examined. 4 
Data for all the local air pollutants are constructed from estimates of fuel 
use which are then applied to country and year specific estimates of 
emissions per unit of fuel used. 
4 Note that carbon monoxide from the transport sector is not considered separately to total 
carbon monoxide since there is very little difference between the two. For example, in 
1993, carbon monoxide emissions from the transport sector accounted for 82% of total 
emissions in the USA and 92% in the UK (OECD 1995). 
112 
Water Pollution. 
(vi) Nitrates. 
With regard to water pollution, this study considers the relationship 
between income and the level of nitrates in rivers. The concentration of 
nitrates in surface and groundwaters has been a source of concern for some 
years and nitrate concentrations beyond the World Health Organisation's 
drinking water guideline are widespread in European and North American 
aquifers (UNEP (1993)). High concentrations of nitrates are suspected of 
causing methaemoglobinaemia in bottle-fed infants. The presence of 
nitrates in rivers and lakes appears to be a direct consequence of the use of 
nitrogen fertilizers on nearby land. 
(vii) Phosphorous 
The second indicator of water quality is the level of phosphorous detected 
in rivers. Phosphorous in river water is often the result of detergents 
entering the river networks and is also associated with the use of phosphate 
fertilisers on agricultural land. If river water contains high concentrations 
of nutrients such as nitrates and phosphates, the result will be a 
proliferation of algal growth. Decaying algae will then consume oxygen, at 
the expense of fish and other aquatic life. 
Nitrate and phosphorous data are given in terms of annual mean 
concentrations of nitrates and phosphorous, measured at the mouth or 
downstream frontiers of the rivers. 
Freshwater pollutants absent from this analysis would include the level of 
dissolved oxygen, the concentration of fecal coliform, and the 
concentrations of heavy metals. 
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5.2.2 Indicators with NO DIRECT Local Environmental Impact. 
(i) Carbon Dioxide. 
Carbon dioxide is a global pollutant for which a comprehensive set of data 
exists. Estimated emissions derive from fossil fuel burning, cement 
production and gas flaring. The data on fossil fuel emissions are created by 
applying carbon dioxide emissions coefficients to the United Nations fossil 
fuel consumption data series; cement emissions data stem from cement 
manufacturing data compiled by the US Bureau of Mines; gas flaring 
emissions stem from the United Nations and the US Department of 
Energy's Energy Information. 
(ii) Total Energy Use. 
In the 1970s the primary environmental concern was the finite nature of 
our supply of fossil fuels. In the 1990s this is a secondary concern, with 
the attention of environmentalists now turned to a different energy problem 
- 
how to deal with the waste which is generated when energy is consumed. 
Indeed, global warming and increased acid rain both stem from greater 
resource use and clearly, the more energy consumed, the more pressing 
these problems become. This study therefore also examines the 
relationship between economic growth 
-and total energy consumption. 
Total energy use data refer to the energy used "by the different end-use 
sectors (i. e. industry, transport, agriculture, commerce, public services and 
residential uses, as well as non-energy uses of gas, coal, oil and oil 
products). It includes consumption of solid fuels (mainly coal), oil, gas, 
electricity and heat" (OECD (1993) p. 204). 
(iii) CFCs and Halons and Methane. 
Other global pollutants considered in this paper are chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs) and halons, and methane. CFCs and halons were, until recently, 
commonly found in refrigeration units and aerosols, whilst halons, in 
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particular, have been widely used as fire extinguishants. Data on the 
consumption of CFCs and halons are based on official reports submitted to 
the Ozone Secretariat, UNEP, under the terms of the Montreal Protocol. 
Note that the trade and consumption of black market CFCs are unlikely to 
be included in these data. Methane is emitted from a variety of sources 
including, landfills, wet rice cultivation, energy production and use, 
biomass burning, and livestock. Due to a lack of time series data these 
environmental indicators are subjected to OLS cross-section analysis. 
Carbon dioxide, CFCs and halons, and methane are all `greenhouse gases' 
which are believed to contribute to global warming 
.5 The term `greenhouse 
gas' refers to certain pollutants which are released by human economic 
activity and which have the effect of preventing heat from escaping into 
the upper atmosphere. 6 It is therefore widely believed that any increase in 
the concentration of these gases will cause the earth's surface and lower 
atmosphere to get warmer 
- 
hence the `greenhouse effect'. Although there 
is uncertainty surrounding the extent and timescale of any climate change, 
the scientific consensus, as represented by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), predicts significant global warming by the middle 
of the next century if current practices remain unchanged. This would 
clearly have widespread ecological and economic implications. 
A global pollutant missing from this analysis is nitrous oxide, another 
greenhouse gas. Its omission is due to the limited nature of nitrous oxide 
emissions data. 
s The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (1990) estimates that carbon dioxide is 
responsible for two-thirds of the greenhouse effect, with methane responsible for 15 
percent, CFCs approximately 24 percent and nitrous oxide 6 percent. As Cline (1992) 
points out though, subsequent findings would indicate that CFCs have a smaller impact 
than the IPCC believed. 
6 The greenhouse gases are transparent to short wave radiation from the sun and allow 
about half to reach the earth's surface, but are relatively opaque to the long wave 
radiation emitted from the earth, trapping about 80 to 90 percent. (Cline 1992). 
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(iv) Municipal Waste. 
Municipal waste data measure waste from households, small commercial 
and industrial enterprises, office buildings, institutions such as schools and 
government buildings and market and garden residuals which are collected 
by and for the municipalities. 7 Two-thirds of OECD waste is disposed of in 
landfill sites, with the result that new sites are constantly being sought-8 
Local opposition to proposed sites is often strong due to the associated 
disruption to the countryside and the increase in freight traffic. In addition, 
in 1991, solid waste was responsible for 16% of total anthropogenic 
methane emissions, thereby providing a contribution to global warming. 
(v) Energy Use from Transport. 
The transport sector also contributes significantly to global total energy 
consumption. Indeed, in 1991, the transport sector was responsible for 
30.8% of total energy consumption in the OECD (OECD (1993)). As a 
result, the relationship between economic growth and energy consumption 
from the transport sector is examined. Energy consumption by the 
transport sector refers to the energy used by air, road and rail transport. It 
should be noted, however, that the transport sector does not only directly 
use energy in the operation of vehicles. As Transnet (1990) point out, the 
demand for transport also results in a demand for the manufacture of 
vehicles and vehicle components; a demand for associated raw material 
manufacture; a demand for the maintenance of vehicles; a demand for 
transport infrastructure; and a demand for the generation of energy. These 
indirect energy requirements are not considered in this analysis, thereby 
7 It should be noted that the municipal waste data simply records how much waste is 
collected, and provides no information concerning how much of that waste is then 
recycled. Recycling rates are rising steadily within the OECD, with the recycling of glass 
standing at 66% in the Netherlands in 1990, for example. However, even for the 
Netherlands, recycled waste represented only 4% of total waste collected in 1990. This 
compares with 3.6% in France, 3.4% in Japan and a relatively high 14% in the USA. 
(OECD (1993)). 
OECD (1993). Calculation is made for 1990, or for late 1980s where 1990 data were not 
available. 9 World Resources Institute (1994) 
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perhaps underestimating the true environmental impact of the transport 
sector. 
(vi) Traffic Volumes. 
Road traffic volumes are expressed in kilometres travelled by all road 
vehicles. The average number of kilometres travelled each year by road 
vehicles is multiplied by the number of motor vehicles in use. Changes in 
traffic volumes are a major factor in explaining the impact of transport on 
the environment, in terms of air pollution, noise pollution, increased 
congestion, and the ever growing pressure for the construction of new 
roads. 
The income, population and trade intensity data for the period 1960-92 
originate from the Penn. Mark 5.6 World Tables, in Summers and Heston 
(1991). The income variable used is real per capita GDP, measured in 
purchasing power parity terms and in 1985 US dollars (variable RGDPCH) 
which allows comparison of income levels between countries and over 
time. The measure of trade intensity is the trade openness variable which is 
the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP. 
5.3 Framework. 
To estimate the relationship between income and environmental quality 
reduced form equations are used which relate the environmental indicators 
to per capita income, for each region or country. The environmental 
indicators are also in per capita form, except for the two measures of water 
pollution, nitrates and phosphorous. '° 
10 Note that due to data constraints a panel analysis is not possible for CFCs and halons, 
and methane therefore a simple OLS cross-section analysis is adopted. 
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Why a Reduced Form? 
Shafik (1994) argues that there are four key determinants of environmental 
quality: (i) natural endowments such as climate and location, (ii) per capita 
incomes which reflect industrial composition and urbanisation, (iii) 
environmental policies and (iv) exogenous factors such as the level of 
technology, trade intensity and population density. Environmental quality 
could clearly be modelled using structural equations which include the 
above as variables, but such an approach would require extensive data 
which, for the most part, either do not exist or, as Grossman and Krueger 
(1995) point out, are of questionable validity. An alternative is to model 
environmental quality using a reduced form approach, as practised by 
Grossman and Krueger (1995), Shafik (1994), Selden and Song (1994) and 
Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1992). Natural endowment is accommodated in 
reduced form equations by the inclusion of fixed effects which allow each 
country or region to have its own intercept. The inclusion of per capita 
income in the reduced form is intended to capture both the direct and the 
indirect consequences of economic growth. Therefore, explanatory 
variables which themselves are generated by economic development i. e. 
the endogenous effects of growth such as the composition of output and 
the growth of urbanisation, are not explicitly considered. With regard to 
environmental policy, although not lending itself to direct inclusion in a 
reduced form approach, it is likely that there is a relationship between such 
policy and the level of per capita income across countries. The level of 
technology, if exogenous, may be reflected in a time trend which is linear 
in nature. However, the inclusion of a time trend raises a number of 
complicating issues. As a result, a model containing a time trend is 
considered separately in Chapter 6, with the time trend (i. e. the level of 
technology) being omitted for the purposes of this present chapter. " Trade 
1' Whilst, for the most part, the reduced form can accommodate the key determinants of 
environmental quality (with the possible exception of environmental policy), the 
influence on environmental quality of other factors such as the oil price changes in the 
1970s and 80s will generally not be accommodated. 
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intensity (the ratio of the sum of imports and exports to GDP) is included 
as an independent variable to test the hypothesis that the more trade- 
oriented a country is, the more degraded is its environment. The 
relationship between trade liberalisation and environmental degradation is 
discussed in Chapter 3. Population density is also tested as an independent 
variable following Selden and Song (1994) who suspect this variable to 
have an inverse relationship with pollution. Their reasons for such a 
suspicion are that if a country has low population density, the government 
may not be too concerned with reducing per capita pollution emissions. 
Secondly, a less concentrated population may require more transportation 
thus raising transport generated pollution. Finally, the rate of economic 
growth is tested as an independent variable. Typically, it is the level of 
income rather than its rate of change which is believed to affect 
environmental quality. Panayotou (1998), however, claims that a high rate 
of income growth could reduce environmental quality if the rapid 
accumulation of stock pollutants exceeds the assimilative capacity of the 
environment. Although increased pollution abatement could perhaps offset 
this accumulation of pollutants, as Panayotou points out, there is no reason 
to assume that a faster rate of economic growth will result in more 
pollution abatement than that corresponding to each level of per capita 
income. 
Given the above, and in the absence of the level of technology, 
environmental quality could be expressed as follows; 
EQ=f(n, Y, p, X) 
where, EQ = environmental quality 
n= natural endowment. This is accommodated using fixed effects. 
Y= per capita income. This is intended to also capture the 
endogenous effects of economic growth. 
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p= environmental policy. This is likely to be a function of income. 
X= exogenous factors such as trade intensity, population density 
and the rate of income growth. 
Specifically, two reduced form equations are estimated; 12 
(1) Quadratic in levels; 
Eic = (a + µi F1) + RYic + Yß'2 it + (PXic + eic 
(2) Quadratic in logs; 
1nE; t = (a, + is F; ) + 11In(Y, c) + 8(1nY; c )2+ coX, c + e1 
where, E= the environmental indicator in per capita form 
Y= per capita income 
F= region or country-specific fixed effects 
X= exogenous factors 
i=1..... n regions 
t =1....... T years 
A priori, the quadratic logs function would seem to provide a more 
realistic income / environmental quality path than the quadratic levels 
function due to the symmetrical nature of the latter. 13 With regard to 
pollution for example, this symmetry implies that, firstly, pollution levels 
will fall at the same rate as they increased, and secondly, these pollution 
levels will become negative, possibly in a very short space of time. Two 
12 A cubic function was also estimated, but the fact that every cubic relationship 
necessarily goes to plus or minus infinity was deemed to be unrealistic. As a result, the 
study concentrates on quadratic relationships, although linear and log linear relationships 
are also considered for two environmental indicators. 13 Appendix G contains the proof that a quadratic levels function with a positive income 
term and a negative income squared term will be symmetrical around the maximum 
turning point, whilst a quadratic logs function will not be. 
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examples of quadratic functions, one in logs the other in levels, which both 
give the same turning point, will illustrate this point: 
If the two quadratic functions are; 
lne = 31ny 
- 
0.5(lny)2 
... 
(a) 
e= 
-10 + 10y - 0.25y2 
... 
(b) 
The first order differentiation of (a) and (b), respectively, gives; 
dine 
dlny =3-m y 
de 
_ 
10-0.5y 
dy 
if 3-lny=O 
then 3 =1n y 
and y=2o 
substituting lny =3 into (a); 
lne =3 (3) 
- 
0.5 (3)2 
lne=9-4.5 
lne = 4.5 
e= 90.0 
if 10-0.5y=0 
then 10 = 0.5y 
10 
0.5 y 
and y=20 
substituting y= 20 into (b); 
e= 
-10 + 10 (20) - 0.25 (20)2 
e=-10+200- 100 
e=90 
Turning points for both functions occur at (20,90). Furthermore, second 
order differentials are negative, thereby confirming that these are maximum 
turning points. 
Diagram 1, below, illustrates the two functions. The quadratic levels 
function can be seen to be symmetrical around the turning point. In 
contrast, once the quadratic logs function passes the turning point it falls 
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away only gradually, as the curve asymptotically approaches zero. Those 
pollutants that have experienced falling emissions would seem to have 
followed a path closer to the quadratic logs function than the quadratic 
levels function, with pollution levels stabilising and then falling only 
gradually. Therefore, of the two functional forms, the quadratic logs 
function would seem to provide a more realistic basis with which to model 
the relationship between income and environmental quality. 
Diagram 1. 
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With regard to the actual estimation procedure, an analysis of ordinary 
least squares residuals, for all estimations, indicates the existence of 
autocorrelation, that is the error terms are correlated over time, as well as 
heteroscedasticity, i. e. the variance of the error terms is not equal. 14 Due to 
the existence of these features, a generalised least squares approach is 
adopted following Kmenta (1986), which corrects for both autocorrelation 
and heteroscedasticity. '5 
`° For all estimations Box-Pierce and Durbin-Watson tests were used to indicate the 
existence of autocorrelation. Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey, Harvey, and Glejser tests were also 
used to indicate heteroscedasticity. 
15 See Appendix H for an outline of Kmenta's (1986) GLS process. 
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The Standard Errors of the Turning Points 
- 
The Delta Method. 
To assess the reliability of estimated turning points, the standard error 
associated with each turning point is calculated and reported in Table 2, 
below. The Delta method is used to calculate the errors, following Greene 
(1993). For the logged quadratic function, for example, it takes the 
following form: 
If mE=a+ ßlnY+ q(1nY)2 
81nE 
=+ 201nY 81nY 
At the turning point, 
1nY* 
_ 
-)6 
20 
45* *Q thus; 
- 
=2 and 
SSY= 
20' 
The Delta method states that, given the above, the variance of income at 
the turning point is as follows; 
Var Y* = (-1/2q5 ß/20Z) 
(varp 
Cov 
(1/2qs 
Cov Vary ß/2q2 
The standard error of r is then = var Y* 
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Simultaneity Bias. 
A Hausman specification test was employed to test the null of exogeneity 
of current income in the EKC. Lagged income was used as the 
instrumental variable. The test statistic is a Wald statistic, which is then 
referred to a chi-squared distribution, with appropriate degrees of freedom 
(see Greene (1993)), of the form; 
W=(b 
- 
bn, )'[V1-Vo]'1(b 
- 
bIV) 
A 
where b= the GLS estimators using current income 
A b I, = the GLS estimators using lagged income (the instrumental 
variable) 
V1= the variance-covariance matrix for the estimation using lagged 
income 
VO = the variance-covariance matrix for the estimation using 
current income, divided by the variance of the current income estimation 
and multiplied by the variance of the lagged income estimation. 
This test has been performed for all of the key pollutants 
- 
namely carbon 
dioxide and all four local air pollutants. The null of exogeneity was 
accepted in all cases, indicating that simultaneity is unlikely to be present. 
The test results are included in the next section. 16 
Fixed or Random Effects? 
A random effects specification was also used for the local air pollutants 
and carbon dioxide (i. e. for the key pollutants), even though it was felt that 
16 Note that this test is similar to the Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen test used by Holtz- 
Eakin and Selden (1992). Note also that the Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen test and the 
test used in this chapter have low power to reject the null. 
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this specification is more appropriate for studies which use site-specific 
data such as Grossman and Krueger (1993,1995). A Hausman test was 
used to ascertain whether fixed or random effects estimation was preferred 
by determining whether the random effects are correlated with the income 
terms. Only in the absence of such correlation is random effects estimation 
consistent and efficient. Again, the test statistic is based on the Wald 
criterion, of the form; 
W=[b-B]'E'i[b-B] 
A Where b= the GLS estimator using fixed effects 
A B= the GLS estimator using random effects 
E=Var[b]-Var[B] 
In all instances the test statistics indicate that the random effects are 
correlated with the income variables, and hence the fixed effects estimation 
is favoured. The test results are included in the next section, whilst the 
random effects regression results are reported in Appendix I. 
5.4 Results. 
The tables below present the results from Kmenta's (1986) generalised 
least squares approach for the favoured quadratic logs functional form, 
using fixed effects estimation. 17 Appendix I contains GLS quadratic levels 
results as well as GLS linear results (where appropriate), all OLS results 
and all random effects results. The dummy variables form the difference in 
intercept between the relevant country or region, and that of the country or 
region which forms the constant. The figures in parentheses are the `t' 
statistics. Buse R2 is a goodness of fit measure for generalised least 
17 For CFCs and halons, and methane OLS results are reported. 
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squares, which is calculated using weighted variables following Buse 
(1973). It is analogous to the definition of R2 used with ordinary least 
squares, and provides a measure of the proportion of the generalised sum 
of squares of the dependent variable which is attributable to the influence 
of the explanatory variables. D. W. and B. P. refer to Durbin-Watson and 
Box-Pierce tests 
- 
both of which test for the existence of autocorrelation in 
the OLS estimations. B. P. G., Harvey, and Glejser refer to the Breusch- 
Pagan-Godfrey, Harvey and Glejser tests, which test the OLS estimations 
for heteroscedasticity. An asterisk (*) indicates those tests which suggest 
that autocorrelation or heteroscedasticity is present, with a 95% confidence 
interval. Hausman test results for simultaneity and fixed versus random 
effects are also reported, with degrees of freedom in parentheses. 
Choice of Country in the Diagrams: 
For each environmental indicator, the estimated GLS quadratic logs 
relationship between per capita income and environmental quality is 
shown for one of the sample countries or regions. '8 Countries with 
relatively low levels of per capita income have been chosen in the 
diagrams, where possible, if the estimated turning point is at a relatively 
low level of income. This is to illustrate as much of the estimated 
income/environmental quality relationship as possible, and to ensure that 
the turning point is included. If the sample only contains nations with 
similar per capita income levels, the UK has been chosen. The diagrams 
show the likely future path of the income/environmental quality 
relationship, given their previous relationship. 
Table 2 indicates the estimated percentage change in total 
emissions/energy use/traffic volumes over the period 1990-2000 for all 
environmental indicators. Calculations are made for the UK, or Western 
18 The diagram for CFCs and halons stems from an OLS regression. 
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Europe in the case of carbon dioxide. Again, the quadratic logs functional 
form is used together with a two per cent per capita income growth rate. 19 
Table 2. Percentage Change of Total Environmental Indicators in the 
UK 1990-2000. 
Environ. Indicator % Change Environ. Indicator % Change 
Sulphur Dioxide 
-35.8 Phosphorous -32.4 
Sulphur Dioxide 
- 
Tran. 
-15.6 Carbon Dioxide +14.2 
SPM 
-36.2 Total Energy Use +10.9 
SPM 
- 
Transport +7.7 CFCs and Halons 1990 -1.4 
Carbon Monoxide 
-20.0 Transport Energy Use +27.7 
Nitrogen Dioxide +3.7 Municipal Waste +27.3 
Nitrogen Dioxide 
- 
Tran. +11.6 Traffic Volumes +25.1 
Nitrates +15.1 
Table 2 illustrates that many of the local air pollutants are expected to fall 
considerably between 1990 and 2000, but also makes clear the distinction 
between total local air pollution emissions and transport generated local 
air pollution. Also clear is the extent of the expected increase of the more 
indirect environmental indicators such as municipal waste, energy use and 
traffic volumes. These issues are discussed below. 
The trade intensity variable was estimated as negative throughout, thereby 
suggesting that an increase in trade intensity is associated with a fall in 
pollution / environmental damage. The variable, however, was not 
statistically significant for any of the environmental indicators. The results, 
below, therefore stem from regressions from which trade intensity was 
omitted. Grossman and Krueger (1993) also found the trade intensity 
19 According to the Penn. World Tables the UK had a per capita income level of $13,217 
in 1990 and W. Europe $11,540. Total emissions are calculated simply by multiplying 
estimated per capita emissions by population. Population in 2000 is estimated using 
United Nations projected growth rates (UNEP 1993). 
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variable to be negative, whilst it was statistically significant for only one of 
the three pollutants considered in their analysis. 
The population density variable appears to be acting as a linear time trend, 
and is statistically significant and insignificant, positive and negative for 
the same variables as the time trend. As a result, where data allowed, 
cross-section analyses were undertaken for individual years to assess 
whether population density is a determinant of environmental quality, in 
the absence of the time effect. The variable was statistically insignificant 
on all occasions. Due to this fact, and since the link between population 
density and environmental quality is tenuous at best, the results below are 
from regressions which do not include population density as an 
independent variable. 
The rate of economic growth was also statistically insignificant 
throughout, and did not have a uniform sign across indicators. The results 
below therefore stem from regressions from which the rate of economic 
growth was omitted. In contrast, Panayotou (1998) considers sulphur 
dioxide concentrations and finds the rate of income growth to be 
statistically significant and positive, implying that a higher growth rate 
results in higher sulphur dioxide concentrations. 
Tables 3 and 13, below, present the estimates of the turning point levels of 
income (in 1985 US dollars) for the favoured quadratic logs functional 
form, for those environmental indicators for which turning points were 
estimated, and provides a comparison with the results of other studies. ° As 
a point of reference, in 1992, per capita income (in 1985 US dollars) was 
$17,945 in the USA, $12,724 in the UK, $1,282 in India and a mere $408 
in Chad (Summers and Heston (1991)). The standard errors for these 
20 Note that estimated turning points should be treated with caution and, in reality, 
provide only an approximate indication of the income level at which emissions may begin 
to fall. 
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turning points are reported in parentheses, and were calculated using the 
Delta method. The letter 'F' denotes turning points that are higher than the 
maximum observed income in the data set; for the environmental 
indicators with these projected turning points, per capita emissions / 
environmental damage are increasing, at a declining rate, throughout the 
observed income range. Note that no turning points are estimated to be 
below the minimum income level in each sample. 
5.4.1 Indicators with a DIRECT Local Environmental Impact. 
Table 3. Estimated Turning Points (1985 US$). 
This Other Studies: 2' 
Stud : 
Emissions Urban Emissions 
per capita Concentrations per capita 
ENVIRON. Quad. G&K Shafik S&S 
14 
INDICATOR Logs 23 
Sulphur Dioxide $6,900 $4,053 $3,670 $8,916 
(563) 
Sulphur Dioxide $9,800 
- 
Transport (586) 
SPM $7,300 $6,151 $3,280 $9,811 
(264) 
SPM 
- 
Transport $18,000 
2,709 
21 Where, G&K refers to Grossman and Krueger (1995), Shafik refers to Shafik (1994), 
S&S refers to Selden and Song (1994) and H-E&S refers to Holtz-Eakin and Selden 
1992). All estimated turning points are in 1985 US dollars. 
Estimates result from a quadratic levels functional form. Suspended particulate matter 
data were split into two categories by Grossman and Krueger 
- 
smoke and heavy 
particles. This turning point is for smoke. The relationship between heavy particles and 
income was estimated to be monotonically decreasing. Figures in parentheses are the 
standard errors at the turning point, calculated by the Delta method. Grossman and 
Krueger used GEMS data published by the World Health Organisation, together with 
unpublished data from the US Environment Protection Agency. 23 Estimates are from a logged quadratic functional form. Data stem from the Monitoring 
and Assessment Research Centre (1991). 24 Estimates are from Selden and Songs' fixed effects quadratic levels functional form, 
without population density. Data were from the World Resources Institute (1991). 
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Table 3 (Continued). 
This Other Studies: 
Stud : 
Emissions Urban Emissions 
per capita Concentrations er capita 
ENVIRON. Quad. G&K Shafik S&S 
INDICATOR Logs 
Nitrogen Dioxide $14,700 $12,041 
(587) 
Nitrogen Dioxide $17,600 
- 
Transport (1,579) 
Carbon $9,900 $6,241 
Monoxide (353) 
Nitrates $25,000 F $10,524 
(6,779) 
Phosphorous $6,600 
500 
(i) Sulphur Dioxide. 
Table 4. 
SULPHU R DIOXIDE 
- 
GLS LOGS UADR ATIC 
Y 28.43 D7 0.0472 
(5.399) France (0.2295) 
Y 
-1.6084 D8 2.0527 (-5.649) Canada (10.99) 
Dl 
-0.014414 D9 0.66156 
W. Germany (-0.05387) Denmark (4.423) 
D2 
-0.43054 D10 0.072181 
Netherlands (-1.973) Italy (0.4995) 
D3 
-0.29282 CONSTANT -128.56 
Norway (-1.576) Ireland (-5.29) 
D4 0.75158 Buse R 0.7451 
UK (4.321) 
D5 1.7372 Hausman 5.3 
USA (8.738) simultanei (12 d 
D6 0.76627 Hausman 9.2 
Finland (4.652) fixedv. random (2 d 
11 COUNTRIES, 15 YEAR S= 165 OBSERV ATIONS 
The GLS projection contained in diagram 2 shows that per capita income 
and per capita sulphur dioxide emissions have an estimated turning point at 
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a per capita income level of approximately $6,800. As Table 3 illustrates, 
Grossman and Krueger (1995) and Shafik (1994) estimated turning points 
in urban sulphur dioxide concentrations at per capita income levels of 
$4,053 and $3,670, respectively, whilst Selden and Song (1994) estimated 
a turning point in sulphur dioxide emissions at $8,916. The fact that 
turning points for aggregate emissions are significantly higher than those 
for urban air concentrations was expected by Selden and Song, as 
mentioned previously. However, the results of this study, whilst still being 
notably higher than those of Grossman and Krueger and Shafik, are also 
notably lower than the estimates of Selden and Song, thereby weakening 
their argument. 
Diagram 2. 
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Nevertheless, the fact that all estimated turning points are at relatively low 
levels of income illustrates just how successful efforts have been to reduce 
sulphur dioxide emissions. In 1985, the Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution was formed which contained the Sulphur 
Protocol committing signatories to reduce emissions by 30% from 1980 
levels to 1993. Most nations achieved this goal and even non-signatories 
have reduced their emissions. Total sulphur dioxide emissions in Europe 
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fell from approximately 55 million metric tonnes in 1980 to approximately 
40 million in 1991 (World Resources Institute (1994)). In the developed 
world, a change from domestic coal burning to electricity and natural gas 
for cooking and heating has been responsible for a large proportion of this 
reduction in sulphur dioxide (UNEP (1993)). However, many developing 
countries have not made this switch and are now suffering from high levels 
of sulphur dioxide emissions. 
(ii) Suspended Particulate Matter. 
Table 5. 
SUSPENDED PARTICULATE MATTER 
- 
GLS LOGS QUADRATIC 
Y 31.449 D5 0.48937 
8.538 W. Germany (2.939) 
Y 
-1.7674 D6 0.0033189 (-8.707) France (0.01538) 
Dl 0.037248 CONSTANT 
-144.52 
Netherlands 0.1692 Norway (-8.659) 
D2 1.1171 Buse R 0.8975 
Ireland (6.409) 
D3 0.35469 Hausman 6.2 
UK (2.003) (simultaneity) (8 df) 
D4 2.4288 Hausman 6.7 
USA (13.47) (fixedv. random) (2 d 
7 COUNTRIES, 15 YEAR S= 105 OBSERVATIONS 
The projected relationship between per capita income and per capita 
emissions of suspended particulate matter is illustrated in diagram 3, 
below. As with sulphur dioxide, the turning point occurs at a relatively low 
per capita income level 
- 
approximately $7,300. Grossman and Krueger 
(1995) and Shafik (1994) estimated turning points for suspended 
particulate matter concentrations at per capita income levels of $6,151 and 
$3,280, respectively, whilst Selden and Song (1994) estimated a turning 
point for suspended particulate matter emissions at $9,811. Clearly, this 
disparity between estimated turning points for urban air concentrations and 
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those for aggregate emissions supported the hypothesis of Selden and 
Song. 
Diagram 3. 
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However, again, the results of this study are lower than those of Selden 
and Song whilst being higher than the estimates of Grossman and Krueger 
and Shafik. This chapter therefore does support the argument that turning 
points for aggregate emissions are higher than those for urban air 
concentrations, although the difference would not appear to be as large as 
Selden and Song believed. Compared to Selden and Song, this study uses 
far longer time series for each country, resulting in a greater number of 
observations and hence degrees of freedom. 25 However, although this 
chapter's observations for both sulphur dioxide and suspended particulate 
matter do fall on both the upward and downward sloping portions of the 
estimated curves, Selden and Song include more low income countries in 
their sample, and have a wider spread of income and better representation 
on the upward sloping portion. It is therefore difficult to say which results 
are preferable. 
25 Selden and Song's time series consists of averages for the periods 1973-75,1979-81 
and 1982-84. 
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Like sulphur dioxide, all estimated turning points for suspended particulate 
matter are at relatively low levels of per capita income. In the developed 
world the shift from coal and oil for heating and cooking, which led to the 
reductions in sulphur dioxide emissions, has also substantially reduced 
emissions of suspended particulate matter. However, rapid urbanisation in 
the developing world has meant that suspended particulate matter is still a 
major problem in many countries. This fact is substantiated by a joint 
study undertaken by the World Health Organisation and the United 
Nations Environment Programme of air quality in 20 of the world's largest 
cities. The study showed that WHO suspended particulate matter 
guidelines are exceeded by more than a factor of two in 12 of the 20 cities, 
and sulphur dioxide levels are also of concern in many of the cities 
(WHO/UNEP (1992)). Although, globally, progress has been made, there 
is clearly still much work to be done before emissions of suspended 
particulate matter and sulphur dioxide cease to be a problem. 
(iii) Carbon Monoxide. 
Table 6. 
CARBON MONOXIDE 
- 
GLS LOGS QUADRATIC 
Y 31.084 D5 1.8054 
(6.845) USA (13.33) 
Y 
-1.6885 D6 0.49938 (-6.974) France (3.572) 
D1 0.52967 CONSTANT 
-145.34 W. Germany (2.634) UK (-6.827) 
D2 
-0.0043304 Buse R 0.8749 
Netherlands (-0.02093) 
D3 0.87769 Hausman 9.7 
Norway (5.289) (simultaneity) (8 df) 
D4 0.3382 Hausman 10.9 
Re (1-788) 1 fixedv. random (2 df) [__ 
7 COUN TRIES, 15 YEARS = 105 OBSERVATIONS 
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Diagram 4 below illustrates the GLS relationship between per capita 
income and per capita emissions of carbon monoxide. The turning point is 
estimated at approximately $9,900. This turning point is notably higher 
than that estimated by Selden and Song (1995) at $6,241. Nevertheless, the 
relatively low nature of all of these turning points indicates that per capita 
emissions of carbon monoxide are falling in the majority of the developed 
world, despite the continued growth of the transport sector. This success 
can largely be attributed to the fitting of catalytic converters to cars 
- 
even 
the earliest form of which, the oxidation catalyst, tackled carbon monoxide 
- 
and cleaner, more energy efficient engines. 
Diagram 4. 
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(iv) Nitrogen Dioxide. 
Table 7. 
NITROGE N DIOXIDE 
- 
GLS LOGS QUADR ATIC 
Y 18.538 D7 0.10424 
(5.702) Finland 1.008 
Y 
-0.96586 D8 -0.56677 
-5.613 France (-5.342) 
Dl 
-0.16695 D9 0.41381 
W. Germany 
-1.578 Canada (6.364) 
D2 
-0.20622 CONSTANT -91.932 
Netherlands 3.051 Denmark 
-5.986 
D3 0.031121 Buse R 0.9148 
Norway (0.3569) 
D4 
-0.22393 Hausman 11.1 
Sweden (-3.245) (simultaneity) 11 d 
D5 
-0.056081 Hausman 12.0 
UK (-0.7432) fixedv. random (2 d 
D6 0.5615 
USA (8.624) 
10 COUNT RIES, 15 YEARS = 150 OBSERVATIONS 
Diagram 5. 
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Diagram 5 contains the GLS projections of the relationships between per 
capita income and per capita nitrogen dioxide emissions, for the two 
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functional forms. The diagram uses the UK's estimated intercept. Turning 
points occur at a per capita income level of approximately $14,700. This 
compares with Selden and Song's estimated turning point of $12,041, from 
Table 3. Whilst the income levels associated with these turning points are 
clearly substantially lower than those estimated for carbon dioxide, they 
are still relatively high compared with the other two local air pollutants, 
sulphur dioxide and suspended particulate matter. The main reason for this 
finding would seem to be the large contribution of the ever-growing 
transport sector to total nitrogen dioxide emissions. 
(v) Sulphur Dioxide from Transport. 
Table 8. 
SULPHUR DIOXIDE TRANSPORT 
- 
GLS LOGS QUADRATIC 
Y 23.829 D5 0.38715 
(4.291) UK (2.604) 
Y 
-1.2963 D6 -0.071094 (-4.334) Finland (-0.3177) 
D1 
-0.054051 D7 0.33148 
W. Germany (-0.2324) France (1.827) 
D2 0.51288 D8 1.2192 
Netherlands (3.05) Canada (9.524) 
D3 0.91165 CONSTANT 
-115.96 
Norway (5.114) Ireland (-4.505) 
D4 0.69231 Buse R 0.684 
Denmark (2.154) 
9 COUNTRIES, 15 YEAR S= 135 OBSER VATIONS 
Diagram 6, below, illustrates the GLS relationship between per capita 
income and per capita sulphur dioxide emissions from the transport sector. 
The turning point is estimated to occur at a per capita income level of 
approximately $9,800. Interestingly, this turning point can be seen to be 
notably higher than those estimated for total sulphur dioxide emissions. 
The USA is omitted from this estimation as its inclusion led to imprecise 
results. This can be explained by the fact that, in contrast to the other 
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sample countries, the USA does not appear to have reached a turning point 
for sulphur dioxide emissions from transport, with emissions rising 
steadily throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s. The omission of the 
USA clearly weakens the results, however. 
Diagram 6. 
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Although the transport sector is not a major contributor to total sulphur 
dioxide emissions, it can be seen that the reduction of sulphur dioxide 
emissions from the transport sector has proven more difficult than the 
reduction of non-transport sulphur dioxide emissions. 
(vi) Suspended Particulate Matter from Transport. 
The results contained in Table 9 are for the estimated relationships 
between per capita income and per capita suspended particulate matter 
from transport. This relationship is illustrated in diagram 7. The turning 
point is estimated to occur at a per capita income level of approximately 
$18,000. This can be seen to be considerably higher than those estimated 
for total suspended particulate matter emissions and illustrates the fact that 
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particulate emissions from the transport sector are increasing in all sample 
countries throughout the time series. 
Table 9. 
SPM TRANSPORT 
- 
GLS LOGS QUAD RATIC 
Y 9.6647 D4 1.6822 
(5.517) USA (11.59) 
Y 
-0.49306 D5 0.07412 (-5.125) W. Germany (0.5012) 
Dl 0.41891 D6 0.51526 
Netherlands (2.482) Norway (3.521) 
D2 1.2166 CONSTANT 
-54.168 
Ireland (8.498) France 
-6.791 
D3 1.0548 Buse R 0.9496 
UK (4.818) 
7 COUNTRIES, 15 YEAR S= 105 OBSER VATIONS 
Diagram 7. 
Ireland Per Capita Suspended Particulate Matter Emissions 
from Transport 
0.004 
0.0035 
4 0.003 
N 
0-0.0025 
0.002 
v "0.0015 
0.001 
0.0005 t 
0 11- 
5000 
In uad 
Suspended particulate matter from the transport sector is released 
predominantly by diesel-fuelled vehicles and the wear and tear of brake 
linings. The wider use of catalytic trap oxidisers, which are primarily 
designed to reduce particulate emissions from diesel engines, should see 
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particulate emissions from transport at least begin to stabilise, unless goods 
vehicle traffic volumes increase significantly. 
(vii) Nitrogen Dioxide from Transport. 
The estimated relationship between per capita income and per capita 
nitrogen dioxide emissions from the transport sector is illustrated in 
diagram 8, below. The turning point is estimated at a per capita income 
level of approximately $17,500. The relatively high nature of this turning 
point indicates that nitrogen dioxide emissions from transport have proved 
to be difficult to reduce. This difficulty arises largely from the fact that 
traffic volumes are increasing steadily (as illustrated in diagram 16) 
negating any minor fuel efficiency achievements. 
Table 10. 
NITROGEN DIOXIDE TRANSPORT 
- 
GLS LOGS QUADRATIC 
Y 20.487 D5 0.69644 
(5.132) Finland (19.03) 
Y 
-1.0481 D6 0.35845 (-4.911) Denmark (3.371) 
Dl 0.40106 D7 0.92944 
W. Germany (10.82) Canada (18.17) 
D2 0.32798 D8 0.83057 
Netherlands (9.183) Norway (17.89) 
D3 0.30172 CONSTANT 
-104.06 UK (8.939) France (-5.575) 
D4 0.75061 Buse R 0.9232 
USA (14.42) 
9 COUNTRIES, 15 YEAR S= 135 OBSER VATIONS 
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Diagram 8. 
0.03 
UK Per Capita Nitrogen Dioxide Emissions from Transport 
U) 0.025 
0 
U) 
0.02 14 y EW 
Bö0.015 
M 
A 
v 0.01 
m CL 0.005 
uad In 
14 
0- 
9000 11000 13000 15000 17000 19000 21000 
Per Capita Income (US $) 
The introduction of three-way catalytic converters in many OECD 
countries should, however, lead to a marked drop in nitrogen dioxide 
emissions (as well as carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons) in the near 
future. Unfortunately, the three-way catalyst is not without its drawbacks. 
Firstly, it is incompatible with diesel engined vehicles and thus will not 
reduce emissions from goods vehicles. Secondly, in the oxidation of 
nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons, the catalyst emits 
carbon dioxide, thereby reducing local air pollution, but contributing to 
global warming. Thirdly, the use of three-way catalysts may reduce the 
fuel efficiency of the vehicle to which it is fitted. The OECD (1987) quotes 
eight different references which state that three-way catalysts will increase 
fuel use by between 1 and 10%. Clearly, the more fuel which is used the 
more carbon dioxide will be emitted. A fourth problem associated with the 
use of catalytic converters is that they are now believed to increase 
emissions of nitrous oxide, another greenhouse gas. Dasch (1992) states 
that emissions from non-catalyst cars in the USA averaged 3.6mg of 
nitrous oxide per mile whereas emissions from vehicles fitted with three- 
way catalysts increased to 45mg of nitrous oxide per mile. 
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Whilst there is little doubt that the three-way catalyst will significantly 
reduce the quantity of nitrogen dioxide emitted from each passenger car, 
the continued increase in the volume of passenger car traffic will gradually 
negate this initial advance. Furthermore, the growth of nitrogen dioxide 
emissions from goods vehicles, to which three-way catalysts cannot be 
fitted, means that total nitrogen dioxide emissions may well exceed current 
levels by 2020 according to Earth Resources Research Limited (1990). 
Finally, the nature of the three-way catalyst means that nitrogen dioxide 
will be reduced (at least in the short term), but the reduction will occur at 
the expense of an increase in global warming. 
Water Pollution. 
(viii) Nitrates. 
Table 11. 
NITRATES 
- 
GLS LOGS QUADRATIC 
Y 10.224 D8 2.8616 
(3.849) Denmark (4.753) 
Y 
-0.50483 D9 1.0863 (-3.525) Finland (4.429) 
Dl 2.4047 D10 2.7068 
Spain (6.163) Greece (12.37) 
D2 2.7231 D11 3.1715 
W. Germany (9.425) Netherlands (16.33) 
D3 0.64021 D12 4.672 
Norway (2.78) Czech. (15.96) 
D4 1.9435 D13 3.2228 
Switzerland (5.21) Hungary (8.966) 
D5 3.6047 D14 2.8542 
UK (12.53) Bel ium (12.67) 
D6 1.793 CONSTANT 
-53.267 USA (8.54) Canada 
-4.321 D7 2.5304 Buse R 0.8696 
Italy (13.27) 
30 RIVERS, 4 YEARS =120 OBSERVATIONS 
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Diagram 9. 
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With regard to nitrate concentrations in river water, the estimated turning 
point occurs at the relatively high per capita income level of approximately 
$24,500. These turning points are significantly higher than the estimate of 
$10,524 by Grossman and Krueger (1995). 
(ix) Phosphorous. 
PHOSPHOROUS 
- 
GLS LOGS QUADRATIC 
Y 23.76 
(5.706) 
Y 
-1.3511 
(-5.931) 
CONSTANT 
-105.13 
(-5.533) 
Buse R 0.432 
- I 12 OBSERVATIONS 28 -RIVERS, 4 YEARS = 
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Diagram 10. 
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The inclusion of country-specific dummies in the estimation of the 
relationship between per capita income and phosphorous concentrations in 
river water, led to both income terms being statistically insignificant. 
Furthermore, all of the dummies were themselves statistically 
insignificant. Due to this fact, in the above estimation, all countries have 
been given the same intercept, the result being a low R squared value. 
Nevertheless, diagram 10 illustrates the projected relationship between per 
capita income and phosphorous concentrations, and indicates a turning 
point at a per capita income level of approximately $6,600. 
Turning points for the above pollutants can be seen to have small standard 
errors, indicating that the results are reliable 
- 
with the possible exception 
of the quadratic logs turning point for nitrate concentrations. 
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5.4.2 Indicators with NO DIRECT Local Environmental Impact. 
Table 13. Estimated Turning Points (1985 US $)o 
This Study: Other 
Studies: 
ENVIRON. Quadratic Holtz- 
INDICATOR Logs Eakin & 
Selden26 
Carbon Dioxide $62,700 F $35,428 & 
(27,247) $8 million 
Total Energy $34,700 F 
Use (9,719) 
CFCs $12,600 
& Halons 1990 (3,686) 
Transport Energy $4 million F 
Use (1.5 million) 
Traffic Volumes $65,300 F 
(19,412) 
Municipal Waste No estimated turning 
and Methane points 
(i) Carbon Dioxide. 
Table 14. 
CARB ON DIOXIDE 
- 
GLS LOGS QUAD TIC 
Y 3.505 D5 
-0.45546 (8.842) S. &C. America (-6.866) 
-0.15865 D6 0.16119 (-6.633) W. Europe (1.594) 
Dl 0.19459 CONSTANT 
-18.164 
Asia (4.193) Africa (-11.27) 
D2 1.0404 Buse R 0.9649 
E. Europe 7.239 
D3 0.79388 Hausman 4.0 
N. America 7.158 (simultaneity) (8 df) 
D4 0.056883 Hausman 13.6 
Oceania 0.4454 fixedv. random (2 df) 
7 REG IONS, 32 YEARS = 224 OBSERVATIONS 
26 Holtz-Eakin and Selden's turning point of $35,428 resulted from a quadratic levels 
functional form, whilst the turning point of over $8 million was estimated by a quadratic 
logs function. Data were from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (1992). 
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Diagram 11. 
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Diagram 11 illustrates the projected relationships between per capita 
income and per capita carbon dioxide emissions from the GLS results in 
Table 14. As indicated in Table 13, above, the estimated turning point is at 
a per capita income level of approximately $62,700. The confidence 
interval, however, includes a wide range of income. Thus carbon dioxide 
emissions monotonically increase within the observed income range and 
little confidence can be had in the estimated turning points. This is also the 
case for Holtz-Eakin and Selden's (1994) turning points. These results 
suggest that the global nature of carbon dioxide's impact has indeed 
provided little incentive for nations to take unilateral action to reduce 
emissions and multilateral action has been slow to develop. Global 
projections of total carbon dioxide emissions for the period 1992-2025 are 
contained in Appendix J, and show total emissions increasing steadily, for 
both functional forms. On a more positive note however, the 1992 Earth 
Summit in Rio de Janeiro at least heralded the start of joint action to 
prevent climate change. At the Summit, the European Union and Japan 
agreed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000 
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and in 1993 the US agreed to join the EU and Japan in this commitment, 
after at first refusing. Although many nations look unlikely to meet their 
agreed targets, their very existence at least indicates that the issue of 
climate change is slowly entering the political agenda. 
(ii) Total Energy Use. 
Table 15. 
TOTAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION 
- 
GLS LOGS QUADRATIC 
Y 4.2845 D11 0.12539 
(5.162) Greece (1.926) 
Y 
-0.20493 D12 0.40972 
-4.562 Ireland (6.159) 
D1 1.0681 D13 0.17188 
USA (13.76) Italy (2.273) 
D2 0.28459 D14 0.73154 
Japan (3.734) Netherlands (9.698) 
D3 0.62443 D15 0.85101 
Australia (8.068) Norway (11.19) 
D4 0.47733 D16 
-0.057178 
New Zealand 4.534 Portugal (-1.006) 
D5 0.49294 D17 0.020298 
Austria (6.528) Spain (0.2945) 
D6 0.70717 D19 0.43559 
Belgium 9.273 Switzerland (5.66) 
D7 0.45486 D20 1.1968 
Denmark (5.629) Canada (15.06) 
D8 0.93181 D21 0.40821 
Finland (11.81) UK (5.483) 
D9 0.3902 CONSTANT 
-35.457 
France 5.126 Turke (-9.385) 
D10 0.58136 Buse R 0.983 
W. German 7.315 
22 COUN TRIES, 13 YEA RS = 286 OBSERVATIONS 
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Diagram 12. 
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Diagram 12 provides the projected relationships between per capita 
income and per capita energy consumption from the GLS results contained 
in Table 15. The turning point is estimated at a per capita income level of 
approximately $34,700, indicating that per capita energy use has increased 
throughout the observed income range, despite advances in energy 
efficiency. Quite clearly, the effect of the growth of GDP has exceeded the 
extent of any energy efficiency gains. Given this rapid increase in energy 
use, it is no surprise to find that carbon dioxide emissions are also 
experiencing a similar increase. 
(iii) CFCs and Halons. 
Tables 16a and 16b and Diagram 13 illustrate the cross-section relationship 
between per capita income and the per capita consumption of CFCs and 
halons. The effects of the UK and the Netherlands, both of whom have 
very high levels of per capita consumption of CFCs and halons, have been 
isolated using dummy variables. Linear functions have also been estimated 
for 1986 due to the income squared terms being insignificant in the 
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Per Capita Income (US $) 
quadratic functions. Diagram 13, below, illustrates the log quadratic 
functional form for 1990 and the log linear functional form for 1986. 
Table 16a. 
CFCs AND HALONS 1986 
- 
OLS LOGS UADRATIC 
Y 4.8927 R 0.8615 
(2.119) 
Y 
-0.19218 B. P. G. 6.95 2 df* (-1.397) 
DNeth 1.163 HARVEY 8.641 2 df* 
1.791 
DUK 0.84054 GLEJSER 7.645 2 df* 
1.295 
CONSTANT 
-35.984 (-3.739) 
38 COU NTRIES 
Table 16b. 
CFCs AND HALONS 1990 
- 
OLS LOGS QUADRATIC 
Y 15.363 R 0.737 
4.255 
Y 
-0.81370 B. P. G. 17.031 2 df* (-3.802) 
DNeth 0.83182 HARVEY 9.78 2 df* 
(0.7826) 
DUK 0.91106 GLEJSER 32.324 2 di 
(0.8564) 
CONSTANT 
-80.089 
-5.302 
39 COU NTRIES 
In 1986, countries may have been reluctant to unilaterally reduce their 
consumption of CFCs and halons due to the global impact associated with 
these pollutants. 27 However, in 1987 the Montreal Protocol was adopted 
which committed its signatories to a reduction in a number of substances, 
including CFCs and halons, by 50% of their 1986 level by July 1999 
(UNEP (1993)). The success of this Protocol is illustrated by the estimated 
27 Barrett (1991), however, does point out that the severity of the potential impacts of 
ozone depletion seems to suggest that individual countries do have sufficient incentive to 
act unilaterally. 
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relationship between per capita income and the per capita consumption of 
CFCs and halons for 1990 which has an estimated turning point at a per 
capita income level of approximately $12,600. This result would clearly 
seem to illustrate the potential effectiveness of a multilateral response to an 
environmental problem. 
Diagram 13. 
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The case of CFCs and halons may well prove to be idiosyncratic, however, 
due not least to the relative ease with which cleaner alternatives to CFCs 
and halons have been developed, and hence their relatively low abatement 
costs. This analysis of CFCs and halons does illustrate that a multilateral 
policy initiative targetted at a global air pollutant can provide an estimated 
turning point within the observed income range. Clearly, in this example, 
the effect of the Montreal Protocol was to `tunnel through' the original 
1986 curve, resulting in the vastly different curve for 1990.28 
28 Munasinghe (1995) introduced the concept of `tunnelling through'. 
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(iv) Methane 
Table 17. 
METHANE late 1980s 
-O LS LOGS QUAD TIC 
Y 0.50739 
0.5172 
B. P. G. 2.272 2 df 
Y 
-0.01838 (-0.2978) 
HARVEY 1.001 2 df 
CONSTANT 
-5.8861 (-1.532) 
GLEJSER 2.3 2 df 
R 0.1209 
88 COU NTRIES 
Table 17 presents the estimated cross-section relationship between per 
capita income and per capita emissions of methane 
- 
another greenhouse 
gas. Clearly, however, this relationship is not statistically significant. The 
reason for this would appear to be the diverse nature of the sources of 
methane i. e. livestock, rice cultivation, landfill sites, energy production 
and use, biomass burning etc., which means that both developed and 
undeveloped economies can have relatively high methane emissions. 
(v) Municipal Waste. 
In contrast to the environmental indicators considered so far, the estimated 
relationship between per capita income and per capita municipal waste, as 
set out in Table 18, below, shows the income term to be negative and the 
income-squared term to be positive. This also applies to the quadratic 
levels function in Appendix C. Regional-specific dummies have been used 
because the use of country-specific dummies would have left few degrees 
of freedom due to the short time series. 
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Table 18. 
MUNICIPAL WASTE 
- 
GLS LOGS QUADRATIC 
Y 
-17.466 D3 0.71292 (-5.501) Oceania (3.665) 
Y 0.96572 CONSTANT 77.18 
5.697 E. Europe (5.252) 
D1 0.50138 Buse R2 0.9364 
W. Europe (2.719) 
D2 0.91676 
N. America (5.063) 
13 COUNTRIES, 4 YEA RS = 52 OBSERVATIONS 
Diagram 14. 
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Diagram 14 illustrates the relationship between per capita income and per 
capita municipal waste and projects that per capita municipal waste will 
rise steadily with per capita income, with no turning point even in the long 
term. 
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(vi) Energy Use from Transport. 
Table 19. 
ENERGY CONSUMPTION TRANSPORT 
- 
GLS LOGS UADRATIC 
Y 2.3572 D2 0.24833 
(4.244) Oceania (2.028) 
Y 
-0.067244 CONSTANT -30.327 (-2.209) W. Euro e (-11.97) 
Dl 0.68019 Buse R 0.9666 
N. America (5.409) 
24 COUNTRIES, 4 YEAR S= 96 OBSERVATIONS 
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Table 19 contains GLS results for the log quadratic relationship between 
per capita income and per capita energy consumption from the transport 
sector. 29 Region specific dummies have been used as the inclusion of 
country specific dummies would have significantly reduced the degrees of 
freedom due to the short time series. Diagram 15 shows the quadratic logs 
29 For the quadratic levels function, the fact that the income squared term was statistically 
insignificant and since an analysis of the plotted data revealed an almost linear 
relationship between per capita energy use from transport and per capita income, a linear 
functional form is also used (see Appendix Q. 
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relationship, which shows per capita energy consumption increasing 
steadily with economic growth. The function does estimate a turning point, 
albeit at a per capita income level of over $40 million. Clearly, traffic 
volumes have increased by such an extent as to cause per capita energy 
consumption from the transport sector to increase steadily, despite regular 
advances in fuel efficiency. 
(vii) Traffic Volumes. 
Table 20. 
TRAFF IC VOLUMES 
- 
GLS LOGS QUADRATIC 
Y 6.8551 D12 1.3263 
(8.3) Ireland (18.96) 
Y 
-0.30916 D13 0.68861 
-6.815 Italy (7.772) 
D1 1.2077 D14 0.71059 
USA (13.2) Netherlands (8.686) 
D2 0.45969 D15 0.51384 
Japan (5.491) Norway (5.746) 
D3 0.5492 D16 0.98332 
Australia (1.334) Portugal (12.01) 
D4 0.89549 D17 0.1887 
New Zealand (10.99) Spain (2.279) 
D5 0.78538 D18 0.76986 
Austria (8.181) Sweden (6.623) 
D6 0.66588 D19 0.61242 
Bel ium 8.728 Switzerland (5.311) 
D7 0.79753 D20 0.93151 
Denmark (9.64) Canada (10.32) 
D8 0.96266 D21 0.76296 
Finland (11.01) UK (6.607) 
D9 0.78873 CONSTANT 
-29.231 
France (8.728) Turke (-7.876) 
D10 0.75153 Buse R 0.9602 
W. German 8.959 
D11 0.83848 
Greece (5.472) 
22 COUN TRIES, 15 YEA RS = 330 OBSERVATIONS 
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Diagram 16. 
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Table 20 provides the GLS quadratic logs results of the relationship 
between per capita income and per capita traffic volumes. 30 Diagram 16 
shows the projection of this relationship between per capita income and 
per capita traffic volumes. The projection shows a turning point at a per 
capita income level of $65,300. 
The final three environmental indicators 
- 
per capita values of municipal 
waste, energy use by transport and traffic volumes 
- 
all increase 
monotonically throughout the observed income range. The standard errors 
associated with turning points for per capita energy use from transport and 
per capita traffic volumes are very large, however, implying that these 
estimates are unreliable. There is little evidence that the inverted-U 
pollution / income curve exists for these indicators, probably due to the 
lack of a direct local environmental impact associated with each. Apart 
from perhaps causing a loss of amenity value when disposed of in landfill, 
municipal waste only indirectly harms the environment by representing an 
increased use of resources and by generating methane via landfill sites. 
30 Since the income squared term was statistically insignificant for the quadratic levels 
function, a linear functional form is also used (see Appendix Q. 
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Furthermore, methane is a global air pollutant and as such there is little 
incentive to reduce emissions unilaterally. In addition, the environmental 
impact of municipal waste is further masked by the fact that the volume of 
municipal waste does not indicate just how much of that waste is 
recycled 
. 
31 Although the curve depicted in Diagram 14 illustrates the 
relationship between per capita income and per capita volumes of 
municipal waste, it should be pointed out that the composition of 
municipal waste, and hence its environmental impact, is likely to differ 
significantly between developed and developing countries. In the latter 
there is likely to be a far higher proportion of organic waste and hence a 
greater amount of methane emissions per unit of waste. A larger proportion 
of organic waste is also likely to result in leachates which may permeate 
rocks and enter aquifers. 
Like municipal waste, both energy use by transport and traffic volumes 
may have only an indirect impact on the environment, although an increase 
in traffic volumes can directly affect the welfare of motorists. 
Nevertheless, the significant increase in traffic volumes is clearly tending 
to counteract improvements which have been made in terms of fuel 
efficiency and pollution levels. It would therefore appear that the already 
considerable impact of the transport sector on the environment looks 
unlikely to weaken, at least in the short term. 
5.5 Conclusion. 
By examining a wide range of environmental indicators this paper has 
assessed whether EKCs exist for all such indicators, an issue raised by 
Arrow et al. (1995). The manner in which this has been done improves on 
many existing studies by correcting for autocorrelation and 
31 Efforts to reduce the volume of municipal waste are beginning to be made, however. 
For example, on the Ist October 1996 the British government introduced a tax of up to 
seven pounds per tonne of waste deposited at municipal collection sites. 
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heteroscedasticity; calculating standard errors at the turning point level of 
income to indicate the reliability of estimates; and testing for simultaneity 
to ensure no bias was present in the estimates. These factors overcome at 
least some of the weaknesses associated with the estimation of EKCs 
outlined by Stem et al. (1996). 
Results suggest that meaningful EKCs exist only for local air pollutants, 
whilst indicators with a more global, or indirect, environmental impact 
either increase monotonically with income or else have high turning points 
with large standard errors. Little confidence can be attached to such 
turning points. The results of this chapter also support the hypothesis of 
Selden and Song (1994) that urban air concentrations will peak at lower 
income levels than per capita emissions. This implies that it is easier to 
improve urban air quality than it is to reduce national emissions. The 
difference between the two turning point income levels would not appear 
to be as large as Selden and Song (1994) first suggested, however. 
It is important that the EKCs estimated for local air pollutants are not 
misinterpreted, in terms of their global impact. As pointed out by Stem et 
al. (1996) and Selden and Song (1994), global income distribution is 
skewed with median world income per capita far less than the mean, so 
that total emissions of a pollutant can still be increasing in the medium 
term, even though per capita emissions are estimated to peak at a 
reasonably low per capita income level. Clearly, despite the existence of 
EKCs, the reduction of emissions of these local pollutants remains vital, 
particularly in the developing world. 
The fact that, for local air pollutants, estimated turning points for transport 
generated emissions per capita are higher than those for total emissions per 
capita, indicates the importance of tackling pollution in the transport 
sector. In the developed world, emissions of local air pollutants are falling 
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in many sectors, resulting in a reduction in total emissions. If increasing 
transport emissions could be reversed, however, total emissions would 
obviously fall more rapidly. Similarly, energy use in the transport sector 
would appear to be growing more quickly than total energy use. More 
generally, the results also highlight the need to tackle indirect indicators, 
particularly energy use and traffic volumes. The steady increase of these 
indicators is clearly hindering attempts to control carbon dioxide emissions 
and transport generated emissions of local air pollutants. 
With regard to CFCs and halons, the analysis illustrates the importance of 
multilateral action for a global air pollutant and tends to confirm that, 
without such a policy initiative, global air pollutants will increase 
monotonically with income 
- 
at least for the per capita income levels that 
are predicted in the medium-term. Although the case of CFCs and halons 
may be encouraging, it does indicate that without multilateral action 
carbon dioxide emissions are unlikely to be controlled in the short term. 
Finally, as Grossman and Krueger (1996) have observed, there is nothing 
inevitable about the relationship between per capita income and 
environmental quality, as encapsulated in the EKC fitted to historical data. 
Indeed, the analysis of CFCs and halons illustrates that appropriate policies 
can `tunnel through' EKCs. Although there is evidence that developed 
countries have ` grown out of some pollution problems, it is important to 
stress that this is by no means an automatic process. Pollution levels have 
fallen only in response to investment and policy initiatives. 
158 
CHAPTER 6. 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
- 
AN 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS INCORPORATING TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHANGE. 
6.1 Introduction. 
Chapter 5 has provided a framework for analysing the relationship between 
economic growth and a wide range of environmental indicators. However, 
due to several complicating factors, the analysis in that chapter did not 
include a time trend and therefore failed to incorporate any factors which 
are common to all countries but which change over time. The level of 
technology may be such a factor. Using the same methodology as Chapter 
5, but including a time trend as a proxy for the level of technology, this 
chapter re-tests the hypotheses raised in the previous chapter and assesses 
whether the inclusion of technological change (or any other factor which 
changes over time) affects the results. This chapter also examines which 
environmental indicators appear to have benefited from technological 
change, and which have not. 
6.2 Framework. 
The following reduced form equations are estimated'; 
(1) Quadratic in levels; 
Eic = (a + µiFi) +I it + yY 2 it+ kt + eit 
' Note that for the reasons given in Chapter 5, trade intensity, population density and the 
rate of economic growth are omitted from the analysis. 
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(2) Quadratic in logs; 
1nE; t =(X+x; F; ) + r11n(Y; t) + O(1nY; t )2+ kt + e; t 
where, E= the environmental indicator in per capita form 
Y= per capita income 
k= time trend 
F= region or country-specific fixed effects 
i=1..... n regions 
t =1....... T years 
The Implications of Using a Time Trend. 
The inclusion of a linear time trend in a regression implies that the 
estimated curve is shifting upwards or downwards over time, depending on 
whether the estimated coefficient of the time trend is positive or negative, 
respectively. Diagram 1, below, illustrates a function with a negative time 
trend drawn for four consecutive years, with the curve falling throughout 
the period. 
Diagram 1. 
E 
t=1 
t=3 
t=4 
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However, when the function is plotted for the full four years (t=1,2,3,4), as 
opposed to one particular year, a complication arises. The relative sizes of 
the income growth rate and the time trend coefficient will now determine 
where the estimated turning point will occur, and a function indicated by 
t=1,2,3,4 may result. Point b, on the diagram, may not be reached, but 
rather there may be a movement from point a to point c. The size of the 
negative time trend has 'overcome' the income growth rate and the turning 
point has been reached 'prematurely'. 
A second complication associated with the use of a linear time trend is that 
each sample level of per capita income is now 'tied' to a particular year. 
When this is the case, the variable nature of the growth of actual income 
(as opposed to projected income) produces an extremely uneven 
relationship between plotted income and emissions. This point is 
illustrated in Diagram 2, below. 
Diagram 2. 
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The above diagram shows the relationship between actual per capita 
income and per capita emissions of suspended particulate matter, when a 
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time trend is included. The diagram results from a logged quadratic 
function and uses Ireland's intercept. 
As a result of this complication, it seems advisable that all diagrams 
illustrate the relationship between per capita income and the environmental 
indicators using income which grows at a constant rate of growth, rather 
than actual income. However, due to the first complicating factor, the 
choice of this income growth rate is now of great importance since it partly 
determines the position of the estimated turning point. This chapter 
therefore uses the average rate of per capita income growth across all 
countries and all years in each sample to obtain diagrams and turning 
points. 
6.3 Results. 
Table 1. Time Trends 
- 
Direction and T-Statistics. 
ENVIRONMENTAL Quadra tic Logs 
INDICATOR t-stat sign 
Carbon Dioxide 1.17 
- 
Nitrogen Dioxide 
Nitrogen Dioxide 
- 
Trans. 
1.05 
2.43 
- 
+ 
Sulphur Dioxide 
Sulphur Dioxide 
- 
Trans. 
10.36 
2.22 
- 
- 
SPM 
SPM 
- 
Transport 
10.65 
0.54 
- 
- 
Carbon Monoxide 8.82 
- 
Nitrates 5.74 + 
Phosphorous 5.64 + 
Municipal Waste 1.34 + 
Total Energy Consumption 1.48 
- 
Trans. Energy Consum tion 4.73 
- 
Traffic Volumes 7.36 + 
Table 1, above, provides a summary of the direction of the GLS estimated 
time trends, together with t-statistics, for all environmental indicators, for 
2 Transport energy use estimates stem from a log linear function. 
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the quadratic logs functional form. T-statistics in bold represent time 
trends which are significantly different from zero at a 95% confidence 
level. 
Tables 2 and 13, below, present the estimated turning points for the 
quadratic logs functional form, for those environmental indicators for 
which turning points were estimated. Comparison can be made with the 
results of other studies. The year that the estimated turning point 
was/would be reached, in the UK, is indicated in parentheses. The letter 
T' denotes estimated turning points that are higher than the maximum 
observed per capita income level in the data-set; for the environmental 
indicators with these projected turning points, per capita emissions / 
environmental damage are increasing, at a declining rate, throughout the 
observed income range. 
6.3.1. Indicators with a DIRECT Local Environmental Impact. 
Table 2. Estimated Turning Points (1985 US $). 
This Other Studies: 4 
Study: 3 
Emissions Urban Emissions 
Concentrations per capita 
ENVIRON. Quadratic G&K Shafik S&S 
INDICATOR logs 
Sulphur Dioxide $4,500 $4,053 $3,670 $8,916 
(pre 1970) 
Sulphur Dioxide 
- 
$9,000 
Transport (1975) 
SPM $3,000 $6,151 $3,280 $9,811 
(pre 1970) 
SPM 
- 
Transport $18,000 
ost 1992 
3 All turning points were calculated using the average level of per capita income growth 
rate for all the countries in each sample, throughout the time series. 
4 Where, G&K refers to Grossman and Krueger (1995), Shafik refers to Shafik (1994) 
and S&S refers to Selden and Song (1994). All estimated turning points are in 1985 US 
dollars. Note that all these studies incorporate time/technological change into their 
analyses. See Chapter 5, Table 3 for further information regarding these studies. 
163 
Table 2 (Continued). 
This Stud : Other Stud ies: 
Emissions Urban Emissions 
Concentrations per capita 
ENVIRON. Quad. logs G&K Shafik S&S 
INDICATOR 
Carbon Monoxide $7,100 $6,241 
re 1970 
Nitrogen Dioxide $14,500 $12,041 
(post 1992) 
Nitrogen Dioxide $19,500 F 
- 
Transport (post 1992) 
Nitrates $31,700 F $10,524 
(post 1992) 
Phosphorous $10,900 
1984 
The turning points from this study in table 2, above, and Table 13, below, 
have been calculated by estimating emissions/environmental quality given 
per capita income and the linear time trend. In effect they stem from curves 
such as t=1,2,3,4 in diagram 1. A different manner in which to calculate 
the turning point from a function which contains a linear time trend is to 
simply differentiate the estimated function with respect to income. This 
method, which is used, for example, by Grossman and Krueger (1993, 
1995), effectively ignores the time trend, which disappears in the 
differentiation process. In diagram 1, if this method was used, the 
estimated turning point would be that found on curves t=1, t=2, t=3 or t=4. 
Turning points calculated from both methods are presented in Table 3, 
below, (where the first method is referred to as `include time' and the 
second as `ignore time'), together with the turning points from the 
previous chapter which did not include a time trend. Standard errors, 
calculated by the Delta method, are in parentheses. 5 Note that standard 
errors for the first method, where the time trend is included in the 
regression and in the estimation of the turning point, would be the same as 
5 See Chapter 5 for details of the Delta method. 
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that for the second method, where the time trend is included in the 
regression but omitted when calculating the turning point. This is because 
the Delta method uses turning points obtained by differentiation, thus 
standard errors for the turning points from the first method would be based 
on the turning points from the second method. Since turning points from 
the second method are generally at higher income levels than those when 
the time trend is not included in the regression, standard errors also tend to 
be larger. 
Table 3. A Comparison of the Different Methods of Estimating 
Turning Points Used in this Study. 
Time Trend 
ENVIRON. No time 
INDICATOR Include Ignore trend6 
time time 
Sulphur Dioxide $4,500 $15,500 $6,900 
(1,929) (563) 
Sulphur Dioxide $9,000 $13,000 $9,800 
- 
Transport (1,978) (586) 
SPM $3,000 $27,000 $7,300 
(10,399) (264) 
SPM 
- 
Transport $18,000 $20,300 $18,000 
(5,826) 2,709 
Carbon $7,100 $18,600 $9,900 
Monoxide (3,096) (353) 
Nitrogen Dioxide $14,500 $16,300 $14,700 
(2,015) (587) 
Nitrogen Dioxide $19,500 $15,700 $17,600 
- 
Transport (1,817) (1,579) 
Nitrates $31,700 $6,700 $24,500 
(2,146) (6,779) 
Phosphorous $10,900 $6,100 $6,600 
605 500 
It can be seen that turning points for sulphur dioxide, suspended particulate 
matter, carbon monoxide and nitrates vary considerably across methods, 
6 From Chapter 5. 
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with the second method (where the time trend is included in the regression 
but ignored when calculating the turning point) generally providing turning 
points which are quite different to those estimated using the other two 
methods. 
Tables 4-12 and 14-19, below, contain results from the favoured quadratic 
logs functional form calculated using Kmenta's (1986) generalised least 
squares approach. Appendix K, includes GLS quadratic levels results as 
well as GLS linear results (where appropriate), and all OLS results. In 
order to assess whether the estimated time trend is consistent throughout 
the full time series, a dummy has been attached to the first half of the time 
trend for all indicators except those for which there are only four years of 
observations. 7 This dummy is statistically insignificant for all 
environmental indicators, and is therefore reported for only the first 
indicator to be analysed, sulphur dioxide. 
(i) Sulphur Dioxide. 
Table 4. 
SULPHU R DIOXIDE 
- 
GLS LOGS QUADRATIC 
Y 25.971 D6 
-0.33603 (6.271) Finland (-1.931) 
Y 
-1.3458 D7 -1.1033 
-5.976 France (-6.346) 
k 
-0.067253 D8 0.45423 
-10.36 Canada (2.088) 
D1 
-1.2421 D9 
-0.51952 W. Germany (-4.593) Denmark (-3.381) 
D2 
-1.483 D10 
-0.75387 Netherlands 
-10.16 Italy (-6.078) 
D3 
-1.5655 CONSTANT 
-126.58 Nonva 
-8.001 Ireland (-6.635) 
D4 
-0.18742 Buse R 0.8673 UK (-1.119) 
D5 
-0.14577 
USA (-0.4427) 
11 COUNT RIES, 15 YEAR S= 165 OBSER VATIONS 
7 Namely, nitrates, phosphorous, municipal waste and transport energy use. 
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Sulphur Dioxide with Dummy on 1st Half of Time Trend. 
Sulphur Dioxide 
Y 24.729 
(5.58) 
Y 
-1.2786 (-5.32) 
k 
-0.067441 (-10.42) 
dummy on Ist half 0.0024042 
of time trend 1.25 
Diagram 3. 
0.05 
U) ö 0.04 
N 
W 0.03 
mc 
-O 
V 0.02 V 
a) IL 0.01 
Ireland Per Capita Sulphur Dioxide Emissions 
0- 
3000 5000 7000 9000 11000 
Per Capita Income (US $) 
In quad 
Table 1, above, indicates that sulphur dioxide has a statistically significant, 
negative time trend. Diagram 3 illustrates the estimated relationship 
between per capita income and per capita sulphur dioxide emissions when 
this time trend is included. The estimated turning point is at the relatively 
low per capita income level of approximately $4,500 (or $15,500 if the 
time trend is ignored when estimating the turning point). Furthermore, 
Table 3 indicates that there is a large degree of variation between the three 
different estimated turning points. 
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The turning point of $4,500 still supports the hypothesis of Selden and 
Song (1994), that the turning point for per capita emissions of pollution 
will be at a higher level of income than that for urban air concentrations. 
However, since Grossman and Krueger estimated a turning point for urban 
air concentrations of sulphur dioxide at $4,053, the difference between the 
two is clearly small and hence the argument is somewhat weakened. 
The statistically insignificant dummy on the first half of the time trend 
implies that there is no statistically significant difference between the 
estimated time trend in the first half of the time series, compared to that in 
the second half. The estimated time trend for the full time series would 
therefore appear to be representative of the time trend in each half of the 
time series. This is also the case for all other environmental indicators 
since they too have statistically insignificant dummies on the first half of 
the time trend. 
(ii) Suspended Particulate Matter. 
Table 5. 
SUSPENDED PARTICULATE MATTER 
- 
GLS LOGS QUADRATIC 
Y 15.986 D4 1.6556 
(3.692) USA (10.56) 
Y 
-0.78337 D5 0.55485 
-3.29 W. Germany (4.755) 
k 
-0.074815 D6 0.12301 (-10.65) France (0.9468) 
Dl 0.34227 CONSTANT 
-85.239 
Netherlands (2.711) Norwa 
-4.316 
D2 2.4855 Buse R 0.9135 
Ireland (11.95) 
D3 0.719 
UK (5.747) 
7 COUNTRIES, 15 YEAR S= 105 OBSER VATIONS 
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Diagram 4. 
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Like sulphur dioxide, a statistically significant negative time trend is 
estimated for suspended particulate matter, with the estimated relationship 
displayed in Diagram 4. The low turning point level of income, at 
approximately $3,000, contrasts sharply with the estimate of $27,000 from 
a regression where the time trend is still included but omitted from the 
calculation of the turning point. The latter turning point is subject to a 
large standard error, however, as indicated in Table 3. 
The estimated turning point of $3,000 no longer supports the hypothesis of 
Selden and Song (1994) that turning points for aggregate emissions of air 
pollution will be at higher levels of per capita income than those estimated 
for urban air concentrations. Grossman and Krueger estimate a turning 
point of $6,151 for urban air concentrations of suspended particulate 
matter. 
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(iii) Carbon Monoxide. 
Table 6. 
CARBO N MONOXIDE 
- 
GLS LOGS QUADRATIC 
Y 18.579 D4 0.19195 
(4.927) Denmark (0.9998) 
V2 
-0.94479 D5 1.2227 
-4.615 USA (8.56) 
k 
-0.036016 D6 0.37945 (-8.827) France (3.158) 
D1 0.36172 CONSTANT 
-92.907 
W. Germany (2.187) UK (-5.336) 
D2 
-0.059341 Buse R 0.973 
Netherlands (-0.4032) 
D3 0.69513 
Norway (5.473) 
7 COUNTRIES, 15 YEAR S= 105 OBSER VATIONS 
Diagram 5. 
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Like sulphur dioxide and suspended particulate matter, carbon monoxide is 
estimated to have a statistically significant negative time trend. The turning 
point level of income for per capita carbon monoxide is estimated at 
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$7,100, in contrast to the estimate of $9,900 made in the absence of the 
time trend in Chapter 5. Both of these estimates are considerably lower 
than the turning point of $18,600 calculated from a regression which 
includes a linear time trend, but which ignores it when calculating the 
turning point. 
(iv) Nitrogen Dioxide. 
Table 7. 
NITROGEN DIOXIDE 
- 
GLS LOGS QUADRATIC 
Y 17.256 D5 
-0.04418 (4.242) UK 
-0.6186 
Y 
-0.88961 D6 0.51308 
-4.084 USA (7.136) 
k 
-0.0036694 D7 0.10933 (-1.056) Finland (1.367) 
Dl 
-0.17025 D8 -0.56663 
W. German (-1.757) France (-5.382) 
D2 
-0.20066 D9 0.38076 
Netherlands (-3.191) Canada (5.871) 
D3 0.02304 CONSTANT 
-86.568 
Norway (0.3265) Denmark (-4.552) 
D4 
-0.23632 Buse R 0.8673 
Sweden 
-4.317 
10 COUNTRIES, 15 YEAR S= 150 OBSER VATIONS 
Diagram 6 presents the projected relationship between per capita income 
and per capita nitrogen dioxide emissions. Nitrogen dioxide has a negative, 
though statistically insignificant time trend. The estimated turning point is 
again very similar to that estimated in chapter 5, implying that 
technological change is having a negligible impact on nitrogen dioxide 
emissions. 
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Diagram 6. 
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(v) Suspended Particulate Matter from Transport. 
Table 8. 
In quad 
SPM TRANSPORT 
- 
GLS LOGS QUAD RATIC 
Y 9.391 D4 1.6517 
(5.062) USA (10.44) 
Y 
-0.47343 D5 0.070215 
-4.549 W. Germany 0.4655 
k 
-0.0023638 D6 0.50828 
-0.5422 Norway (3.384) 
D1 0.42438 CONSTANT 
-53.296 
Netherlands (2.507) France (-6.402) 
D2 1.2589 Buse R 0.9533 
Ireland (7.481) 
D3 1.0622 
UK (4.722) 
7 COUNTRIES, 15 YEAR S= 105 OBSER VATIONS 
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Diagram 7. 
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Table 8 and Diagram 7, above, present the relationship between per capita 
income and per capita emissions of suspended particulate matter from 
transport. The turning point is estimated at a per capita income level of 
$18,000, which is identical to that estimated in the absence of a time trend, 
whilst a turning point of $20,300 is estimated when a time trend is 
included in the regression, but ignored when calculating the turning point. 
It is, however, considerably higher than the turning point for total 
suspended particulate matter. 
(vi) Sulphur Dioxide from Transport. 
Sulphur dioxide from transport is estimated to have a statistically 
significant negative time trend. The turning point is estimated as $9,000, as 
illustrated in Diagram 8, above, (or $13,000 if the time trend is ignored) 
both of which are notably higher than the estimated turning point of 
$4,500 for total sulphur dioxide emissions. 
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Table 9. 
SULPHUR DIOXIDE TRANSPORT 
- 
GLS LOGS QUADRATIC 
Y 24.015 D5 0.088392 
4.329 UK (0.4482) 
Y" 
-1.2679 D6 -0.37058 
-4.288 Finland (-1.483) 
k 
-0.021377 D7 -0.026219 (-2.226) France (-0.1045) 
Dl 
-0.43722 D8 0.72169 
W. Germany (-1.592) Canada (2.729) 
D2 0.16825 CONSTANT 
-119.58 
Netherlands 0.8056 Ireland (-4.652) 
D3 0.53446 Buse R 0.6913 
Norwav (2.178) 
D4 0.31519 
Denmark (0.8644) 
9 COUNTRIES, 15 YEAR S= 135 OBSER VATIONS 
Diagram 8. 
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(vii) Nitrogen Dioxide from Transport. 
Table 10. 
NITROGEN DIOXIDE TRANSPORT 
- 
GLS LOGS QUADRATIC 
Y 17.174 D5 0.67633 
(4.181) Finland (18.6) 
Y" 
-0.88862 D6 0.36356 
-4.039 Denmark (3.772) 
k 0.0078369 D7 0.97943 
(2.432) Canada (16.65) 
D1 0.40914 D8 0.83953 
W. Germanv (12.83) Norway (19.01) 
D2 0.30617 CONSTANT 
-87.107 
Netherlands 7.959 France 
-4.539 
D3 0.26929 Buse R 0.9246 
UK (7.106) 
D4 0.8256 
USA (11.54) 
9 COUNTRIES, 15 YEAR S= 135 OBSER VATIONS 
Diagram 9. 
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8500 13500 18500 23500 
Table 10 provides the results of the estimated relationship between per 
capita income and per capita emissions of nitrogen dioxide from the 
transport sector. It can be seen that a statistically significant positive time 
trend is calculated, although this is in contrast to the negative (statistically 
insignificant) time trend calculated by the quadratic levels function (see 
Appendix K). Neither would therefore appear reliable. The turning point is 
estimated as $19,500 (or $15,700 if the time trend is ignored) and is 
therefore similar to that estimated in Chapter 5. It is also significantly 
higher than the turning point of $14,500 estimated for total nitrogen 
dioxide emissions. 
As in Chapter 5, it can be seen that the transport generated emissions of 
local air pollution still have estimated turning points at higher levels of per 
capita income than those estimated for total emissions. Local air pollution 
from the transport sector is therefore proving more difficult to reduce than 
in other sectors. 
Water Pollution. 
(viii) Nitrates. 
The relationship between per capita income and nitrate concentrations in 
river water is illustrated in Diagram 10, below. The turning point is 
estimated at a relatively high per capita income level of $31,700. However, 
as'Table 3 indicates, a turning point of only $6,700 is estimated from a 
regression which includes a time trend but which ignores it when 
calculating the turning point. There is clearly a considerable difference 
between these two estimates. 
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Table 11. 
NITRATES 
- 
GLS LOGS QUADRATIC 
Y 7.228 D8 2.5873 
(3.466) Denmark (4.217) 
Y 
-0.41013 D9 0.79384 (-3.69) Finland (3.1) 
k 0.13025 D10 1.5687 
(5.742) Greece (5.541) 
D1 1.7395 D11 2.8851 
Spain (3.993) Netherlands (13.33) 
D2 2.4145 D12 2.8634 
W. Germany (8.464) Czech. (7.071) 
D3 0.44524 D13 1.8753 
Norway 2.08 Hungary (4.588) 
D4 2.0601 D14 2.5955 
Switzerland (7.032) Belgium (11.13) 
D5 3.2457 CONSTANT 
-33.566 
UK 8.784 Canada (-3.392) 
D6 1.8996 Buse R 0.8734 
USA 9.184 
D7 2.0971 
Italy (9.99) 
30 RI VERS, 4 YEARS =120 OBSERVATIONS 
A statistically significant positive time trend is estimated 
- 
for both 
quadratic logs and levels, indicating that nitrate concentrations are rising 
over time in the absence of income changes 
- 
even though data suggest that 
the use of nitrogen based fertilisers is no longer rising in the OECD (see 
OECD (1995)). This apparent anomaly cannot be explained in terms of 
technological change, but is likely to result from the fact that once nitrogen 
accumulates in the soil, it will slowly leach out over many years. This may 
now be happening, resulting in the positive time trend. Turner et al. (1997) 
provide evidence of the long time period needed for concentrations of 
nitrates and phosphorous to fall significantly. 
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Diagram 10. 
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(ix) Phosphorous. 
Table 12. 
PHOSPHOROUS 
- 
GLS LOGS UADRATIC 
Y 30.373 
(5.024) 
Y" 
-1.741 (-5.265) 
k 0.21815 
(5.643) 
CONSTANT 
-133.49 
-4.831 
Buse R- 0.4172 
28 RIVERS, 4 YEARS = 112 
OBSERVATIONS 
In quad 
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Diagram 11 illustrates that concentrations of phosphorous in river water 
are estimated to begin falling at a per capita income level of $10,900 (or 
$6,100 if the time trend is ignored when estimating the turning point). As 
with nitrates, both functional forms estimate a statistically significant 
positive time trend. This implies that the relationship between per capita 
income and concentrations of phosphorous has been shifting upwards i. e. 
in the absence of income changes concentrations have been rising over 
time. The reason for this is likely to be the same as for nitrate 
concentrations, above. 
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6.3.2 Indicators with NO DIRECT Local Environmental Impact. 8 
Table 13. Estimated Turning Points (1985 US $). 
This Other 
Study? Studies: '° 
ENVIRON. Quadratic H-E&S 
INDICATOR logs 
Carbon Dioxide $57,000 F $35,428 & 
(post 1991) $8 million 
Total Energy Use $32,200 F 
(post 1992 
Traffic Volumes $110,300 F 
(post 1992 
Municipal Waste No estimated turning 
points 
Table 14. A Comparison of the Different Methods of Estimating 
Turning Points Used in this Study. 
Time Trend 
ENVIRON. No time 
INDICATOR Include Ignore trend" 
time time 
Carbon Dioxide $57,000 $74,300 $62,700 
(35,140) (27,247) 
Total Energy Use $32,200 $44,400 $34,700 
(17,974) (9,719) 
Traffic Volumes $110,300 $29,400 $65,300 
(5,927) 19,412 
Table 14 indicates that the greatest variability amongst estimated turning 
points is for traffic volumes. Nevertheless, all nine turning points fall 
beyond current income levels. 
8 Since only cross-section data exist for CFCs and halons and methane, they are not 
considered in this chapter, the use of a time trend not being applicable. 9 All turning points were calculated using the average level of per capita income growth 
rate for all the countries in each sample, throughout the time series. 
10 Where H-E&S refers to Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1992). Estimated turning points are in 
1985 US dollars and incorporate time/technological change. See Chapter 5, Table 2 for 
further information regarding this study. 
11 From Chapter 5. 
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(i) Carbon Dioxide. 
Table 15. 
CARBON DIOXIDE 
- 
GLS LOGS QUADRATIC 
Y 3.6186 D4 
-0.078705 (8.506) Oceania (-0.4449) 
Y" 
-0.16131 D5 -0.53881 
-6.541 S. &C. America (-5.091) 
k 
-0.0022109 D6 0.019537 (-1.176) W. Europe (0.1189) 
D1 0.19483 CONSTANT 
-18.791 
Asia 4.02 Africa 
-10.53 
D2 0.94531 Buse R 0.9634 
E. Europe (5.48) 
D3 0.61904 
N. America 3.219 
7 REGI ONS, 32 YEARS = 224 OBSERVATIONS 
Diagram 12. 
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Diagram 12, above illustrates the projected relationship between per capita 
income and per capita carbon dioxide emissions from the GLS results in 
Table 15. The time trend can be seen to be negative, implying that in the 
absence of income changes per capita carbon dioxide emissions are falling 
over time, although it is not statistically significant. The estimated turning 
point, at $57,000, (or $74,300 if the time trend is ignored) is very similar 
to that calculated in the absence of a time trend, and clearly falls well 
outside the observed income range. It would therefore appear that 
technological advance is having little impact on carbon dioxide emissions. 
(ii) Total Energy Use. 
Table 16. 
TOTAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION 
- 
GLS LOGS QUADRATIC 
Y 4.2144 D9 0.29667 
(4.823) France (2.906) 
Y2 
-0.19691 D10 0.48376 (-4.138) W. Germany (4.614) 
k 
-0.0022505 D11 0.082791 (-1.483) Greece (1.151) 
D1 0.94998 D12 0.35213 
USA (8.435) Ireland (4.427) 
D2 0.19416 D13 0.084863 
Japan 1.92 Italy (0.8703) 
D3 0.52339 D14 0.64169 
Australia (4.98) Netherlands (6.471) 
D4 0.39189 D15 0.7481 
New Zealand (3.283) Norway (7.133) 
D5 0.40527 D16 
-0.094981 
Austria (4.139) Portugal (-1.456) 
D6 0.61691 D17 
-0.040328 
Bel ium 6.182 S vain (-0.4837) 
D7 0.35809 D18 0.72029 
Denmark (3.399) Sweden (6.607) 
F D8 0.84106 D19 0.32491 
Finland 8.231 Switzerland 2.992) 
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Table 16 (Continued). 
TOTAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION 
- 
GLS LOGS QUADRATIC 
D20 1.0837 CONSTANT 
-35.399 
Canada (9.777) Turke (-8.919) 
D21 0.31973 Buse R 0.9814 
UK (3.278) 
22 COUN TRIES, 13 YEA RS = 286 OBSERVATIONS 
Diagram 13. 
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Table 16 and Diagram 13, above, present the estimated relationship 
between per capita income and per capita energy use. The turning point is 
estimated at a per capita income level of $32,200 (or $44,400 if the time 
trend is ignored) and, like carbon dioxide, is well outside the observed 
income range. These turning points are also subject to a large standard 
error, thereby questioning their reliability. A negative time trend is 
estimated, although it is not statistically significant. This last point is 
perhaps surprising given that energy consumption per unit of GDP has 
been falling steadily for many years, largely due to technological advance. 
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(iii) Municipal Waste. 
Table 17. 
MUNICIPAL WASTE 
- 
GLS LOGS QUADRATIC 
Y 
-13.272 D2 0.82199 (-3.41) N. America (4.814) 
Y 0.73706 D3 0.57364 
(3.486) Oceania (3.018) 
k 0.019922 CONSTANT 58.057 
(1.34) E. Euro e (3.265) 
DI 0.34996 Buse R 0.9352 
W. Europe (1.993) 
13 COUNTRIES, 4 YEA RS = 52 OBSERVATIONS 
Diagram 14. 
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Per capita municipal waste, as illustrated above, is estimated to rise 
steadily with per capita income. A positive time trend has been estimated, 
although it is not statistically significant. 
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(iv) Energy Use from Transport. 
Table 18. 
ENERGY CONSUMPTION TRANSPORT 
- 
GLS LOGS LINEAR 
Y 1.2395 D2 0.24298 
(49.53) Oceania (1.947) 
k 
-0.0031136 CONSTANT -25.706 (-4.734) W. Euro e (-115.2) 
D1 0.62624 Buse R 0.9806 
N. America (4.995) 
24 COUNTRIES, 4 YEAR S= 96 OBSERVATIONS 
Diagram 15. 
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Diagram 15, above, indicates the log linear relationship between per capita 
income and per capita energy consumption in the transport sector. Since 
income squared terms were not statistically significant, and since an 
analysis of the data revealed an almost linear relationship between per 
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capita income and per capita energy use by the transport sector, linear 
functions are also estimated (see Appendix K). Clearly, energy 
consumption in the transport sector is rising steadily with per capita 
income. Table 18 indicates that energy use from transport possesses a 
statistically significant negative time trend. This finding is intuitive since 
energy efficiency in the transport sector has been increasing in recent 
years. 
(v) Traffic Volumes. 
Table 19. 
TRAFF IC VOLUMES 
- 
GLS LOGS QUADRATIC 
Y 6.529 D11 1.1324 
(8.854) Greece (7.488) 
Y 
-0.3173 D12 1.7254 (-7.774) Ireland (22.05) 
k 0.01516 D13 1.2645 
(7.366) Italy (11.76) 
Dl 1.9855 D14 1.3264 
USA (14.57) Netherlands (12.11) 
D2 1.068 D15 1.1719 
Japan (10.24) Norway (10.12) 
D3 1.2236 D16 1.2418 
Australia (4.053) Portugal (13.65) 
D4 1.4862 D17 0.62765 
New Zealand (13.28) Spain (6.745) 
D5 1.367 D18 1.4483 
Austria (12.59) Sweden (9.739) 
D6 1.271 D19 1.3544 
Belgium 12.26 Switzerland (8.855) 
D7 1.4461 D20 1.6519 
Denmark (12.69) Canada (13.14) 
D8 1.5638 D21 1.3636 
Finland (13.29) UK (10.15) 
D9 1.4287 CONSTANT 
-26.295 
France (12.32) Turkey (-7.942) 
D10 1.402 Buse R 0.9736 
W. Germany (12.37) 
22 COUN TRIES, 15 YEA RS = 330 OBSERVATIONS 
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Diagram 16. 
Turkey Per Capita Traffic Volumes 
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Diagram 16 illustrates that per capita traffic volumes are estimated to 
begin falling at a per capita income level of over $100,000. Such a high 
turning point stems from the near linear nature of the income/traffic 
volumes data. 12 A turning point of $29,400 is estimated from a regression 
which also includes a time trend but which ignores it when calculating the 
turning point. Although this estimate is notably lower than that mentioned 
above, it is still well outside the sample income range. The standard error 
associated with the latter turning point is also significantly smaller than 
that calculated in the absence of the time trend. Furthermore, Table 19 
indicates that traffic volumes display a statistically significant positive 
time trend, implying that in the absence of income changes per capita 
traffic volumes will continue to rise over time. This finding is not 
unexpected but would not be easily explained in terms of technological 
change. 
12 For the quadratic levels function, the income squared term was not statistically 
significant. A linear function was therefore estimated (see Appendix K). 
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6.4 Conclusion. 
It would appear that the results in this chapter are very similar to those 
found in Chapter 5. Turning points for pollutants which have a local 
environmental impact are all within the observed income range, with the 
exception of nitrate concentrations and suspended particulate matter (when 
the time trend is included in the regression, but ignored when estimating 
the turning point), although the latter turning point is very unreliable due to 
the large standard error. In contrast, those indicators with have only an 
indirect local environmental impact are all increasing throughout the 
observed income range. 
Similarly, turning points for per capita emissions of total local air 
pollutants are still all lower than those for per capita emissions of transport 
generated local air pollutants 
- 
with the exception of nitrogen dioxide if the 
time trend is included in the regression, but ignored when calculating the 
turning point. 
Selden and Song's (1994) hypothesis that per capita emissions of local air 
pollutants will peak at higher per capita income levels than urban air 
concentrations is still supported by the results for sulphur dioxide, 
although the turning point of $4,500 is only marginally higher than that 
estimated for urban concentrations by Grossman and Krueger (1993, 
1995). However, the results for suspended particulate matter no longer 
support the hypothesis unless the time trend is included in the regression, 
but ignored when estimating the turning point. This turning point has a 
very large standard error, however. 
All of the local air pollutants considered, with the exception of nitrogen 
dioxide, have been found to possess a statistically significant negative time 
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trend. Thus, if income changes are controlled for, per capita emissions of 
these pollutants have still fallen over time, perhaps due to changes in 
technology. Such an assertion would seem intuitive. In the developed 
world, the shift away from the use of coal and oil for heating and cooking 
towards natural gas and smokeless fuels, has seen a marked reduction in 
the emissions of both sulphur dioxide and suspended particulate matter. 
Furthermore, technological advance has facilitated a reduction in the 
emissions of sulphur dioxide from power stations, whilst more energy 
efficient motor vehicles, together with catalytic converters, 13 are largely 
responsible for the reductions in carbon monoxide. In contrast, the 
contribution of the ever growing transport sector has meant that emissions 
of nitrogen dioxide have largely escaped unchecked. It is only the 
relatively recent introduction of the three-way catalytic converter that has 
seen significant reductions in emissions. Thus, for much of the time period 
under consideration, technology has had little impact on nitrogen dioxide 
emissions 
- 
perhaps explaining the statistically insignificant time trend. 
Transport generated emissions of suspended particulate matter and 
nitrogen dioxide do not display a statistically significant time trend. An 
explanation for this may be that neither suspended particulate matter from 
transport nor nitrogen dioxide from transport have been greatly affected by 
technological change. The recent introduction of catalytic trap oxidisers, 
designed to reduce particulate emissions from diesel engines would not 
have significantly reduced emissions during the time period considered. 
Similarly, as mentioned above, the introduction of the three-way catalytic 
converter which will reduce nitrogen dioxide, has also occurred only 
recently. The existence of a statistically significant time trend for sulphur 
dioxide emissions from transport is perhaps more difficult to explain in 
terms of technological change. It would appear that emissions have fallen 
13 Even the earliest form of catalytic converter, the oxidation catalyst, tackled carbon 
monoxide. 
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due to greater fuel efficiency, although it is less clear why this has not been 
the case for nitrogen dioxide. 
With regard to time trends for the global / indirect environmental 
indicators, per capita values of both municipal waste and traffic volumes 
possess positive time trends, implying that the indicators have been 
increasing over time (in the absence of income changes), although the time 
trend is not statistically significant for the former. This finding is difficult 
to explain in terms of the level of technology. In contrast, per capita values 
of total energy use, transport energy use and carbon dioxide emissions 
possess negative time trends, implying that the indicators have been 
decreasing over time (in the absence of income changes), although only 
transport energy use has a statistically significant time trend. Greater 
energy efficiency may explain why these three indicators all possess 
negative time trends, although it is less clear why they are not all 
statistically significant. 
The methodology used in Chapters 5 and 6 now contributes to the 
estimation of the environmental impact of the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations, contained in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7. 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE URUGUAY ROUND. 
7.1 Introduction. 
It is widely expected that the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations will 
significantly increase global production and welfare levels. However, little 
attention has been paid to the possible environmental impact which may 
also arise as a result of the Uruguay Round. This chapter therefore 
attempts to quantify the impact of the Uruguay Round on the 
environmental indicators considered in Chapters 5 and 6. Where possible, 
the likely monetary cost / saving associated with an increase / decrease in 
pollution is also estimated. 
The impact on the environmental indicators is quantified in terms of the 
three mechanisms associated with trade liberalisation as outlined by 
Grossman and Krueger (1993), and referred to in Chapter 3- the 
composition effect, the scale effect and the technique effect. The 
composition effect refers to the fact that trade liberalisation is likely to 
change the composition of industry as countries specialise to a greater 
extent in those sectors in which they enjoy a comparative advantage. This 
change in industrial composition may have either a positive or negative 
impact on the environment. The scale effect stems from the expansion in 
the scale of production which is likely to occur as markets expand due to 
trade liberalisation. Taken in isolation, the scale effect is likely to prove 
damaging to the environment. Finally, the technique effect refers to the 
fact that following trade liberalisation, a nation may have greater access to 
resource efficient production methods whilst at the same time individuals 
may begin to demand a cleaner environment as they experience increasing 
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incomes. Thus, the manner of production may change as a result of trade 
liberalisation, to the benefit of the environment. 
The composition effect is estimated by combining the local air pollution 
intensities from Hettige et al. (1994) with the estimated effect of the 
Uruguay Round on the composition of output from Francois et al. (1995). 
Regional sectoral pollution intensities are obtained from the US sectoral 
pollution intensities of Hettige et al. by adjusting for regional differences 
in total pollution intensity. These regional pollution intensities were 
calculated using environmental Kuznets curves (EKCs). Combined scale 
and technique effects are also calculated using these EKCs together with 
Francois et al. 's estimates of income gains resulting from the Uruguay 
Round. ' 
As far as I am aware, no other study has attempted to quantify the 
environmental impact associated with the Uruguay Round. Grossman and 
Krueger (1993), however, attempt to partially quantify the environmental 
impact associated with the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). The methodology used in this chapter improves on theirs in 
several ways. First, Grossman and Krueger estimate the composition effect 
associated with NAFTA in terms of the overall toxic intensity of 
production rather than in terms of individual air pollutants. As they 
themselves point out, the problem with using aggregated toxic releases (as 
opposed to individual types of toxic release) and measuring this in terms of 
weight is that some relatively heavy releases have little adverse impact on 
health whilst other relatively light releases may have a serious health 
impact. Furthermore, when calculating the composition effect Grossman 
and Krueger used US sectoral toxic intensities for all nations, including 
Mexico. As mentioned above, this chapter adjusts US sectoral intensities 
according to differences in regional total intensities. Finally, when 
1 In this chapter the scale effect and the technique effect are combined into one effect. 
This is hereafter referred to as the combined scale and technique effect. 
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discussing scale and technique effects, Grossman and Krueger consider 
local air and water pollutants and illustrate that, generally, such pollutants 
follow an inverted-U shaped path. No attempt is made to estimate the size 
of the scale and technique effects specifically resulting from the NAFTA. 
This chapter actually estimates the size of the combined scale and 
technique effect which may result from the Uruguay Round, and does this 
in terms of a range of local and global indicators. By estimating the size of 
the composition effect and the combined scale and technique effects, 
simple aggregation provides the total impact of the Uruguay Round. From 
this, monetary estimates can be made of the likely environmental costs / 
savings. 
7.2 Framework. 
Composition effects and combined scale and technique effects are 
estimated using Francois et al. s' (1995) estimates of the impact of the 
Uruguay Round on regional income and sectoral production levels. The 
impact on the environment of the composition effect and combined scale 
and technique effects is estimated, firstly, using a comparative static 
framework. This estimates levels of pollution and energy use for 1990 with 
and without the Uruguay Round. Secondly, a dynamic framework 
estimates the difference between levels of pollution and energy use in the 
year 2000, with and without the Uruguay Round, if the initial 1990 income 
gain from the Uruguay Round has 'grown' for ten years. This dynamic 
framework considers both the situation where the Uruguay Round leaves 
the income growth rate unaffected, and the situation where the Uruguay 
Round results in an increase in the growth rate of income. 
The EKCs in Diagram 1 provide an illustration of how composition and 
combined scale and technique effects may effect levels of pollution 
emissions. 
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Diagram 1. Hypothetical Environmental Kuznets Curves. 
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EKCs capture the environmental impact of the scale and technique effects 
associated. with a change in income i. e. if income increases, EKCs combine 
the increase in emissions resulting from an increase in the scale of 
production, with the decrease in emissions which occurs as individuals 
begin to demand a cleaner environment. Thus, if the Uruguay Round 
generates an increase in 1990 per capita income from 1990 to 1990UR, then 
starting at point 'a', the combined scale and technique effect may cause a 
movement to point 'b' and an increase in per capita emissions from e to e'. 
However, this change in emissions may be offset or augmented by the 
composition effect associated with the Uruguay Round which, by 
increasing or decreasing the pollution intensity of each unit of GDP, may 
raise or lower the EKC. In the diagram above, the composition effect has 
resulted in a shift of the EKC from EKCI to EKC2. Thus, there is a 
movement from point 'b' to point 'c' and a further increase in per capita 
emissions to point e". Therefore, in the comparative static framework 
mentioned above, the combined scale and technique effect for 1990 results 
in a movement along the EKC from point 'a' to point V. The composition 
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effect then causes a shift in the curve and a movement to point V. The 
overall environmental impact is therefore the difference between per capita 
emissions level e and level e". 
With regard to the dynamic framework, per capita income in the absence 
of the Uruguay Round is represented by 2000 and in the presence of the 
Uruguay Round by 2000uR. 2 Using the same logic as above, the combined 
scale and technique effect is represented by a shift from point 'd' to point 
'g'. The composition effect then results in a shift to point T. The overall 
impact on pollution for the year 2000 is therefore the difference between 
per capita pollution emissions with and without the Uruguay Round, that 
is, the difference between points e1 and e3. 
7.2.1 Composition Effect. 
The environmental impact of the Uruguay Round's composition effect is 
estimated using the results of Francois et al. (1995) together with the 
World Bank's Industrial Pollution Projection System (Hettige et al. 
(1994)). Francois et al. estimate the effect of the Uruguay Round on the 
level of production of 68 four digit ISIC manufacturing sectors in twelve 
countries/regions. 3 Hettige et al. (1994) estimate local air pollution 
intensities for each ISIC sector for the US in terms of pounds of pollution 
per million 1987 US dollars of output. These pollution intensities were 
estimated by merging manufacturing census data from over 200,000 
factories throughout the US with US Environmental Protection Agency 
data on air pollution emissions. Intensities are estimated for nitrogen 
dioxide, sulphur dioxide, carbon monoxide and suspended particulate 
matter. Multiplying the output change estimated for each sector by that 
sector's pollution intensity provides the change in air pollution for each 
2 Note that the position of 2000UR relative to that of 2000, will depend on whether the 
income growth rate is affected by the Uruguay Round. 
3 The results of Francois et al. are given in terms of GTAP sectors which can be broken 
down into 4 digit ISIC sectors. 
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country / region resulting from the change in the composition of output. 
This is therefore an estimate of the environmental impact of the Uruguay 
Round's composition effect. 
As yet, Hettige et al. do not estimate sectoral pollution intensities for any 
country other than the USA. However, rather than apply US intensities to 
all other countries/regions, US sectoral intensities have been scaled for 
each country / region according to the difference between that country / 
region's total pollution intensity (for each pollutant) and that of the USA. 
These total pollution intensities were calculated using the estimated 
environmental Kuznets curves from the previous chapters. If the estimated 
environmental Kuznets curve is of the following form; 
Inx =a; +biny; r-c(lnyid2+e, 1 
and 
x; t = total pollution / population in country i, year t. 
y; t = gdp / population in country i, year t. 
X; t = total pollution in country i, year t. 
Y; t = gdp in country/region i, year t. 
N1 = population in country i, year t. 
pit = total pollution / gdp (i. e. pollution intensity) in country i, year t. 
then, 
InX, 
-InN;, =a; +b(InYit-InN; )-c(InY; )2+e; r 
4 Since some GTAP sectors cover more than one ISIC sector, to obtain a pollution 
intensity for that GTAP sector an average of the pollution intensity of the ISIC sectors 
was taken, weighted by the share of each ISIC sector in each country's GDP. To enable 
full compatibility, the output change for each sector, and each sector's pollution 
intensities, have been deflated to 1985 US dollars. 
196 
1nXt=a; +bOn Yt-InN; )-c(Iny, )2+InN; t+e11 
lnXt 
- 
In Y, =1np; 1= a; +b (In Y; 1-InNit) -c (Iny1)2 + InN; t - In Y11 + e; 1 
Inptr=aj+(b-1) (InY, t-1nN; )-c(Inyi)2+e, 1 
Inpir = ai 
- 
(1- b) Iny; 
r -c 
Onyr)2 + eil 
Thus, for example, if China's total sulphur dioxide intensity is estimated, 
in this manner, for 1992 and is calculated to be 50% higher than the US's 
total sulphur dioxide intensity, then China's sectoral intensities will be 
estimated by increasing US sectoral intensities by 50%. Whilst such a 
procedure clearly assumes that each country's sectoral intensities are 
uniformly higher or lower than those of the US, it is felt that such a method 
is far preferable to the application of US sectoral intensities to other 
countries without modification. 
For sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide, estimated intercepts in Chapters 
5 and 6 are not compatible with the regions considered in Francois et al. 
(1995). As a result, pollution intensities for these pollutants stem from new 
regressions which have been run using UNEP (1993) data, with regression 
results in Appendix N. Fixed effects intercepts have not been estimated 
(due to a lack of data) for Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe. 
Sectoral intensities for these regions are therefore scaled according to 
pollution intensities in East Asia, South Asia and China, respectively, due 
to expected similarities in pollution levels and intensities. 5 
For carbon monoxide and suspended particulate matter, estimated 
intercepts in Chapters 5 and 6 are also incompatible with the regions 
considered in Francois et al. (1995), and, unlike sulphur dioxide and 
5 For example, per capita emissions of carbon dioxide in Latin America, Africa and 
Eastern Europe and broadly similar with those in East Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe. 
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nitrogen dioxide, alternative data are not available. However, since all of 
the EKCs estimated for local air pollutants considered in Chapters 5,6 and 
Appendix N of this chapter, behave similarly and have turning points at 
similar income levels, it has been possible to estimate middle and low 
income country intercepts for carbon monoxide and suspended particulate 
matter emissions. This has been done by scaling down the average 
intercept for the OECD countries for carbon monoxide and suspended 
particulate matter (from Chapter 5) by the proportion that middle and low 
income country intercepts are lower than the average OECD intercept for 
sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide. 6 European Union intercepts for 
carbon monoxide and suspended particulate matter are formed by taking an 
average of the European Union countries' intercepts in each sample. 7 
These intercepts are also used for Japan. These manufactured intercepts, 
together with the estimated intercept for the USA and the estimated 
income coefficients (from Chapter 5) are reported in Appendix N. 
Pollution intensities for China, South Asia and Africa were calculated 
using the low income intercept, whilst those for East Asia, Latin America 
and Eastern Europe were made using the middle income intercept. 
7.2.2 Combined Scale and Technique Effects. 
The results of Chapter 5 together with the estimates of the Uruguay 
Round's contribution to regional/national income levels from Francois et 
al. (1995), are used to estimate the impact on environmental quality of the 
combined scale and technique effects associated with the Uruguay 
Round. 8' ,9 
I Using the sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide results from Appendix N. 
For carbon monoxide this is an average of the intercepts for Netherlands, UK, West 
Germany, Denmark and France. For suspended particulate matter an average of the 
intercepts for Netherlands, UK, West Germany and France is taken. $ Some environmental indicators considered in Chapter 5 could not be analysed in this 
chapter since the environmental data used in Chapter 5 are reported for countries/regions 
which are incompatible with the countries/regions used by Francois et al. Other indicators 
could only be analysed for certain countries/regions since data did not exist for all regions 
and hence intercepts could not be estimated. Where data allowed, new regressions were 
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Referring back to Diagram 1 and using the example of the 1990 combined 
scale and technique effect, if the Uruguay Round generates an increase in 
per capita income from 1990 to 1990UR, the resultant change in per capita 
emissions (due to combined scale and technique effects) will be e to e'. 
Multiplying both levels of per capita emissions by the 1990 level of 
population provides the level of total emissions with and without the 
Uruguay Round's combined scale and technique effects. The increase in 
per capita income is calculated using the estimated welfare gain from the 
Uruguay Round for each of Francois et al. s' regions. 
In all, the environmental impact of the scale and technique effects is 
estimated for three scenarios: (1) for 1990, if the full effects of the 
Uruguay Round were in place; 1° (2) for the year 2000 if the Uruguay 
Round's 1990 increase in income had `grown' for 10 years; and (3) for the 
year 2000 if the Uruguay Round's 1990 increase in income had `grown' 
for 10 years, and per capita income growth rates were 0.5% higher due to 
the effects of the Uruguay Round. This link between the Uruguay Round 
and the actual rate of growth is raised by Francois et al. (1993), who cite 
numerous studies as evidence of the empirical link between trade 
liberalisation and the rate of economic growth. " Although unable to 
quantify the possible impact of the Uruguay Round on the growth rate, 
Francois et al. consider the dynamic gains associated with the Round "as 
potentially much more important than extant estimates of static and 
run to make the results more compatible with the countries/regions used by Francois et al. 
The results are contained in Appendix N and are very similar to the original results in 
Chapter 5. 
9 See Appendix L for a summary of Francois et al. 's' paper, and see Appendix M for a 
summary of their estimated income gains resulting from the Uruguay Round. This 
chapter uses the estimated income gains stemming from their dynamic increasing returns 
to scale monopolistic competition model with an endogenous savings rate since this was 
deemed to be their most realistic model. 
10 Francois et al. (1995) estimate the welfare effects of the Uruguay Round in terms of 
1992 US $. These estimates have therefore been deflated to 1985 US $ to enable 
comparison with the estimated composition effect. 
11 e. g. Lee (1993), Matin (1993), Barro (1989) and Krueger (1978). 
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medium-run gains" (Francois et al. (1993) p. 10). The choice, in this 
chapter, of a 0.5% addition to the rate of growth is not intended to be an 
estimate, but merely serves to illustrate the impact on the various 
environmental indicators of a change in the rate of growth. 
Scenario 2 is estimated in the same manner as scenario 1. Per capita 
emissions are estimated for the year 2000 by allowing actual 1990 per 
capita income to grow in accordance with World Bank (1994) forecasts of 
regional per capita income growth. 12 The same is then done for 1990 per 
capita income when the Uruguay Round is in place. Using UNEP (1993) 
population forecasts the difference between total emissions in the year 
2000, with and without the Uruguay Round, can then be calculated. 
Finally, scenario 3 uses the same method, but 1990 per capita income 
when the Uruguay Round is in place is allowed to grow by an additional 
0.5% per annum. Again, the difference between year 2000 emissions with 
and without the Uruguay Round can then be calculated. 
Since pollution levels without the Uruguay Round are always compared 
with pollution levels with the Uruguay Round in the same year, estimated 
regressions do not include a time trend. 13 Thus, unless new regressions 
have been performed (with results in Appendix N) the regression results 
used in this chapter stem from Chapter 5. 
12 Specifically, the following growth rates are used; USA, EU, E. Europe and Japan 2%; 
East Asia and China 6.2%; South Asia 3.4%; Africa 0.9%; and Latin America 1.7%. 
13 i. e. 1990 pollution without the Uruguay Round is compared with 1990 pollution with 
the Uruguay Round and 2000 pollution without the Uruguay Round is compared with 
2000 pollution with the Uruguay Round etc. 
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7.3 Results. 
7.3.1 Composition Effect. 
Given the Uruguay Round Final Agreement, Francois et al. (1995) predict 
that the largest output shocks will result from the phaseout of the Multi- 
Fibre Agreement (MFA). Their model indicates that the liberalisation of 
the MFA will result in a significant contraction of textile and clothing 
production in developed countries, matched by an expansion of these 
sectors in the developing world, particularly East and South Asia. As the 
Asian developing countries shift resources into textiles and clothing, the 
manufacturing sectors contract, particularly transport equipment, steel, 
non-ferrous metals and other machinery. There is therefore a concurrent 
expansion of these sectors in the developed economies. Growth of 
transport equipment production is predicted to occur largely in the USA 
and Canada, growth in non-ferrous metals is likely to be concentrated in 
Australia and New Zealand, the USA and Europe, whilst growth in other 
machinery and other manufactures is likely to occur in the USA, Canada 
and Europe. Exceptions to the above pattern are Africa and Latin America 
who are both predicted to expand certain manufacturing sectors. 
Attention now turns to the impact of these compositional changes on air 
pollution. Although large changes are predicted in the output of the textile 
and clothing sectors, these sectors possess relatively low pollution 
intensities. Nevertheless, as Tables 1-4 illustrate, the contraction of these 
sectors has led to a reasonably large reduction in all four pollutants in the 
developed world, whilst pollution has risen in the developing regions as 
the clothing and textile sectors expand. East Asia, in particular, is predicted 
to experience a significant increase in air pollution due to the growth of 
these sectors. 
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In contrast, many of the heavy industry sectors possess large pollution 
intensities with iron and steel and non-ferrous metals generating large 
volumes of sulphur dioxide and carbon monoxide in particular. Typically, 
the direction of the output change in these sectors dictates whether the 
region as a whole will experience an overall increase or decrease in 
pollution, as a result of compositional changes. The predicted expansion of 
heavy industry in the developed economies is, thus, likely to raise total 
compositional pollution for these regions, for all four pollutants. 
Conversely, most developing regions are predicted to experience a fall in 
total compositional pollution due to the contraction of heavy industry. 
Several exceptions are worth noting, however. Of the developing 
economies, Latin America is predicted to experience an increase in total 
compositional pollution, for all four pollutants, due to an estimated 
increase in both iron and steel and non-ferrous metal production, despite 
contractions in other heavy industries. For nitrogen dioxide and suspended 
particulate matter, Africa and Eastern Europe are also predicted to 
experience an overall increase in total compositional output, whilst Eastern 
Europe is also predicted a similar increase for carbon monoxide. For 
Africa and Eastern Europe, these predicted increases in pollution are due to 
an increase in production in certain heavy industries which more than 
compensate for the contraction of the iron and steel and non-ferrous metals 
sectors. This same compensation did not occur for sulphur dioxide due to 
the very large sulphur dioxide pollution intensities associated with these 
two sectors. 
Estimates of total compositional pollution are expressed in both thousand 
pounds and tonnes and have been expressed as a percentage of each 
region's total emissions in 1992. The largest absolute decrease in total 
emissions as a result of compositional change occurs in East Asia for 
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sulphur dioxide, carbon monoxide and suspended particulate matter and in 
China for nitrogen dioxide. The contraction of sulphur dioxide in East Asia 
is equivalent to 4.0% of total sulphur dioxide emissions. The estimated 
reduction in pollution in East Asia is due to the contraction of heavy 
industry in this region, which is not compensated by the increase in 
pollution stemming from the expanding textiles and clothing sectors. The 
largest absolute increases in total emissions occur in the United States for 
sulphur dioxide, carbon monoxide and suspended particulate matter and in 
Latin America for nitrogen dioxide. For both regions this is due to the 
expansion of heavy industry. 
7.3.2 Combined Scale and Technique Effects. 
(i) Nitrogen Dioxide Emissions. 
Table 5 presents the likely changes in nitrogen dioxide emissions resulting 
from the Uruguay Round, for the three different scenarios, given Francois 
et aLs' estimates of the Round's income effects. 14 Estimates are expressed 
in tonnes and as percentages of total emissions. 15 These estimates stem 
from a new regression which uses UNEP (1993) nitrogen dioxide 
emissions data. These data cover a wider range of countries than the 
OECD data, thereby allowing the estimation of intercepts for more 
countries or regions than was previously possible, although observations 
exist for only four years. 16 The results of this regression can be found in 
Appendix N. For both nitrogen dioxide and sulphur dioxide, estimations 
for Latin America and Eastern Europe were made using East Asia's fixed 
effects intercept, whilst estimations for Africa were made using South 
'4 From their increasing returns, monopolistic competition model. 
is All percentages illustrate how much higher that year's estimated emissions are with the 
Uruguay Round in place, compared with the same year's estimated emissions in the 
absence of the Uruguay Round. 16 Observations are for 1975,1980,1985 and 1990 
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Asia's intercept. Table 5 outlines the impact of scale and technique effects 
on nitrogen dioxide emissions, for all three scenarios. 
Table 5. The Impact of Combined Scale and Technique Effects on 
Nitrogen Dioxide Emissions (tonnes and % of total emissions). 
NITROGEN 
DIOXIDE 
Scenario 1. 
1990 
Scenario 2. 
2000 
Scenario 3. 
2000+0.5% 
EU 25,277 0.19% 17,826 0.12% 134,168 0.93% 
USA 10,688 0.05% 
-7,998 -0.03% -73,226 -0.29% 
Japan 3,212 0.14% 1,918 0.06% 11,396 0.34% 
China 133,874 1.57% 236,529 1.23% 1,205,334 6.29% 
East Asia 63,886 2.04% 73,398 1.36% 220,232 4.09% 
South Asia 18,181 0.98% 34,297 0.92% 245,887 6.58% 
Africa 18,971 2.02% 37,174 1.83% 157,998 7.76% 
Latin America 36,203 0.92% 43,095 0.73% 217,038 3.68% 
E. Europe 3,565 0.06% 3,415 0.05% 130,013 1.99% 
GLOBAL 314,601 0.52% 439,654 0.50% 2,248,840 2.56% 
With regard to the developed world, the results indicate that there will be a 
modest increase in nitrogen dioxide emissions in the European Union and 
Japan for all three scenarios. It is estimated that North America would also 
experience an increase in emissions in 1990, had the Uruguay Round been 
in place, but by the year 2000 per capita income levels will be sufficiently 
high to ensure a decrease in nitrogen dioxide emissions. 
The results for the developing world suggest moderate increases in 
nitrogen dioxide emissions for all three scenarios, for all regions. Asia and 
Africa look likely to be the worst affected, with emissions increasing by up 
to 6% or 7% by the year 2000 if the Uruguay Round contributes 0.5% to 
growth rates. Global nitrogen dioxide emissions are predicted to increase 
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by little over 0.5% if growth rates are unaffected, or by over 2.5% if the 
latter increase by 0.5%. 
(ii) Sulphur Dioxide Emissions. 
Estimates are in tonnes and percentages of total emissions. As with 
nitrogen dioxide, these estimates stem from a new regression which uses 
UNEP (1993) sulphur dioxide emissions data. The results of this 
regression can be found in Appendix N. Table 6 provides the estimated 
impact of combined scale and technique effects on sulphur dioxide 
emissions. 
Table 6. The Impact of Combined Scale and Technique Effects on 
Sulphur Dioxide Emissions (tonnes and % of total emissions). 
SULPHUR 
DIOXIDE 
Scenario 1. 
1990 
Scenario 2. 
2000 
Scenario 3. 
2000+0.5% 
EU 
-63,852 -0.39% -80,780 -0.54% -658,453 -4.39% 
USA 
-210,288 -0.66% -226,719 -0.77% -1,580,050 -5.37% 
Japan 
-9,014 -0.64% -13,103 -0.80% -93,287 -5.75% 
China 130,458 2.13% 225,395 1.38% 1,138,536 6.95% 
East Asia 156,222 1.78% 142,832 1.28% 426,213 3.81% 
South Asia 54,178 1.33% 105,249 1.12% 752,214 7.97% 
Africa 55,294 2.81% 114,753 2.29% 487,239 9.72% 
Latin America 70,603 0.66% 51,700 0.37% 264,222 1.91% 
E. Europe 380 0.003% 
-8,628 -0.07% -145,264 -1.13% 
GLOBAL 135,711 0.15% 310,699 0.27% 591,370 0.52% 
Sulphur dioxide emissions are predicted to fall in all developed regions, 
for all three scenarios, due to the fact that per capita income levels in these 
regions now exceed that of the estimated turning point. The opposite is 
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true in the developing world, with all regions predicted to experience 
moderate increases in sulphur dioxide emissions. Asia is estimated to 
experience the largest absolute increase in emissions, whilst Africa looks 
set to experience the largest percentage increase. 
Global emissions are predicted to increase only moderately, the estimated 
increase in sulphur dioxide emissions in the developing world having been 
offset, to an extent, by the reduction in emissions in the developed world. 
(iii) Carbon Monoxide Emissions. 
Table 7 outlines the estimated impact of combined scale and technique 
effects on carbon monoxide emissions for each scenario. Estimates are 
expressed in tonnes and as a percentage of total emissions and were 
calculated using the regression results in Appendix N. 
Table 7. The Impact of Combined Scale and Technique Effects on 
Carbon Monoxide Emissions (tonnes and % of total emissions). 
CARBON 
MONOXIDE 
Scenario 1. 
1990 
Scenario 2. 
2000 
Scenario 3. 
2000+0.5% 
EU 
-195,671 -0.34% -247,550 -0.48% -2,017,799 -3.91% 
USA 
-690,409 -0.57% -735,466 -0.64% -5,107,152 -4.44% 
Japan 
-131,383 -0.99% -201,877 -1.52% -1,427,120 -10.74% 
China 613,486 1.81% 1,058,229 1.67% 5,367,021 8.47% 
East Asia 295,918 1.93% 270,553 1.76% 807,336 5.25% 
South Asia 107,156 1.27% 205,854 1.22% 1,507,650 8.94% 
Africa 109,362 2.44% 221,568 2.31% 965,126 10.06% 
Latin America 147,802 0.81% 116,796 0.52% 551,393 2.45% 
E. Europe 26,767 0.15% 48,195 0.22% 629,186 2.90% 
GLOBAL 339,402 0.11% 736,302 0.22% 1,275,641 0.39% 
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Table 7 indicates that the developed regions are expected to experience a 
decrease in carbon monoxide emissions as a result of combined scale and 
technique effects. In contrast, all other regions are likely to suffer from 
increased emissions. The USA is predicted to experience the largest 
absolute fall in emissions whilst Japan may benefit from the largest 
percentage fall. Conversely, it is estimated that the largest absolute 
increase in carbon monoxide emissions will occur in China, and the largest 
percentage increase will be in Africa. 
Global emissions are estimated to increase only moderately as a result of 
combined scale and technique effects as the increased emissions in the 
developing and transition regions are largely offset by the falling 
emissions in the developed world. 
(iv) Suspended Particulate Matter Emissions. 
Table 8, below, provides the estimated impact of combined scale and 
technique effects on suspended particulate matter emissions, for each 
scenario, calculated using the regression results in Appendix N. Estimates 
are expressed in tonnes and as a percentage of total emissions. 
Emissions of suspended particulate matter as a result of combined scale 
and technique effects follow the same pattern as sulphur dioxide emissions 
and differ from carbon monoxide emissions only in the fact that emissions 
of suspended particulate matter in Eastern Europe fall for scenarios 2 and 
3. Thus emissions are set to fall in the developed world and increase in the 
developing regions, whilst in Eastern Europe emissions increase in 
scenario 1 but fall by the year 2000 (scenarios 2 and 3). The largest 
absolute and percentage fall in emissions occurs in the USA, whilst the 
largest absolute and percentage increase in emissions occurs in China. 
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Table 8. The Impact of Combined Scale and Technique Effects on 
Suspended Particulate Matter Emissions (tonnes and % of total 
emissions). 
SUSP. PART. 
MATTER 
Scenario 1. 
1990 
Scenario 2. 
2000 
Scenario 3. 
2000+0.5% 
EU 
-14,533 -0.26% -18,386 -0.44% -149,869 -3.58% 
USA 
-59,577 -0.79% -63,466 -1.01% -440,714 -7.08% 
Japan 
-9,852 -0.54% -13,522 -0.64% -96,197 -4.55% 
China 37,306 1.99% 63,759 1.86% 341,191 9.95% 
East Asia 36,237 1.71% 33,131 1.23% 98,863 3.67% 
South Asia 14,502 1.37% 27,284 1.33% 205,329 10.01% 
Africa 14,800 2.67% 30,122 2.49% 129,921 10.74% 
Latin America 18,099 0.59% 15,373 0.46% 78,571 2.35% 
E. Europe 186 0.002% 
-4,235 -0.06% -71,332 -1.01% 
GLOBAL 36,058 0.12% 70,060 0.24% 95,763 0.32% 
Again, global emissions increase only moderately due to the substantial 
fall in emissions in the developed world, which partially compensates for 
the increased emissions in the developing regions. 
(v) Carbon Dioxide Emissions. 
Table 9, below, provides the estimated impact of the Uruguay Round on 
carbon dioxide emissions for each scenario. Estimates are in thousands of 
tonnes of carbon, and as percentages of total emissions. 
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Table 9. The Impact of Combined Scale and Technique Effects on 
Carbon Dioxide Emissions (thousands of tonnes and % of total 
emissions). 
CARBON 
DIOXIDE 
Scenario 1. 
1990 
Scenario 2. 
2000 
Scenario 3. 
2000+0.5% 
EU 3,796 0.37% 8,847 0.33% 27,936 2.42% 
USA 5,256 0.33% 5,289 0.29% 33,100 1.80% 
Japan 1,145 0.37% 1,478 0.32% 10,417 2.28% 
China 6,169 1.44% 11,342 1.22% 58,013 6.24% 
Asia 20,283 1.61% 38,450 1.39% 168,766 6.09% 
Africa 3,092 1.78% 6,098 1.73% 25,963 7.36% 
Latin America 2,731 1.02% 3,750 0.90% 19,131 4.59% 
E. Europe 534 0.08% 626 0.08% 24,388 3.11% 
GLOBAL 31,111 0.51% 64,538 0.70% 309,701 3.34% 
It is clear that carbon dioxide emissions are estimated to experience a small 
to moderate increase, depending on the scenario, in all regions. For all 
scenarios, the largest absolute increase in emissions is expected to occur in 
Asia, where total emissions are estimated to increase by over 160,000 
tonnes (6.09%) for scenario 3. The largest percentage increase in emissions 
is predicted to occur in Africa. Globally, emissions increase by at least 
0.5%, or by as much as 3.34% if the growth rate of per capita income 
increase by 0.5%. 
(vi) Municipal Waste. 
Table 10, below, presents the estimated impact of the Uruguay Round, in 
terms of municipal waste, for the European Union, North America and 
Oceania respectively. Estimates are expressed in thousands of tonnes and 
as percentages of total waste generated. 
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Table 10. The Impact of Combined Scale and Technique Effects on the 
Generation of Municipal Waste (thousands of tonnes and % of total 
waste). 
MUNICIPAL Scenario 1. Scenario 2. Scenario 3. 
WASTE 1990 2000 2000+0.5% 
EU 531 0.42% 1,057 0.69% 9,128 5.96% 
USA 2,376 1.19% 4,611 1.51% 34,778 11.4% 
Oceania 470 0.73% 946 1.03% 7,512 8.21% 
All regions are predicted to experience an increase in municipal waste 
generation, with the largest increase occuring in North America. 
(vii) Total Energy Consumption. 
Table 11 presents the estimated impact of the Uruguay Round on total 
energy use. Estimates are expressed in million tonnes of oil equivalent and 
as percentages of total energy use. These results stem from a different 
regression to those estimated in Chapters 5 and 6, as data have been 
aggregated into regions which are more compatible with the results of 
Francois et al. Appendix N contains the regression results. 
Table 11. The Impact of Combined Scale and Technique Effects on 
Total Energy Consumption (MTOE and % of total energy 
consumption) 
. 
TOTAL Scenario 1. Scenario 2. Scenario 3. 
ENERGY 1990 2000 2000+0.5% 
EU 2.89 0.29% 2.76 0.25% 21.8 1.98% 
USA 3.52 0.23% 3.16 0.18%' 21.47 1.19% 
Oceania 1.02 0.28% 1.03 0.23% 7.51 1.66% 
Asia 13.31 1.47% 23.23 1.24% 101.35 5.41% 
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All regions are predicted to experience an increase in total energy use, 
although this increase is expected to be largest in Asia. Not surprisingly, 
predicted changes in carbon dioxide in Table 9 can be seen to closely 
mimic these estimated changes in energy use. 
The Transport Sector 
(viii) Energy Use from the Transport Sector. 
The Uruguay Round's estimated impact on energy use by the transport 
sector is presented in Table 12. Estimates are expressed in million tonnes 
of oil equivalent and as percentages of total energy use by the transport 
sector. As with total energy use, these results stem from a new regression 
which uses data aggregated into regions which are more compatible with 
those used by Francois et al. The results of this regression can be found in 
Appendix N. 
Table 12. The Impact of Combined Scale and Technique Effects on 
Energy Use by the Transport Sector (MTOE and % of total energy 
use from transport). 
TRANSPORT Scenario 1. Scenario 2. Scenario 3. 
ENERGY 1990 2000 2000+0.5% 
EU 2.28 0.77% 2.96 0.77% 24.43 6.38% 
USA 5.63 0.9% 7.77 0.9% 56.0 6.52% 
Oceania 1.39 0.84% 1.99 0.85% 15.13 6.46% 
Asia 2.66 1.54% 6.16 1.59% 27.28 7.02% 
It can be seen from Table 12 that the largest estimated absolute increase in 
transport generated energy use occurs in the USA, whilst the largest 
percentage increase is predicted to occur in Asia. 
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(ix) Traffic Volumes. 
Table 13 contains the estimated impact of the Uruguay Round on total 
traffic volumes. Estimates are expressed in millions of kilometres travelled 
by road vehicles and as percentages of total traffic volumes. The results 
stem from a new regression which uses data aggregated into regions which 
are more compatible with those used by Francois et al. 
Table 13. The Impact of Combined Scale and Technique Effects on 
Traffic Volumes (millions of kilometres and % of total traffic 
volumes). 
TRAFFIC Scenario 1. Scenario 2. Scenario 3: 
VOLUMES 1990 2000 2000+0.5% 
EU 17,893 0.83% 21,445 0.77% 175,015 6.2% 
USA 28,787 0.79% 34,442 0.71% 243,397 5.04% 
Oceania 6,681 0.84% 8,596 0.77% 64,467 5.77% 
Asia 7,938 3.05% 27,200 2.71% 122,061 12.14% 
As with transport generated energy use, the largest absolute increase in 
traffic volumes is estimated to occur in the USA, whilst Asia is predicted 
to experience the largest percentage increase. 
7 
. 
3.3 Combining Composition and Scale and Technique Effects 
Since both composition effects and combined scale and technique effects 
have been calculated for sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, carbon 
monoxide and suspended particulate matter, it is possible to aggregate the 
two effects to estimate the overall impact of the Uruguay Round on these 
pollutants. Thus, the combined scale and technique effect is added to 
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(subtracted from) the composition effect. Estimates are expressed in tonnes 
and as percentages of total emissions. 
Table 14. The Estimated Impact of the Uruguay Round on Nitrogen 
Dioxide Emissions (tonnes and % of total emissions). 
NITROGEN 
DIOXIDE 
Scenario 1. 
1990 
Scenario 2. 
2000 
Scenario 3. 
2000+0.5% 
EU 35,911 0.27% 28,524 0.19% 144,866 0.98% 
USA 23,493 0.11% 4,807 0.02% 
-60,421 -0.23% 
Japan 9,988 0.43% 8,694 0.27% 18,172 0.57% 
China 118,459 1.39% 210,416 1.09% 1,179,221 6.13% 
East Asia 59,960 1.91% 70,870 1.31% 217,704 4.03% 
South Asia 8,952 0.48% 25,068 0.67% 236,658 6.35% 
Africa 20,508 2.18% 38,711 1.91% 159,535 7.85% 
Latin America 59,435 1.51% 58,056 0.98% 231,999 3.99% 
E. Europe 13,050 0.22% 12,900 0.19% 139,498 2.04% 
GLOBAL 349,756 0.64% 458,046 0.52% 2,267,232 2.58% 
It can be seen that all regions are estimated to experience an increase in 
nitrogen dioxide emissions as a result of the Uruguay Round, with the 
exception of the USA for scenario 3. China is estimated to experience the 
largest absolute increase in emissions even though the large scale and 
technique effect is partially offset by a negative composition effect, whilst 
Africa is predicted to suffer from the largest percentage increase. Both 
East Asia and South Asia benefit from negative composition effects which 
reduce, to an extent, the positive combined scale and technique effects. 
The EU, Africa and Latin America all suffer from composition effects and 
combined scale and technique effects which are both positive. This is also 
true for the USA for scenario 1, although for scenarios 2 and 3 the 
combined scale and technique effects are negative. 
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Table 15. The Estimated Impact of the Uruguay Round on Sulphur 
Dioxide Emissions (tonnes and % of total emissions). 
SULPHUR 
DIOXIDE 
Scenario 1. 
1990 
Scenario 2. 
2000 
Scenario 3. 
2000+0.5% 
EU 
-7,715 -0.04% -24,643 -0.16% -602,316 -4.03% 
USA 
-102,951 -0.32% -119,382 -0.41% -1,472,713 -5.01% 
Japan 19,588 1.38% 15,499 0.95% 
-64,685 -3.95% 
China 18,336 0.3% 113,273 0.69% 1,026,414 6.28% 
East Asia 
-190,741 -2.17% -204,131 -1.83% 79,250 0.71% 
South Asia 30,780 0.75% 81,851 0.87% 728,816 7.76% 
Africa 53,731 2.73% 113,190 2.26% 485,676. 9.69% 
Latin America 123,676 1.16% 104,773 0.75% 317,295 2.27% 
E. Europe 
- 
8,653 
-0.07% -17,661 -0.14% -154,297 -1.25% 
GLOBAL 
- 
63,949 
-0.07% 62,769 0.05% 343,440 0.30% 
Both the European Union and the USA are predicted to benefit from a 
reduction in sulphur dioxide emissions as a result of the Uruguay Round, 
with both regions experiencing large negative combined scale and 
technique effects which more than offset the positive composition effect. 
Surprisingly, Japan is predicted to suffer an increase in emissions for 
scenarios 1 and 2 as a result of a large, positive composition effect which 
is larger than the negative combined scale and technique effect. In scenario 
3, per capita income is sufficient to ensure that the negative scale and 
technique effects outweigh the positive composition effect. China is 
predicted to experience only a modest increase in emissions, for scenarios 
1 and 2 at least, since the large positive combined scale and technique 
effect are almost entirely removed by a negative composition effect. In 
scenarios 1 and 2, the largest fall in emissions is estimated to occur in East 
Asia due to an extremely large negative composition effect which 
outweighs a reasonably large positive combined scale and technique effect. 
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In scenario 3, the combined scale and technique effect has become large 
enough to overcome the negative composition effect 
- 
resulting in a net 
increase in sulphur dioxide emissions. Both South Asia and Africa are 
estimated to experience an increase in emissions even though a negative 
composition effect weakens a positive scale and technique effect. Africa is 
predicted to suffer the largest percentage increase in emissions. For 
scenario 1, Latin America is predicted to experience the largest absolute 
increase in emissions since both the composition effect and the combined 
scale and technique effect are positive. China suffers the largest absolute 
increase in emissions in scenarios 2 and 3. As with carbon monoxide and 
suspended particulate matter, the very small global figure reflects the fact 
that the decreases in emissions in the USA and the European Union are 
offset by increasing emissions in the developing world. 
Table 16. The Estimated Impact of the Uruguay Round on Carbon 
Monoxide Emissions (tonnes and % of total emissions). 
CARBON 
MONOXIDE 
Scenario 1. 
1990 
Scenario 2. 
2000 
Scenario 3. 
2000+0.5% 
EU 
-128,613 -0.22% -180,492 -0.35% -1,950,741 -3.78% 
USA 
-590,440 -0.48% -635,497 -0.55% -5,007,183 -4.36% 
Japan 
- 
97,121 
-0.73% -167,615 -1.26% -1,392,858 -10.49% 
China 568,936 1.68% 1,013,679 1.60% 5,322,471 8.40% 
East Asia 9,306 0.06% 
-16,059 -0.10% 520,724 3.39% 
South Asia 66,630 0.79% 165,258 0.98% 1,467,124 8.69% 
Africa 106,951 2.39% 219,157 2.28% 962,715 10.04% 
Latin America 184,255 1.01% 153,249 0.68% 587,846 2.62% 
E. Europe 38,463 0.22% 59,891 0.27% 640,882 2.93% 
GLOBAL 158,367 0.06% 611,571 0.18% 1,150,980 0.34% 
The European Union, the USA and Japan benefit from negative combined 
scale and technique effects which by far outweigh positive composition 
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effects, and therefore are estimated to enjoy a reduction of carbon 
monoxide emissions for all scenarios. China, East Asia, South Asia and 
Africa all experience a negative composition effect which is outweighed 
by a larger positive combined scale and technique effect, with the 
exception of scenario 2, in which East Asia's negative composition effect 
is larger than its positive combined scale and technique effect. Latin 
America and East Europe suffer from composition and combined scale and 
technique effects which are both positive. The USA experiences the largest 
absolute fall in emissions, whilst Japan benefits from the largest 
percentage decrease. China suffers the largest absolute increase in 
emissions and Africa the largest percentage increase. 
Table 17. The Estimated Impact of the Uruguay Round on Suspended 
Particulate Matter Emissions (tonnes and % of total emissions). 
SUSP. PART 
MATTER 
Scenario 1. 
1990 
Scenario 2. 
2000 
Scenario 3. 
2000+0.5% 
EU 
-7,365 -0.13% -11,218 -0.27% -142,701 -3.42% 
USA 
- 
45,272 
-0.60% -49,161 -0.78% -426,409 -6.79% 
Japan 
- 
4,354 
-0.24% -8,294 -0.39% -90,969 -4.31% 
China 20,672 1.10% 47,125 1.37% 324,557 9.46% 
East Asia 
-26,206 -1.24% -29,312 -1.09% 36,420 1.35% 
South Asia 9,909 0.94% 22,691 1.11% 200,736 9.79% 
Africa 14,934 2.7% 30,256 2.50% 130,055 10.75% 
Latin America 31,436 1.02% 28,710 0.86% 91,908 2.75% 
E. Europe 4,542 0.07% 121 0.002% 
-66,976 -0.95% 
GLOBAL 
- 
1,704 
-0.0005% 30,918 0.11% 56,621 0.19% 
The developed world is again estimated to experience a fall in emissions as 
a result of a large negative combined scale and technique effect which 
more than offsets a positive composition effect. The Asian regions 
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experience negative composition effects which, for China and South Asia, 
are outweighed by large positive combined scale and technique effects. For 
East Asia, the negative composition effect is significantly larger than the 
positive combined scale and technique effects, resulting in a net decrease 
in emissions. Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe all suffer from 
both positive composition and scale and technique effects. The USA 
experiences the largest absolute decrease in emissions as well as, for 
scenario 3, the largest percentage decrease. For scenarios 2 and 3, East 
Asia is estimated to benefit from the largest percentage decrease in 
suspended particulate matter emissions. In contrast, the largest absolute 
increase in emissions occurs in Latin America for scenario 1, and China 
for scenarios 2 and 3. The largest percentage increase is estimated to occur 
in Africa for all scenarios. 
7.3.4 A Monetary Evaluation of Increased / Decreased Environmental 
Dama e. 
It is possible to provide monetary estimates of the impact of the Uruguay 
Round (from both composition effects and combined scale and technique 
effects) on nitrogen dioxide, sulphur dioxide, carbon monoxide and 
suspended particulate matter emissions. For carbon dioxide, monetary 
estimates are possible only for combined scale and technique effects, since 
composition effects have not been estimated. 
Monetary estimates of the damage resulting from one tonne of nitrogen 
dioxide, sulphur dioxide, carbon monoxide and suspended particulate 
matter have been made by several authors. '7 These estimates are generally 
made by estimating the likely impact of a tonne of pollution, on the locale 
in which it is emitted, in terms of factors such as the cost of resultant 
illness amongst the population exposed to the pollution; the cost of 
17 See, for example, PACE (1990) and Pearce (1993). 
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mortality; and damage to buildings. Fankhauser (1995) uses estimates of 
$5,000 for each tonne of nitrogen dioxide and $2,500 for each tonne of 
sulphur dioxide. For each tonne of carbon monoxide and suspended 
particulate matter, Pearce (1993) uses estimates of $15.23 and $14,283, 
respectively (converted to 1990 US dollars). These figures, although 
stemming from site specific estimates, are used for all developed regions 
(EU, USA and Japan) in the absence of any superior information. 
Following Fankhauser, to obtain damage cost estimates for the developing 
regions, these figures are scaled according to differences in income. 
Specifically, Fankhauser estimates damage costs in middle income and 
low income regions to be one-fifth and one-tenth of those in developed 
regions, respectively. 
For nitrogen dioxide, the resultant damage costs per tonne of emissions are 
$5,000 for the developed regions, $1,000 for the middle income regions 
(East Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe) and $500 for the remaining 
low income regions. 
Table 18, below, indicates that all regions are estimated to suffer a 
monetary cost of many millions of dollars due to increased nitrogen 
dioxide emissions, with the exception of the USA for scenario 3. The cost 
for each region (and hence the global cost) becomes particularly large once 
the growth rate has been increased in scenario 3. 
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Table 18. The Monetary Cost of the Increase in Nitrogen Dioxide 
Emissions 
- 
Based on Table 14 (millions US $). 
NITROGEN 
DIOXIDE 
Scenario 1. 
1990 
Scenario 2. 
2000 
Scenario 3. 
2000 +0.5% 
European Union 179.5 142.6 724.3 
USA 117.4 24.0 
-302.1 
Japan 49.9 43.5 90.9 
China 59.2 105.2 589.6 
East Asia 59.9 70.9 217.7 
South Asia 4.4 12.5 118.3 
Africa 10.2 19.4 79.8 
Latin America 59.4 58.1 232.0 
Eastern Europe 13.1 12.9 139.5 
GLOBAL 553 489 1,890 
Similarly, Fankhauser provides estimates of sulphur dioxide damage of 
$2,500 for the developed world, $500 for middle income countries and 
$250 for less developed countries. It should be noted, however, that 
estimates for both nitrogen dioxide and sulphur dioxide do not take into 
account the damage from acid rain and therefore may understate the value 
of total damage caused. 
For sulphur dioxide, the large weighting received by emissions in the 
developed world results in large, monetary savings. As a result, although 
the developing and transition regions are estimated to suffer a monetary 
cost, globally, a significant monetary saving is estimated. 
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Table 19. The Monetary Cost / Saving from the Change in Sulphur 
Dioxide Emissions 
- 
Based on Table 15 (millions US $). 
SULPHUR 
DIOXIDE 
Scenario 1. 
1990 
Scenario 2. 
2000 
Scenario 3. 
2000 +0.5% 
European Union 
-19.2 -61.6 -1,505.8 
USA 
-257.3 -298.5 -3,681.8 
Japan 49.0 38.7 
-161.7 
China 4.5 28.3 256.6 
East Asia 
- 
95.3 
-102.0 39.6 
South Asia 7.6 20.5 182.2 
Africa 13.4 28.3 121.4 
Latin America 61.8 52.4 158.6 
Eastern Europe 
-4.3 -8.8 -77.1 
GLOBAL 
- 
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-303 -4,668 
Pearce (1993) provides the damage cost of $15.23 (deflated to 1990 US 
dollars) per tonne of carbon monoxide emitted in the developed world. 
This figure can then be adjusted following Fankhauser, to obtain the 
figures of $3.04 for middle income regions and $1.52 for low income 
regions. 
The monetary costs and savings associated with changes in carbon 
monoxide emissions, in Table 20, can be seen to follow an identical 
pattern to those associated with sulphur dioxide emissions. Again, the 
weighting attached to developed world emissions means that monetary 
savings in these regions far outweigh monetary costs incurred in the 
developing and transition regions. However, the magnitude of the costs 
and savings are significantly lower than for nitrogen dioxide and sulphur 
dioxide. 
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Table 20. The Monetary Cost / Saving from the Change in Carbon 
Monoxide Emissions 
- 
Based on Table 16 (millions US $). 
CARBON Scenario 1. Scenario 2. Scenario 3. 
MONOXIDE 1990 2000 2000 +0.5% 
European Union 
- 
2.0 
-2.7 -29.7 
USA 
- 
9.0 
-9.7 -76.3 
Japan 
-1.5 -2.6 -21.2 
China 0.9 1.5 8.1 
East Asia 0.03 0.05 1.6 
South Asia 0.1 0.3 2.2 
Africa 0.2 0.3 1.5 
Latin America 0.6 0.5 1.8 
Eastern Europe 0.1 0.2 1.9 
GLOBAL 
- 
11 
-13 -110 
Pearce (1993) also provides a damage figure of $14,283 (converted to 
1990 US dollars) per tonne of suspended particulate matter emitted. Pearce 
points out that damage costs associated with this pollutant are not well 
researched, but stresses that the figure chosen is well below that found in 
other studies (e. g. Glomsrod et al. (1992)). Again, this figure is adjusted to 
$2,856 for middle income regions and $1,428 for low income regions. 
As Table 21, below, illustrates, the financial impact of Uruguay Round 
induced changes in emissions of suspended particulate matter again 
follows a pattern largely identical to that associated with sulphur dioxide 
emissions and carbon monoxide emissions. The magnitude of the costs and 
savings is larger than for any other pollutant, however. The weighting 
attached to emissions reductions in the developed world has meant a 
significant global monetary saving has been estimated. 
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Table 21. The Monetary Cost / Saving from the Change in Suspended 
Particulate Matter Emissions 
- 
Based on Table 17 (millions US $). 
SUSP. PART. 
MATTER 
Scenario 1. 
1990 
Scenario 2. 
2000 
Scenario 3. 
2000 +0.5% 
European Union 
- 
105.2 
-160.2 -2,038.2 
USA 
- 
646.6 
-702.2 -6,090.4 
Japan 
-62.2 -118.5 -1,299.3 
China 29.5 67.3 463.5 
East Asia 
- 
74.8 
-83.7 104.0 
South Asia 14.2 32.4 286.7 
Africa 21.3 43.2 185.7 
Latin America 89.8 82.0 262.5 
Eastern Europe 13.0 0.3 
-191.3 
GLOBAL 
-721 -839.4 -8,316.8 
Fankhauser (1995) also provides an estimate of the global mean value of 
the marginal social cost associated with carbon dioxide emissions. He 
estimates this to be $20.3 per tonne of carbon emitted. This figure stems 
from a global estimate of the cost incurred if carbon dioxide concentrations 
were to double, which in turn is an aggregation of the regional costs 
associated with such an increase in concentrations. In the case of carbon 
dioxide the source of the emissions is not relevant as the resultant impact is 
globally distributed. The same marginal social cost estimate is therefore 
applied to emissions from all regions to estimate the monetary cost of the 
increase in carbon dioxide emissions stemming from the combined scale 
and technique effect. 
18 This is therefore only a partial estimate of the 
Uruguay Round's impact on carbon dioxide emissions since it fails to take 
into account the composition effect. 
18 These points were clarified by personal correspondence with Samuel Fankhauser. 
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Table 16. The Monetary Cost of the Increase in Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions Resulting from Combined Scale and Technique Effects 
Alone (millions US $). 
CARBON 
DIOXIDE 
Scenario 1. 
1990 
Scenario 2. 
2000 
Scenario 3. 
2000 +0.5% 
European Union 77.0 179.6 567.1 
USA 106.6 107.4 671.9 
Japan 23.2 30.0 211.5 
China 125.2 230.2 1,177.7 
Asia'9 411.7 780.5 3,425.9 
Africa 62.7 123.8 527.0 
Latin America 55.4 76.1 388.4 
Eastern Europe 10.8 12.7 495.0 
GLOBAL 899.2 1,310.1 6,286.8 
All regions are estimated to experience a monetary cost as a result of 
increased carbon dioxide emissions. The largest monetary cost is incurred 
by Asia and amounts to almost $3.5 billion for scenario 3 and over $6 
billion globally. 
Although this is only a partial evaluation of the Uruguay Round's impact 
on carbon dioxide emissions, it is likely that the composition effect on 
carbon dioxide emissions will follow a similar pattern to that associated 
with nitrogen dioxide, sulphur dioxide and suspended particulate matter, 
since all four pollutants stem largely from energy use. Thus it is possible 
that the composition effect will add to emissions, and hence to the 
monetary cost, above, for the developed regions and Latin America, whilst 
emissions may fall in the Asian regions. The effect of compositional 
19 Includes China. 
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changes on Africa and Eastern Europe are difficult to predict since they 
vary depending on the pollutant. 
These estimated monetary costs can be seen to form only a small 
proportion of the estimated Uruguay Round benefits. For example, for 
China, Africa and Latin America, the monetary costs associated with the 
above five pollutants form approximately 1.2% of their estimated income 
gain for 1990.20 For the European Union this figure is only 0.4% whilst the 
USA's environmental benefit represents 1.8% of the initial estimated gain. 
Monetary damage estimates of this nature are subject to much uncertainty, 
however, as is the appropriate mechanism with which to scale costs for the 
developing regions. The sensitivity of the results to this scaling mechanism 
can be illustrated by allowing the developing regions to be subjected to the 
same monetary cost, per unit of pollution, as the developed regions. In this 
situation, China, Africa and Latin America would experience pollution 
costs equivalent to between 5-6% of their estimated gains from the 
Uruguay Round for 1990. Furthermore, pollution costs for the developing 
regions would be larger than any savings estimated for the developed 
regions resulting in a global environmental cost for all scenarios. 
7.4 Conclusion. 
This chapter has attempted to estimate the impact of the Uruguay Round of 
trade negotiations on carbon dioxide, total energy use and four local air 
pollutants. Results indicate that the developing and transition regions will 
experience an increase in energy use and emissions of all five pollutants as 
a result of the Uruguay Round. In the developed regions emissions of three 
local air pollutants are predicted to fall whilst nitrogen dioxide emissions, 
carbon dioxide emissions and energy use rise. 
20 To allow this comparison, the estimated income gains have here been deflated to 1990 
US dollars. 
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The analysis of the composition effect associated with the Uruguay Round 
highlights the sectors which may require additional abatement efforts. The 
expansion of the textile sectors in virtually all developing regions is 
predicted to lead to an increase in emissions of all four local air pollutants. 
In the developed regions it is the heavy industrial sectors which are 
predicted to expand as a result of the Uruguay Round, again, leading to 
increases in emissions of all four local pollutants. These increases are 
particularly large due to the high pollution intensities associated with the 
output from these sectors. 
The results also highlight the effect of a change in the rate of economic 
growth on pollution emissions and energy use. As the results indicate, if 
the Uruguay Round were to increase this rate of growth, the level of 
emissions and energy use in the year 2000 is likely to be considerably 
different to that predicted for the year 2000 in the absence of the Uruguay 
Round. For example, the increase in emissions of local air pollution for the 
developing regions for the year 2000 is generally 5 to 10 times higher if 
the growth rate has been increased by 0.5%, with emissions predicted to 
increase by up to 10% for some regions. 
With regard to the monetary costs associated with these changes in 
pollution, it would appear that, compared to the estimated gains from the 
Uruguay Round, these costs are small. It is, nevertheless, important that 
the existence of such costs is recognised. Furthermore, it should, of course, 
also be pointed out that the above analysis is only a very partial estimate of 
the environmental impact of the Uruguay Round. Indeed, the monetary 
cost estimates consider only five air pollutants at the expense of other local 
air pollutants, greenhouse gases, CFCs, water pollutants and numerous 
other environmental indicators which may also be affected. 
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It should, of course, be pointed out that the estimates contained within this 
chapter depend, not only on the estimated EKCs, but also on the 
computable general equilibrium income estimates of Francois et al. As 
such, the reliability of the estimated results is open to question. Greater 
attention should perhaps be given to the direction of changes in pollution 
and energy use rather than to the magnitude of such changes. Nevertheless, 
this analysis indicates that trade liberalisation may result in some degree of 
environmental damage, particularly in the developing regions as a result of 
increased emissions of local air pollutants and perhaps globally for carbon 
dioxide emissions and energy use. 
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CHAPTER 8. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS. 
8.1 Introduction. 
The previous chapters have addressed the broad and complex issue of the 
relationship between economic growth, trade liberalisation and the 
environment. Perhaps not surprisingly, the results generated in these 
chapters have far-reaching implications for both national and international 
policy. In order to consider these policy implications in more detail, a 
distinction has been drawn between the implications for the WTO, those 
which relate to the creation of a World Environmental Organisation 
(WEO) and those which relate to national environmental policy. These will 
now be considered in turn. 
8.2 Implications for the WTO. 
The investigation into the impact of trade liberalisation on the environment 
highlighted a number of deficiencies in the workings of the GATT 
- 
many 
of which have now been passed on to the WTO. 
The first implication for policy stems from the issue of whether liberalised 
trade suppresses the implementation of environmental legislation, both at a 
national and international level. Chapter 3 stated that any international 
environmental agreements which contain trade-based enforcement 
mechanisms are currently illegal under current WTO rules. Thus, any 
nations who are signatories to both the GATT/WTO and an agreement 
such as the Montreal Protocol are subject to conflicting obligations. It is 
therefore recommended that the WTO be amended to prevent interference 
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with multilaterally accepted environmental agreements. 1 With regard to 
national environmental legislation, Nordhaus (1994) argued that it is 
economically efficient for nations to harmonise their policies aimed at 
global environmental issues whilst policies targetted at local 
environmental problems should be left to the discretion of individual 
countries. Using standard neoclassical analysis Nordhaus stated that, for 
global pollutants, the marginal benefits of emissions reduction are likely to 
be common to all countries, whilst the marginal abatement costs are likely 
to differ. 2 In these circumstances, it is therefore possible for a single level 
of pollution tax to equate the marginal benefits and the marginal costs for 
each nation. In contrast, for local pollutants each nation will possess 
different marginal costs and marginal benefits, thereby also requiring 
different levels of pollution tax in each country to equate these costs and 
benefits. 3 This argument is examined in detail in Chapter 3 and is 
illustrated diagrammatically in Appendix F. Chapter 3 also pointed out 
that, in reality, policy decisions are not made using economic efficiency 
arguments alone. As a result, the negotiations necessary before such global 
legislation could be implemented would need to address a number of other 
issues, including equity and the environment. Nevertheless, from an 
environmental point of view Nordhaus's conclusions would also seem 
sensible. By harmonising the response to global environmental issues, 
either through the use of common standards or, as Nordhaus recommends, 
through the adoption of harmonised emissions fees, countries are forced to 
adopt standards or regulations which are often higher than those which 
1 Optimal intervention theory suggests that such environmental agreements should not 
restrict trade but should instead internalise externalities. However, the fact that 
multilateral agreements of this nature are addressing global environmental problems and 
given the extent of externalities and the difficulties faced in globally internalising them, it 
would appear that, in the interests of the environment, trade restrictions are necessary if 
they are in support of a multilaterally accepted agreement. 
2 In reality, it is unlikely that the marginal benefits of abatement will be constant across a 
number of countries. Global warming, for example, is likely to have an extremely varied 
impact on different countries. 
3 Nordhaus treats global externalities as traded goods which will experience price 
equalisation across countries. Conversely, local externalities are treated as non-traded 
goods and possess prices specific to each country. 
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individual countries would have adopted. Indeed, as Esty (1994) points 
out, the Montreal Protocol is just such an example of standards being 
adopted which are higher than the existing standards of any country. It is 
clear that the multilateral implementation of environmental regulations 
avoids the 'prisoner's dilemma' fear associated with unilateral standard 
setting, since loss of competitiveness is no longer a concern. Chapters 5's 
analysis of CFC emissions illustrates how effective the Montreal Protocol 
has been in tackling the use of CFCs, and shows how the implementation 
of this policy effectively `tunnelled through' the original pre-Montreal 
Protocol environmental Kuznets curve. In contrast, the case of carbon 
dioxide in Chapters 5 and 6 indicates that without such multilateral 
attention, nations do not reduce emissions due to the risk of losing 
competitiveness combined with the ability to free ride by benefitting from 
other nations' pollution control. 
Whether to harmonise the response to transboundary pollutants (such as 
nitrogen dioxide and sulphur dioxide 
- 
the causes of acid rain), which are 
neither local or global pollutants, less clear. Nordhaus, himself, points out 
that his analysis applies only to pure global and local externalities. It 
would not appear appropriate, for example, to adopt a globally harmonised 
response to acid rain, given that some nations do not suffer from acid rain 
and hence the marginal benefits of abatement would be far from equal. 
Indeed, attaining public acceptability for a policy which charges them for a 
problem they do not have would also be difficult. Conversely, since the 
sulphur dioxide emissions, for example, of one country can directly affect 
the environment of another, it would also appear unwise for abatement to 
be fully at the discretion of individual countries. From an environmental 
point of view, there would therefore seem to be a need for multilateral 
commitment to tackle a transboundary issue such as acid rain. One option 
would be to adopt a harmonised regional response amongst nations with 
similar income levels. Most European nations are already committed to 
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reduce sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide by common targets under the 
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, whilst the US 
uses a system of marketable permits to reduce emissions of sulphur 
dioxide. Under the US sulphur dioxide control program, the Clean Air Act 
sets the national total amount of emissions deemed acceptable. Permits for 
this total are allocated mainly to power companies generally based on 
historical emissions levels and on fuel type. In addition, a small amount of 
permits are released through auction once a year. Permits can then be 
traded, with their price being determined on the open market. Interestingly, 
under this system all states are subject to the same national emissions 
ceiling and all face the same open market permit price even though the 
marginal benefits of abatement will vary significantly from state to state, 
with acid rain a particular problem only in the North-Eastern states. The 
US permit program therefore does not appear to conform with a notion of 
economic efficiency, if marginal benefits are measured at the level of the 
state rather than for the nation as a whole 
.4 The policy, however, has 
proved very successful, with emissions of sulphur dioxide falling rapidly 
since the permit system began. 
There is therefore a clear need for the developing regions to follow in the 
footsteps of Europe and the US and to adopt similar commitments, ideally 
using marketable permits or pollution taxes common to all countries, rather 
than the less efficient common standards. However, the number of 
countries who adhere to the harmonised commitment and whether or not 
they all suffer from acid rain will be of importance if the policy is to be 
efficient in economic terms. The level at which any tax was set in the 
developing world is unlikely to be determined by economic efficiency, 
4 Even if marginal benefits are measured at a national level it is unclear whether the US 
permit system is efficient in economic terms i. e. whether it equates the marginal cost and 
marginal benefit of emissions reduction. However, as with pollution taxes, marketable 
permits are likely to be more efficient than command and control policies since it appears 
inefficient to force all firms to cut pollution by the same amount when they are likely to 
face very different marginal abatement costs. 
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however, since a number of political factors would have to be considered. 
Indeed, the environment is still considered to be a luxury good in many 
developing countries, indicating that the necessary co-operation and 
commitment from these countries may be difficult to achieve. In addition, 
it is important that the developing countries do not feel that they are being 
'bullied' into adopting environmental regulations by the economically 
powerful North. The issue of environmental protection is even more 
sensitive since the developing countries may resent having to pay for 
environmental problems which they consider to have been largely caused 
by the developed regions. Clearly, environmental regulation in developing 
countries needs to be established through careful negotiation 
-a potential 
role for a World Environmental Organisation, as discussed below. 
Many environmentalists have expressed the fear that any harmonisation 
will cause standards to fall to the lowest common denominator. However, 
this risk can be overcome by simply treating common standards as a 
baseline, or minimum standard, which countries are allowed to exceed 
providing the higher standard does not impose an excessive restriction on 
trade. The WTO should then adopt a test, to use if a dispute arises, which 
assesses whether in the absence of the new standard, significant 
environmental damage would have occurred. Thus, if the raised standard 
was challenged as being an unnecessary restriction to trade, the country 
responsible would have to demonstrate to the WTO that the disruption to 
trade was not disproportionate to the environmental benefits resulting from 
the higher standard. 5 Environmentalists have often criticised the 
harmonisation of ambient air quality standards and production and process 
standards due to national variations in environmental endowments and 
environmental preferences. However, the need to tackle global and 
5 It would also have to be proved that there was no non-trade distorting measure that 
would provide equivalent results. Given the recent WTO ruling on the EU's ban on US 
beef containing growth hormones, it would appear that even if a nation's environmental 
standard is found to be an excessive restriction on trade, it can remain in place providing 
compensation is paid to the complainant. 
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transboundary pollution at a multilateral level would seem to take priority 
over these objections. Furthermore, the harmonisation of ambient air 
quality levels, rather than the harmonisation of the tools to achieve these 
levels, has the advantage of respecting differences in assimilative capacity 
between nations. In addition, since nations with a high assimilative 
capacity will face lower environmental compliance costs, such nations will 
retain their comparative advantage. 
Generally, it would seem appropriate that the level at which the 
environmental regulation is set mirrors the scale of the environmental 
problem itself. Since some problems are clearly global in nature, then the 
solution to such problems should be co-ordinated at a global level. 
Damage to the ozone layer, for example, will continue if only some nations 
reduce emissions of CFCs, whilst others do not. Thus, global externalities 
require a harmonised and co-ordinated policy response. Similarly, 
pollutants which do not have a global impact but are still transboundary in 
nature (e. g. sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide) also require a co- 
ordinated multilateral response. In contrast, small scale, or local, 
environmental problems should be tackled at a local level. Externalities 
such as the destruction of woodland or emissions of suspended particulate 
matter would clearly be dealt with more effectively at a national level and 
hence such policies are ill suited to harmonisation between countries. 6 
The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (the Standards Code), 
however, makes no distinction between standards which address global 
issues and those which merely deal with local environmental problems. 
Indeed, by promoting the harmonisation of all standards, the Agreement 
6 Jacobs (1991) argues, however, that the protection of a habitat of particular importance, 
such as the rainforests, which some may consider to be a local environmental problem, 
should not be left to the discretion of individual nations, but should be subject to 
international co-ordination and agreement. Tropical forests provide a number of different 
functions and services many of which would be 'globally' valued, thereby suggesting that 
the destruction of such forests should be considered to be a global environmental 
problem, requiring global agreement. 
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may be damaging both to the goal of economic efficiency, and possibly to 
attempts to protect the environment. It is therefore recommended that the 
Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement concentrates on the harmonisation 
of only those standards which relate to global environmental issues and 
should not aim for the global harmonisation of transboundary pollution 
standards or local pollution standards. However, Stevens (1993), claims 
that the GATT/WTO is not the appropriate institution to set or harmonise 
standards, yet at present it is solely responsible for determining whether 
these standards are legitimate if they are challenged by another nation.? 
The creation of a World Environmental Organisation, as outlined below, 
would provide a more suitable forum in which the level of environmental 
standards could be decided. 
Chapter 3 next considered the issue of whether trade liberalisation in the 
presence of divergent environmental standards would provide the nation 
with the lowest standard with a competitive advantage, thereby providing 
an incentive for nations to lower their environmental standards. It was seen 
that the extent of any competitive advantage which results from low 
environmental standards is empirically uncertain, and hence so too is the 
strength of any pressure to lower standards. However, if nations, or 
producer lobbies, perceive there to be an economic gain from lowering 
standards, some nations may do so 
- 
at the expense of the environment. In 
such a situation the harmonisation of environmental standards is advisable. 
As stated above, from an environmental point of view, those standards 
aimed at local environmental problems would not be suited to 
harmonisation, and the possible environmental harm resulting from their 
harmonisation may not be compensated by the environmental benefit 
resulting from the removal of pressure to lower standards. As a result, the 
policy suggestion mentioned above still holds 
- 
environmental regulations 
7 Although the GATT/WTO can decide that an environmental standard is too high, it 
cannot claim that a standard is too low, thereby illustrating, from an environmental point 
of view, the unsuitability of the GATT/WTO to deal with such issues. 
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designed to tackle global environmental issues should be harmonised 
between nations. In addition, transboundary emissions may be dealt with 
most effectively by harmonising policies within regions. Such proposals 
may prove environmentally beneficial as nations are forced multilaterally 
to adopt standards which are higher than those which would have been 
adopted unilaterally. In addition, if by operating low environmental 
standards a competitive advantage is gained, this partial harmonisation will 
at least partially remove a nation's ability to lower its environmental 
standards. 
It was stated in Chapter 3 that the GATT/WTO will allow trade restrictions 
to be implemented in response to a consumption externality, but is wary of 
allowing trade restrictions in response to production externalities (apart 
from in limited instances under the Technical Barriers to Trade 
Agreement) due to the extent of the trade restrictions which may follow. 
Furthermore, trade restrictions may not be implemented in response to 
environmental damage which occurs outside the jurisdiction of the trade- 
restricting country. However, such extraterritorial environmental damage 
may seem extremely important to a nation. Whilst the production 
processes of an exporting country may directly damage the environment of 
an importing country, the importing country may also feel it has suffered if 
the production methods adversely affect the global commons. It is for this 
reason that Baker (1992) argues that trade restrictions aimed at protecting 
the global environment should not be considered to be outside a nation's 
jurisdiction. As a result, Esty states "Rather than making GATT legality 
turn on the issue of where the trade measure is aimed 
- 
barring 
extraterritorial actions - the critical determination should be the presence or 
absence of a bona fide environmental injury... " (Esty (1994) p. 139-40). If 
there is evidence of a significant threat to the environment, then it is here 
suggested that WTO rules should allow a trade restraint to be placed on the 
offending product wherever the damage occurred, and irrespective of 
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whether the environmental damage arose through the consumption of the 
good or through its method of production. WTO rules should therefore be 
amended to remove the prohibition against extraterritorial actions and to 
allow a distinction to be drawn between ` like' products which are the result 
of very different production and processing methods. Although domestic 
regulations would be preferable to trade restrictions, in reality, such 
regulations may not be forthcoming. The global nature of many 
environmental problems and hence both the extent of externalities and the 
difficulties associated with removing them, suggests that trade restrictions 
may be necessary in response to production methods which have a 
significant impact on the environment. If action is to be taken, a 
multilateral response is preferable. However, at present, it can often prove 
impossible to obtain global co-operation. Thus, the co-ordination of 
multilateral action could be one role of a World Environmental 
Organisation (WEO). Attention now turns to the other possible roles of 
such an organisation. 
8.3 The Creation of a World Environmental Organisation. 
Numerous calls have now been made for a global institution designed 
solely to protect the global environment, although specific details relating 
to its possible role have remained sparse. Runge (1994) states that a WEO 
should aim to define and upgrade national environmental policies and 
standards; monitor and verify national performance; and provide expertise 
and assistance in WTO trade-environment disputes. Esty (1994) also 
provides some general principles to which a WEO could adhere, including; 
the polluter pays principle; a precautionary approach; and an emphasis on 
pollution prevention rather than `end of pipe' technology. One factor 
common to both of these discussions, however, is an acceptance of the 
need for such an institution if environmental issues are to be dealt with 
effectively at a global level. 
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The creation of a WEO would serve to elevate international environmental 
policy-making to a status similar to that currently enjoyed by international 
trade policy. Operating parallel to the WTO, the two institutions would 
ideally possess similar power and authority and would collaborate fully 
when designing trade and environmental policy. The WEO could arise 
from a strengthening of existing institutions such as the United Nations 
Environment Programme, or it could be a new institution designed 
specifically for the task. Clearly, there is a risk of an unhappy alliance 
between the WEO and the WTO, and the prospect of repeated deadlock 
when negotiating trade and environmental policy. However, if the global 
environment is considered to be as important as the global trading regime, 
then it too requires a purpose-built institution to protect its interests. Esty 
(1994) argues that there would need to be recourse to an outside arbiter if 
the WEO and the WTO could not resolve a conflict, and suggests the 
International Court of Justice or a yet-to-be-established UN Economic 
Security Council. The precise relationship between the WEO and the WTO 
requires careful consideration which is beyond the remit of this research. 
Although the funding of the WEO may prove to be a complex issue, one 
possible source is the Global Environment Facility (GEF), a fund jointly 
established by the World Bank, the United Nations Development 
Programme and the United Nations Environment Programme to facilitate 
global environmental projects. Unfortunately, the GEF relies on voluntary 
donations from individual countries and is likely to prove insufficient for 
the WEO's requirements. An additional source of finance could be the 
revenue from the pollution taxes implemented by the WEO once it is 
established. The feasibility of this option is questionable, however. It is 
unlikely that national governments would be prepared to surrender 
responsibility for the imposition of environmental taxes, and the revenue 
from them, to an international bureaucracy. Furthermore, the payment of 
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taxes to an unelected global institution is likely to be unpopular with the 
general public. Nevertheless, the idea is theoretically viable and, as such, 
requires further investigation. 
The results and arguments contained in Chapters 4,5 and 6 provide some 
clear guidelines for the implementation of global sustainable development 
which the WEO could follow. Chapter 4 illustrates the uncertainty which 
exists regarding the impact of the economy on the environment. However, 
as Ekins notes, "Modesty in the face of uncertainty is, doubtless, laudable 
but it can all too easily lead to inaction or mere calls for more research. " 
(Ekins (1993) p. 280). The precautionary principle would therefore seem a 
sensible strategy for the WEO to adopt. 8 As Costanza emphasises, "If we 
are unsure about future limits the prudent course is to assume they exist. 
One does not run blindly through a dark landscape that may contain 
crevasses. One assumes that they are there and goes gingerly and with eyes 
wide open, at least until one can see a little better. " (Costanza (1989) p. 5). 
Given the existence of such uncertainty and the possibility of 
environmental actions being irreversible, it would appear dangerous to 
assume that man-made capital is a substitute for natural capital. Clearly, 
natural assets that are critical to human survival, such as biodiversity or the 
ozone layer, are irreplaceable. It is therefore essential that such natural 
assets are maintained, since no amount of man-made capital will 
compensate for their loss. 
Diagram 1 illustrates that, when trying to implement the precautionary 
principle, a number of options are available. 
8 As O'Riordan and Cameron (1994) point out, the precautionary principle states that, in 
the face of uncertainty and given the severity of potential environmental harm, policy 
makers should err on the side of caution and risk providing too much environmental 
protection rather than too little. 
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Diagram 1. 
Cost 
AC 
safety 
margin DC2 DC1 \H I 
safety 
iargin 
PP CL PP EF PP Effluent 
+ + + load 
BAT BATNEEC (S) BATNEEC 
(P) 
Where SPP = Strict Precautionary Principle; BAT = Best Available 
Technology; BATNEEC (S) = Best Available Technology Not Entailing 
Excessive Net Social Cost; CL = Critical Load; BATNEEC (P) = Best 
Available Technology Not Entailing Excessive Net Private Cost; E to E' = 
maximum economic efficiency; DC = Damage Costs; AC = Abatement 
Costs. 
In Diagram 1, the abatement cost (AC) and damage cost functions (DC1 
and DC2) assume that pollutants can be emitted/discharged up to the point 
CL (critical load) without significant environmental damage. Beyond this 
point the uncertainty surrounding the pollution damage increases, as 
represented by the divergence between DC, and DC2. The economically 
efficient level of pollution control lies between E and E', where marginal 
abatement costs are equal to marginal damage costs. The precautionary 
options available are therefore: the strict precautionary principle (SPP) 
under which only discharges of materials unlikely to damage ecosystems 
or diminish environmental quality are permitted; the precautionary 
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principle coupled with best available technology (PP+BAT) for discharges 
likely to result in environmental damage; the precautionary principle using 
best available technologies not entailing excessive cost 
(PP+BATNEEC(S)) where 'excessive cost' is interpreted in terms of the 
full social costs and benefits involved; the precautionary principle using 
BATNEEC (PP+BATNEEC (P)) interpreted using only the financial costs 
and benefits involved. 
Whichever form of the precautionary principle is chosen, the first step in 
ensuring that nations maintain at least their stock of critical natural capital, 
is to ensure that nations maximise `green' net national product (NNP) 
rather than GNP. The WEO could provide a clear and common framework 
through which green NNP could be calculated in all countries, similar to 
the manner in which the system of national accounts was adopted 
following the work of Kuznets and Keynes. It was pointed out in Chapter 
4, however, that `green' NNP can increase even if an economy is 
developing unsustainably and is therefore not, in itself, an indicator of 
sustainability. It is therefore recommended that the use of `green' NNP 
should be accompanied by the adoption of a system of physical accounts, 
even though such a system suffers from the lack of a common unit of 
measurement and the inability to assess the relative importance of the 
different accounts. The use of physical accounts for each environmental 
indicator is likely to prove vital in the quest for sustainability and the 
maintenance of at least the stock of critical natural capital. Only by 
studying the accounts for individual indicators will policy makers be aware 
of whether the economy is operating in an environmentally sustainable 
manner and be able to gear policy towards those indicators that are 
deteriorating. Again, the WEO could provide a common methodology for 
the calculation of physical accounts and encourage its adoption in all 
countries, thereby allowing the comparison of each environmental 
indicator between countries. 
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There are, however, a number of other ways in which the WEO can help to 
achieve sustainable development. 
Chapter 3 stressed that if nations are to internalise environmental costs, it 
must be on a multilateral basis due to the considerable disincentives 
associated with unilaterally raising prices in this manner. It is also vital 
that developing countries partake in this process of internalisation. This 
would prevent the developed countries from progressing towards 
sustainability at the expense of the developing world and reduce the 
likelihood of disputes arising over hidden environmental subsidies and 
`pollution havens'. Clearly, the WEO would be in an ideal position to 
establish commitments for internalisation in both the developed and the 
developing regions, by instigating and supervising negotiations. Although 
estimating the extent that prices need to rise due to numerous 
environmental costs is fraught with difficulties, attempting to internalise 
the cost of global warming is likely to be a key priority. Indeed, Chapters 5 
and 6 predict that carbon dioxide emissions will increase steadily, in all 
regions, for many years to come if current practices remain unchanged. 
Through negotiation and supervision, the WEO could play a key role in the 
implementation of a global carbon tax or the establishment of an 
internationally traded marketable permit system 
.9 For these policies to 
be 
effective it is essential that they are implemented internationally rather 
than left to the discretion of individual nations. This finding was clearly 
illustrated in Chapters 5 and 6, thereby indicating the need for a WEO. 
Although the powers of a WEO to enforce compliance to a carbon tax or a 
system of marketable permits is unclear, it is reasonable to suggest that 
such policies would receive the compliance and status currently enjoyed by 
9 See Jacobs (1991) and Larsen and Shah (1994) for examples of how marketable permits 
could be used to reduce global emissions of carbon dioxide. See also Howe (1994) for a 
comparison of taxes and marketable permits in the light of US and EU experience. 
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multilateral environmental agreements such as the Montreal Protocol and 
the Basel Convention. 
The WEO could also recommend, and encourage adherence to, minimum 
standards for policies aimed at other global and transboundary 
environmental issues. This would help to ensure that the policies aimed at 
these issues are harmonised globally, or regionally for transboundary 
pollutants, as advocated in the previous section. Policies aimed at local 
environmental problems which are left to the discretion of individual 
countries, could still be subject to general WEO guidelines. 
8.4 Implications for National Environmental Policy. 
The results of Chapters 5 and 6 indicate that emissions of local air 
pollutants are still increasing in many developing countries and, although 
falling in the developed world, appear to be still increasing globally. 
Clearly, such pollutants must be tackled, particularly in the developing 
world. Although Europe adheres to the UNECE Convention on Long 
Range Transboundary Air Pollution and to various protocols within the 
convention, at present the developing world has made no commitments to 
reduce such pollution. '° As mentioned above, the WEO could encourage 
developing countries to adhere to regional harmonised minimum standards 
for the local air pollutants which also have transboundary impacts (i. e. 
sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide). However, individual developing 
countries will determine themselves the extent of policies to tackle the 
other local pollutants. I I Clearly, this is an issue which requires attention 
from domestic policy makers in developing countries. 
10 SCE is the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. 
11 Until the developing world makes the switch from burning coal to electricity and 
natural gas for cooking and heating, emissions of sulphur dioxide and suspended 
particulate matter, at least, are likely to remain problematic. 
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The results of Chapter 7 indicate the effect on local air pollution of 
changes in the global composition of industry induced by the Uruguay 
Round. These results highlight the sectors in which increased pollution 
control efforts are likely to be required. The expansion of the textile 
sectors in virtually all developing regions is predicted to lead to an 
increase in emissions of all four air pollutants, indicating that policy 
makers in these regions should pay particular attention to these sectors. 12 
In the developed regions it is the heavy industrial sectors which are 
predicted to expand as a result of the Uruguay Round, leading to increases 
in emissions of all four pollutants. These increases are particularly large 
due to the high pollution intensities associated with the output from these 
sectors. It would therefore appear wise for domestic policy makers in the 
developed world to ensure that sufficient attention is paid to the emissions 
stemming from heavy industry. Once the scale effects associated with the 
Uruguay Round are also taken into consideration, the results reiterate the 
findings of Chapters 5 and 6- namely, that global pollutants will increase 
in all regions whilst local pollutants will increase in the developing world 
and fall in the developed world. Nitrogen dioxide is the only exception and 
is predicted to increase in both the developing and the developed regions. 
The results of Chapters 5 and 6 also highlight the need for domestic policy 
makers to tackle the environmental impact of the transport sector. Since 
estimated turning points for transport generated emissions of local air 
pollution were consistently higher than those estimated for total emissions 
of the same pollutants, it is clear that pollution emissions from transport 
are proving more difficult to control than emissions from other sectors. 
Similarly, energy use by the transport sector shows little or no sign of 
falling compared to total energy use which, although still increasing, is 
increasing at a decreasing rate. The analysis of traffic volumes illustrates 
12 Even though the increase in emissions in these sectors is predicted to be more than 
offset by decreases in emissions in other sectors. 
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why these problems are occurring, with traffic volumes projected to 
increase steadily for some years. 
The developed nations in particular therefore require an integrated 
transport policy which places an emphasis on public transport and 
investigates alternative energy sources to petrol and diesel. Other policies 
such as the restricted use of vehicles in city centres and road tolls may also 
be desirable. 
Chapters 5 and 6 also highlight the need for governments to tackle indirect 
environmental indicators such as energy use, municipal waste and, as 
addressed above, traffic volumes. The multilateral implementation of a 
carbon tax, or a system of international marketable permits, as advocated 
in the previous section, is likely to reduce energy use (and associated 
pollution). These policies should raise the price of energy with the result 
that consumers are likely to reduce fuel consumption, whilst firms now 
have more of an incentive to invest in energy saving technology. 13 
Volumes of municipal waste may be reduced by taxing firms when 
depositing at refuse collection sites, as is now the case in the UK. Such a 
policy needs careful enforcement, however, to prevent the growth of illegal 
`fly tipping'. Furthermore, the amount of waste going to landfill sites can 
be reduced by encouraging greater recycling. The recycling of glass and 
plastic, however, is unlikely to reduce methane emissions from landfill 
sites which are generated by decomposing organic waste. The recycling of 
paper may have a small effect on methane emissions, whilst the 
composting of organic waste will only serve to move methane emissions 
from the landfill site to the composting site. 
13 The environmental impact of the transport sector is also likely to be reduced if the 
increase in the price of petrol and diesel is sufficient to reduce traffic volumes. 
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8.5 Conclusion. 
The results of the previous chapters raise a number of implications for both 
trade policy and environmental policy. With regard to the former, several 
amendments are likely to be required to the WTO if it is to operate in a 
manner which is more environmentally benign. It has here been suggested 
that the WTO should not be allowed to interfere with multilaterally 
accepted environmental agreements and that the Technical Barriers to 
Trade Agreement should aim to harmonise only those standards aimed at 
global environmental issues, at least until a WEO could adopt this latter 
role. In addition, it has been argued that a distinction should be drawn 
between `like' products which are the result of very different production 
and processing methods and that it may also be wise to lift the prohibition 
on action taken in response to extra jurisdictional environmental damage. 
The creation of an international institution to protect the global 
environment has also been advocated and several possible roles for such an 
institution have been highlighted. To help facilitate a notion of 
sustainability which maintains the natural capital stock (or at least the 
stock of critical natural capital) the WEO could provide a common 
methodology for the calculation of `green' NNP and a system of physical 
accounts, and to encourage their adoption by all nations. The WEO would 
also be in an ideal position to establish harmonised commitments to tackle 
carbon dioxide, perhaps via a carbon tax, and to encourage the 
internalisation of environmental costs in general. It is imperative that such 
initiatives are implemented multilaterally if the global environment is to 
benefit and if nations are not to find themselves at a competitive 
disadvantage. The WEO would also be the most suitable institution to 
implement the regional harmonisation of commitments to reduce 
transboundary pollution. 
248 
The success experienced by the GATT/WTO in liberalising world trade 
provides a justification for an institution with similar authority and status 
to protect the global environment. The relationship between the WTO and 
the WEO is likely to prove complex, however, and is an issue which 
deserves greater attention from researchers and policy-makers alike. 
Finally, with regard to national policy, it has been argued that in the 
developing world in particular, greater efforts are required to tackle local 
air pollution. The need for all nations to address the environmental impact 
of the transport sector has also been highlighted, as well as the impact of 
various other sectors in the developed and the developing world resulting 
from trade-induced changes in the global composition of industry. Finally, 
the importance of reducing indirect environmental indicators, such as 
energy use and traffic volumes, has also been emphasised. 
It is clear from the above that in order to move towards a notion of global 
sustainable development a careful mix of both national and international 
policy will be required, as well as a number of institutional changes. The 
size of this task should not be underestimated. The extent of future 
amendments to national environmental policies will depend very much on 
the political will of national governments. Furthermore, given the 
difficulties associated with international policy making, as illustrated by 
the duration of the last round of GATT talks, for example, it appears 
unlikely that the necessary institutional changes will occur quickly. 
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CHAPTER 9. 
CONCLUSION. 
This thesis has analysed, and where possible quantified, the impacts of 
trade liberalisation and economic growth on the environment. 
Particular attention has been paid to the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations and the economic growth predicted to arise as a result of 
these negotiations. 
Chapter 1 explained the background to the issues to be discussed, 
whilst Chapter 2 began the analysis of the relationship between trade 
liberalisation and the environment by considering the development of 
the GATT since 1948. Particular attention was paid to the GATT's 
treatment of the environment throughout this period. The chapter 
illustrates how successful the GATT has been in reducing the size and 
number of industrial tariffs and points out that agricultural protection 
is also now falling as a result of the Uruguay Round. It was seen that 
the GATT's provisions for the protection of the environment are 
minimal and it was not until the Uruguay Round, and the creation of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO), that any significant advances 
were made in this area. In contrast to the GATT, the WTO at least 
formally recognises the need to protect the environment and has 
created a Committee on Trade and the Environment. This clearly 
represents a step in the right direction, although there is, as yet, little 
evidence of any firm commitment to alter the workings of the WTO to 
benefit the environment. 
Chapter 3 examined the environmental implications of the 
GATT/WTO and trade liberalisation in general. Although trade 
liberalisation may benefit the environment, for example through the 
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increased exchange of environmentally beneficial products and 
services or through the removal of distortions in the location and 
intensity of production, it may also prove environmentally damaging. 
This chapter examined the different arguments and, together with 
Chapter 8, provided a number of recommendations for the workings of 
the WTO. Chapter 4 began the analysis of a major implication of trade 
liberalisation 
- 
the generation of economic growth. Concentrating on 
theoretical arguments, the chapter highlighted the differences between 
the pro-growth and anti-growth positions, particularly those which 
manifested themselves in the 1960s and 70s. Similar positions can still 
be detected amongst different proponents of sustainable development, 
indicating that the debate was far from settled. The chapter finished by 
examining the deficiencies of GNP as an indicator of production and 
welfare and suggested possible alternatives. 
Given the uncertainty surrounding the impact of the economy on the 
environment, Chapters 5 and 6 attempted to estimate empirically the 
relationship between economic growth and a wide range of 
environmental indicators. Improving on the traditional methodology 
for estimating environmental Kuznets curves (EKCs) the chapters 
provided a number of interesting findings. For example, results suggest 
that economic growth is associated with increasing emissions of global 
pollutants such as carbon dioxide and indicators with an indirect 
environmental impact, such as energy use and traffic volumes! This 
would appear to be due to the lack of incentives for unilateral action. 
In contrast, the emissions of local air pollutants tend to decline with 
economic growth, once a certain per capita income level is attained. 
Clearly, governments have a greater incentive to reduce emissions of 
such pollutants when they directly affect the locale in which they are 
emitted. The chapters also highlighted the impact of the transport 
1 CFCs were also increasing steadily prior to them receiving multilateral attention 
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sector on pollution and energy use and, in addition, illustrated that 
urban air concentrations tend to improve before total emissions do. 
Chapter 6 re-tested the hypotheses of Chapter 5 with the inclusion of a 
time trend as a proxy for the level of technology. This did little to alter 
the results of Chapter 5 and reinforced which pollutants have 
benefitted from technological change and which have not. Generally, 
total emissions of local air pollutants have fallen in response to 
technological advance whilst emissions from transport have not. This 
latter point may be due to the fact that the introduction of catalytic 
converters occurred towards the end of the time series under 
consideration. Energy use and carbon dioxide emissions also possess 
negative time trends (although not always statistically significant), 
presumably due to advances in energy efficiency. Despite these 
advances, both indicators remain on the upward sloping portion of 
their EKCs and therefore continue to increase. 
Chapter 7 estimated the environmental impact of the Uruguay Round 
of trade negotiations in terms of the environmental indicators 
considered in Chapters 5 and 6. Using the results of Chapter 5, 
together with those of Francois et al. (1995) and Heftige et al. (1994), 
the chapter estimated the environmental impact of the composition 
effect and scale and technique effects associated with the Uruguay 
Round. Results suggested that in the developing and transition regions 
most indicators will increase as a result of the Uruguay Round, whilst 
in the developed regions three local air pollutants will fall and the 
others increase. 
As well as highlighting the sectors which are likely to increase or 
decrease pollution emissions as a result of the Uruguay Round, the 
analysis also indicated the effect on the environmental indicators of a 
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change in the rate of economic growth. An increase in the growth rate 
effectively amplifies the magnitude of the change in the environmental 
indicator stemming from the initial income gain. Whether the Uruguay 
Round will increase the rate of economic growth therefore becomes an 
issue of considerable importance when trying to determine the 
Uruguay Round's environmental impact. 
Combining estimated pollution changes with estimates of the monetary 
cost associated with a unit of pollution, allowed the calculation of the 
monetary cost or benefit associated with the environmental impact of 
the Uruguay Round. Results suggested that such costs and benefits 
form only a small portion of the estimated monetary gains from the 
Uruguay Round. It is important to stress, however, that these monetary 
costs and benefits stem from changes in only five air pollutants at the 
expense of a vast array of other potential environmental impacts. 
The policy implications stemming from the thesis were discussed in 
Chapter 8 and a distinction was drawn between those implications for 
the WTO, those which relate to the creation of a World Environmental 
Organisation (WEO) and those which relate to national environmental 
policy. The chapter recommended a number of changes to the 
workings of the WTO to reduce the environmental impact of trade 
liberalisation and also advocated the creation of a WEO which would 
aim to protect the global environment. A number of possible roles and 
policies for a WEO were highlighted which would help facilitate a 
notion of sustainable development. These would then be 
complemented by various amendments to national environmental 
policy. 
The results and discussions within this thesis suggest that trade 
liberalisation has the potential to damage the environment. 
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Amendments to the workings of the WTO could alleviate this damage, 
to an extent, but in the presence of externalities such damage is likely 
to continue. Clearly, externalities need to be fully internalised so that 
product prices reflect their full costs of production. The creation of a 
WEO is likely to prove vital in the quest to internalise environmental 
costs at a global level, although the size of the task should not be 
underestimated. Indeed, the precise role of a WEO, and in particular its 
relationship with the WTO, is an issue which will require further 
attention from researchers and policy-makers. The methods with which 
environmental costs are estimated also require further research. 
Particularly sparse is information on the monetary costs of 
environmental damage in developing countries. If such costs are to be 
internalised, it is likely that their accuracy and reliability will require 
improvement. 
The environmental impact specifically resulting from economic 
growth is less clear. Although certain environmental indicators can 
improve in association with economic growth, others continue to 
deteriorate. As stressed in Chapter 5, however, there is nothing 
inevitable about the estimated relationship between per capita income 
and environmental indicators since concerted policy initiatives can 
`tunnel through' the EKC. It is also important to note that where 
improvements in indicators have occurred, this has not been an 
automatic process. Indicators will only improve as a result of policy 
and investment and not as a result of economic growth per se. If such 
policy and investment does occur, it appears that economic growth can 
be compatible with a reduction in emissions of local air pollutants. For 
other indicators, policy initiatives will need to be multilateral to 
overcome the disincentives associated with unilaterally tackling 
indicators such as carbon dioxide or energy use. If appropriate policies 
are implemented and technological advance continues then it may be 
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possible for global or indirect indicators also to improve in association 
with economic growth. As noted in Chapter 8, however, only the 
careful monitoring of physical accounts will tell us to what extent this 
compatibility is being attained. 
With regard to possible extensions of the thesis, Panayotou (1997) has 
noted that the EKC relationship effectively tells us very little about the 
actual determinants of environmental quality. Since income is used to 
cover all changes which may take place with economic development, 
the EKC relationship can provide little information on how factors 
such as the structure of the economy, the rate of income growth or the 
quality of institutions will determine environmental quality. In 
examining the determinants of sulphur dioxide, Panayotou therefore 
introduces variables to represent the scale of the economy, the 
proportion of industrial output in GDP, the growth rate of income, the 
quality of institutions, and per capita income to represent both the 
demand and supply for pollution abatement. Such an expansion of the 
typical EKC relationship could provide useful insights for policy- 
makers. It may therefore prove worthwhile to undertake a similar 
analysis on the environmental variables considered in this thesis, 
thereby providing further information on the linkages between the 
economy and the environment. 
An additional point not yet considered in the thesis is the fact that 
certain pollutants may only be falling in the developed regions because 
of structural changes in the global economy. More specifically, due to 
changing comparative advantage many developed economies have 
seen their industrial share of GDP fall, to be replaced by an expansion 
of the tertiary sector, whilst many developing economies are 
experiencing an increase in their industrial share of GDP. It may 
therefore be the case that pollution is falling in the developed regions 
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as the emphasis of the economy moves from heavy industry, whilst 
pollution is rising in the developing regions as their industrial sectors 
expand? If this is so, developing regions may not be able to follow the 
same pollution paths as those estimated in Chapters 5 and 6 since they 
may have no-one to whom their industry, and hence pollution, can be 
passed. 
Lucas et al. (1992) partially address this issue by considering how the 
toxic intensity of production has changed in response to economic 
development for a wide range of developed and developing countries 
over the period 1960-88. They find that toxic releases from 
manufacturing, as a proportion of GDP, have an inverted U 
relationship with per capita GDP. This has to be due to one of two 
factors; either the manufacturing sector becomes `cleaner' once a 
certain per capita income level is attained, or the manufacturing sector 
becomes smaller, relative to GDP. Lucas et al. then estimate the 
relationship between toxic releases from manufacturing, as a 
proportion of manufacturing output, and per capita GDP. They find 
that the toxic intensity of manufacturing output increases 
monotonically with per capita income. Thus, the original inverted U 
relationship between the toxic intensity of GDP and per capita GDP 
has to be due to the fact that the manufacturing sector has become 
smaller relative to GDP, and not actually become `cleaner'. This 
finding therefore supports the hypothesis suggested above that, rather 
than becoming `cleaner' with economic development, the 
manufacturing sector simply becomes smaller as manufacturing output 
shifts to less developed economies. Lucas et al. perform the above 
2 It is important to distinguish this argument from the `pollution haven' hypothesis, since 
the two often become confused. It is not being claimed that industries will uproot from 
developed countries and move to developing countries to take advantage of lax 
environmental standards. Rather, it is suggested that changes in comparative advantage 
occur as economies develop resulting in a natural progression from industrial output 
towards the service sector. 
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analysis using sectoral toxic intensities, but the publication of sectoral 
air pollution intensities by Hettige et al. would now allow such an 
analysis for local air pollutants. It is therefore suggested that a useful 
extension to this thesis would be to examine the manner in which the 
pollution intensity of GDP and of manufacturing output has changed 
with economic development, following Lucas et al. This would then 
provide an explanation of why the EKC inverted U relationship arises. 
It may also indicate whether the developing regions are likely to 
experience difficulties in trying to attain turning points at similar 
income levels to those experienced in the developed regions. 
To conclude, this thesis has indicated the complexity of the linkages 
between trade liberalisation, economic growth and the environment. 
Although these relationships are becoming better understood, there is 
still much uncertainty and a number of unresolved issues. Something 
far more certain, however, is that these linkages will attract increasing 
attention in policy-making circles, particularly due to the continued 
globalisation of national economies. 
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Appendix A. 
GATT Articles of Agreement. 
I General Most-Favoured Nation Treatment 
II Schedules of Concessions 
III National Treatment on Internal Taxation and regulation 
IV Special Provisions Relating to Cinematograph Films 
V Freedom of Transit 
VI Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties 
VII Valuation for Customs Purposes 
VIII Fees and Formalities connected with Importation and 
Exportation 
IX Marks of Origin 
X Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations 
XI General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions 
XII Restrictions to Safeguard Balance of Payments 
XIII Non-discriminatory Administration of Quantitative 
Restrictions 
XIV Exceptions to the rule of Non-discrimination 
XV Exchange Arrangements 
XVI Subsidies 
XVII State Trading Enterprises 
XVIII Governmental Assistance to Economic Development 
XIX Emergency action on Imports of Particular Products 
XX General Exceptions 
XXI Security Exceptions 
XXII Consulatation 
XXIII Nullification or Impairment 
XXIV Territorial Application-Frontier Traffic-Customs Unions 
and Free Trade Areas 
XXV Joint Action by the Contracting Parties 
XXVI Acceptance, Entry into Force and Registration 
XXVII Withholding or Withdrawal of Concessions 
XXVIII Modification of Schedules and Tariff Negotiations 
XXIX The Relation of this Agreement to the Havana Charter 
XXX Amendments 
XXXI Withdrawal 
XXXII Contracting Parties 
XXXIII Accession 
XXXIV Annexes 
XXXV Non-application of the Agreement between 
particular Contracting Parties 
258 
XXXVI Principles and Objectives 
XXXVII Commitments 
XXXVIII Joint Action 
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Appendix B. 
The GATT Negotiating Rounds. 
Round Dates No. of countries Value of trade covered 
Geneva 1947 23 $10 billion 
Annecy 1949 29 
- Torquay 1950-51 32 
- Geneva 1956 33 $2.5 billion 
Dillon 1961-62 39 $4.9 billion 
Kennedy 1964-67 74 $40 billion 
Tokyo 1973-79 99 $155 billion 
Uruguay 1986-94 103 
- 
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Appendix C. 
Uruguay Round Negotiating Groups. 
Trade Barriers 
Tariffs 
Non-Tariff Measures 
Sectors 
Natural Resource Based Products 
Tropical Products 
Textiles and Clothing 
Agriculture 
GATT System 
Safeguards 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
GATT Articles 
MTN Agreements and Arrangements 
Functioning of the GATT System 
Dispute Settlement 
New Issues 
Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights 
Trade-Related Investment Measures 
Services 
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Appendix D. 
Timetable for Further WTO Negotiations. 
DATE ITEM SOURCE 
1995 January 1 WTO enters into force Marrakesh Decl. 
June 30 Deadline for negotiations GATS Annex; ministerial 
on financial services and decision 
on movement of natural 
persons 
1996 January 1 Government Procurement GPA Article XXIV. 1 
Agreement enters into 
force 
April 30 Deadline for negotiations GATS Annex; ministerial 
on basic decision 
telecommunications 
services 
June 30 Review of operation of Article 8.2, footnote 25 
provision regarding R&D of subsidies agreement 
subsidies 
June 30 Deadline for negotiations GATS Annex; ministerial 
on maritime services decision 
1997 January 1 Start negotiations on GATS Article XIII 
government procurement 
January 1 
January 1 
December 31 
1998 January 1 
of services 
First review of provisions 
on preshipment 
inspection(reviews every 
3 years thereafter) 
First review of TRIPs 
section on geographical 
indications 
Deadline for negotiations 
on emergency safeguards 
for services 
Examine standard of 
review for antidumping 
disputes, and consider its 
application to countervail 
cases 
Article 6 of preshipment 
inspection agreement 
TRIPS Article 24.2 
GATS Article X 
Ministerial agreement 
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January 1 First review of operation Article 15.4 of the TBT 
and implementation of agreement 
TBT provisions (reviews 
are to be held every 3 
years thereafter) 
January 1 Deadline for report with Ministerial decision 
recommendation from 
Working Party on Trade 
in Services and the 
Environment on 
modification of GATS 
Article XIV (general 
exceptions) 
January 1 Review of operation and Article 12.7 of sanitary 
implementation of and phyto sanitary 
sanitary and agreement 
phytosanitary provisions 
(further reviews to be 
held as need arises) 
1999 January 1 Start negotiations on GPA Article XXIV. 7 
further improvement of 
the GPA (extensions of 
coverage) 
January 1 Deadline for review of TRIPs agreement Article 
provision on patent or sui 27.3b 
generis protection of 
plant varieties 
January 1 Deadline for review of Ministerial decision 
dispute settlement rules 
and procedures 
June 30 Start review of provisions Article 31 of subsidies 
on serious prejudice and agreement 
nonactionable subsidies 
2000 January 1 Start first round of GATS Article XIX 
negotiations on 
progressive liberalisation 
of services (new 
negotiations to increase 
the general level of 
specific commitments) 
January 1 Review of Article II GATS Annex (MFN) exemptions 
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January 1 Launch new negotiations Article 20 of agriculture 
to continue reform agreement 
process in agriculture 
January 1 First review of TRIPs TRIPs agreement Article 
agreement; reviews to be 71.1 
held every 2 years 
thereafter 
January 1 Deadline for review of TRIMs agreement Article 
TRIMs agreement and 9 
consideration of whether 
to complement it with 
provisions on investment 
and competition policy 
January 1 Review of interpretation Understanding on 
of the rules on Interpretation of GATT 
modification and Article XXVII 
withdrawal of 
concessions 
January 1 First review of Paragraph 2 of GATT 
grandfathering of US 1994 
Jones Act (and like 
provisions); reviews to be 
held every 2 years 
thereafter 
January 1 Deadline for appraisal of TPRM agreement section 
TPRM F 
Unspecified Negotiations on increased TRIPs agreement Articles 
protection for 23 and 24.1 
geographical indications 
for wines and spirits 
Unspecified Subsidies in services GATS Article XV 
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Appendix E. 
GATT/WTO Membership, 1994. (Dates indicate accession to the GATT). 
Angola 1994 Germany 1951 
Antigua and Barbuda 1987 Ghana 1957 
Argentina 1967 Greece 1950 
Australia 1948 Grenada 1994 
Austria 1951 Guatemala 1991 
Bahrain 1993 Guinea, Republic of 1994 
Bangladesh 1972 Guinea-Bissau 1994 
Barbados 1967 Guyana 1966 
Belgium 1948 Haiti 1950 
Belize 1983 Honduras 1994 
Benin 1963 Hong Kong 1986 
Bolivia 1990 Hungary 1973 
Botswana 1987 Iceland 1968 
Brazil 1948 India 1948 
Brunei 1993 Indonesia 1950 
Burkina Faso 1963 Ireland 1967 
Burundi 1965 Israel 1962 
Cameroon 1963 Italy 1950 
Canada 1948 Jamaica 1963 
Central African Republic 1963 Japan 1955 
Chad 1963 Kenya 1964 
Chile 1949 Korea, Republic of 1967 
Colombia 1981 Kuwait 1963 
Congo 1963 Lesotho 1988 
Costa Rica 1990 Liechtenstein 1994 
Cote d'Ivoire 1963 Luxembourg 1948 
Cuba 1948 Macao 1991 
Cyprus 1963 Madagascar 1963 
Czech Republic 1993 Malawi 1964 
Denmark 1950 Malaysia 1957 
Djibouti 1994 Maldives 1983 
Dominica 1993 Mali 1993 
Dominican Republic 1950 Malta 1964 
Egypt 1970 Mauritania 1963 
El Salvador 1991 Mauritius 1970 
Fiji 1993 Mexico 1986 
Finland 1950 Morocco 1987 
France 1948 Mozambique 1992 
Gabon 1963 Myanmar 1948 
Gambia 1965 Namibia 1992 
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Netherlands 1948 South Africa 1948 
New Zealand 1948 Spain 1963 
Nicaragua 1950 SriLanka 1948 
Niger 1963 Surinam 1978 
Nigeria 1960 Swaziland 1993 
Norway 1948 Sweden 1950 
Papua New Guinea 1994 Switzerland 1966 
Pakistan 1948 Tanzania 1961 
Paraguay 1993 Thailand 1982 
Peru 1951 Togo 1964 
Philippines 1979 Trinidad and Tobago 1962 
Poland 1967 Tunisia 1990 
Portugal 1962 Turkey 1951 
Qatar 1994 Uganda 1962 
Romania 1971 United Arab 1994 
Emirates 
Rwanda 1966 United Kingdom 1948 
St. Kitts and Nevis 1994 USA 1948 
St. Vincent and 1993 Uruguay 1953 
Grenadines 
Senegal 1993 Venezuala 1990 
Sierra Leone 1963 Yugoslavia 1966 
Singapore 1961 Zaire 1971 
Slovak Republic 1993 Zambia 1982 
Slovenia 1994 Zimbabwe 1948 
Solomon Islands 1994 
Source: Hoekman and Kostecki (1995). 
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Appendix F. Diagrams from Nordhaus (1994). 
Policy for Global Externalities. DIAGRAM 1 (from Nordhaus (1994)) 
Marginal costs, 
benefits and 
emissions fee 
T* 
MC2 
MB 
rl r2 Emissions 
reduction 
Policy for Local Externalities. DIAGRAM 2 (from Nordhaus (1994)). 
Marginal costs, 
benefits and 
emissions fee 
T2 
T1 
MC2 
rl r2 Emissions 
reduction 
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Appendix G. 
Quadratic levels functions are symmetric around a maximum turning 
point, quadratic logs functions are not. A proof. 
Turning points for 2 example functions: 
Quadratic levels: Quadratic logs: 
e=a+by_ 
cy2 lne=a+biny-2c(lny)2 
ay 
=b-cy adIne ny =b-clay 
turning points: 
y*= 
b 
in y= 
b 
cc 
b 
y*=eý 
2 
and e* =a+ b(b) -2 c(b) for both functions. 
Consider y* ±z for the quadratic levels function; 
e=a+b(y±z)-. c(y±z)2 
e+ =a+by*-Icy*Z +bz-cy*z- 
I 
cz2 fory=y*+z 2 
e- =a+by*-2cy*Z -bz+cy*z- 
1 
cz2 fory=y*-z 2 
b 
buty*= 
- 
c 
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therefore e+ = e- =e* -1 cz2 and the function is symmetric around the 
maximum turning point. 
Now consider the quadratic logs function; 
as before; 
lne 
=a +b(lny *±lnz) -2 c(1n y In z)' 
and 1n e+ = In e- =1n e* 
-1 c(1nz)2 
this function is also symmetric around Iny* but, as shall be seen, not around 
y*. 
lny+=lny*+1nz 1ny'=1ny*-1nz 
y+=y*"z y= y* z 
y 
_Z2 
and y 
symmetry implies y+ 
- 
y* = y* 
-y for all values of y 
therefore (y-z2)-Y *=y* 
-y- 
(Z2) y*=y* * 
y*Z-y*=y*-y 
z2 
-z=z-1 
z2 
-2z+1=O 
This condition does not hold for z>1. So if z>1 y+ 
-y*>y* -y- 
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The log quadratic function is therefore not symmetric around y*, since the 
same e value requires V- y*) > (y* 
- 
y'). 
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Appendix H. 
Kmenta's (1986) GLS Process. 
This process firstly estimates the regression coefficients by ordinary least 
squares and obtains estimated residuals. These estimated residuals are then 
used to calculate estimates of the autocorrelation parameter for each region 
(p'), where; 
ei eir-1 
p'= t=2,3,... T 
... 
(1) 
Z e2if-I 
To avoid the possibility of p' exceeding one in value, p; is estimated by the 
sample coefficient of correlation between e"1 and e;, 
_1 
ie. 
Pi t 2, 
t 
JI: 7 
The estimated autocorrelation parameters are then used to transform the 
observations, such that; 
Pit = BIX*itl + BzX*it. 2 + """ + BkX*itk + u*tt """(3) 
where, Y*it = 1- p' 2 Yi, fort= I 
I'*it = I; t - P; I;, 
-1 
for t=2,3,... T 
and X*, tk = 1- p' Zr Xit, k for t=1 
X*it, k =Xt, k - P; Xu-i, k for t=2,3, 
... 
T 
k=1,2,... K 
i=1,2,... I 
If ordinary least squares is then applied to equation (3), the resultant 
regression residuals (u*; t) can be used to estimate the variances of u,, by; 
1T 
s2ui 
_u *ýr2 
... 
(4) 
T-K ý_, 
Note that equation (3) can be considered as the transformation to remove 
autocorrelation. To remove heteroscedasticity, both sides of equation (3) 
should be divided by si which is obtained from equation (4). This leads to; 
Y* *ft =BIX**it1 +B2X**it2 +... + B**itk+ U**it 
... 
(5) 
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where Y* *it = 
Y it 
sui 
X**itk= it, k k=1,2,... K 
sui 
u** = 
* u it 
it 
sui 
t=1,2,... T 
1=1,2, 
... 
N 
The disturbance u**;, is asymptotically nonautoregressive and homoscedastic. 
Equation (5) is then estimated by ordinary least squares, utilising all the NT 
pooled observations. (Kmenta (1986) pp. 618-620). 
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Appendix I. 
Alternative GLS. OLS and Random Effects Results. 
SULPHUR GLS LEVELS OLS LOGS OLS LEVELS 
DIOXIDE QUADRATIC QUADRATIC QUADRATIC 
Y 0.81939e-05 31.39 0.33209e-05 
(2.135) (5.842) (0.8002) 
Y 
-0.71465e-09 -1.7912 -0.57026e-09 (-4.327) (-6.2) (-3.393) 
D1 0.017498 0.30511 0.028315 
W. Germany (2.474) (2.741) (3.961) 
D2 
-0.0031415 -0.26173 0.0060405 
Netherlands (-0.4357) (-2.411) (0.8741) 
D3 0.012036 0.044347 0.024822 
Norwa y (1.099) (0.3965) (3.466) 
D4 0.048151 0.92703 0.054036 
UK (5.523) (8.75) 8.045 
D5 0.12386 2.1271 0.13489 
USA (11.24) (16.87) (16.87) 
D6 0.053008 1.0427 0.064974 
Finland (5.279) (9.63) (9.404) 
D7 0.014667 0.29183 0.025156 
France (1.859) 2.633 (3.532) 
D8 0.18313 2.4336 0.18915 
Canada (9.794) (20.29) (24.94) 
D9 0.042668 0.91282 0.053384 
Denmark (5.756) (8.208) (7.484) 
D10 0.0090662 0.26878 0.017733 
Italy (1.278) (2.607) (2.733) 
CONSTANT 0.029371 
-140.47 0.056657 
Ireland (1.469) (-5.631) (2.586) 
Buse R /R 0.787 0.9092 0.9093 
D. W. 0.751* 1.0185* 
B. P. 142.965 23 df* 75.624 23 df* 
B. P. G. 23.522 12 df* 42.536 12 dfK 
HARVEY 21.218 12 df* 36.006 12 df* 
GLEJSER 26.363 12 df* 84.82 12 df* 
11 COUN TRIES, 15 YEA RS = 165 OBSERVATIONS 
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SULPHUR GLS LOGS QUADRATIC 
DIOXIDE RANDOM EFFECTS 
Y 30.402 CONSTANT 
-135.39 (5.48) (-5.25) 
Y 
-1.7353 Rz 0.6017 (-5.82) 
11 COUNTRIES, 15 YEA RS = 165 OBSERVATIONS 
SUSPENDED GLS LEVELS OLS LOGS OLS LEVELS 
PARTICULATE QUADRATIC QUADRATIC QUADRATIC 
MATTER 
Y 0.39428e-05 28.864 0.72573e-05 
(3.714) (5.905) (3.91) 
Y 
-0.24249e-09 -1.6247 -0.38616e-09 (-4.845) (-6.158) (-5.092) 
Dl 
-0.0013904 0.029657 -0.0028923 
Netherlands (-0.2912) (0.4362) (-1.429) 
D2 0.016411 1.1006 0.017827 
Ireland (3.414) (11.06) (5.894) 
D3 0.7618e-03 0.30848 
-0.69844e-03 
UK (0.1579) (4.487) (-0.3422) 
D4 0.04309 2.3457 0.043728 
USA (6.888) (30.7) (17.89) 
D5 0.0030954 0.45076 0.0018076 
W. Germany (0.6441) 6.924 (0.9293) 
D6 
-0.0011918 -0.064738 -0.0026658 
France (-0.246) (-0.9852) (-1.357) 
CONSTANT 
-0.0035521 -132.82 -0.021393 
Nonva (-0.5037) (-5.867) (-1.85) 
Buse R/ R 0.8788 0.9495 0.8594 
D. W. 0.7391 * 1.4469* 
B. P. 143.694 34.701 
23 df* 23 df 
B. P. G. 34.345 8 df* 23.886 8 df* 
HARVEY 29.076 8 df* 36.889 8 df'` 
GLEJSER 41.766 8 df* 76.247 8 df* 
7 COUNTR IES, 15 YEARS =105 OBSERVATIONS 
274 
SPM GLS LOGS QUADRATIC 
RANDOM EFFECTS 
Y 26.614 CONSTANT 
-121.92 (5.03) (-4.98) 
Y 
-1.502 R2 0.5045 (-5.26) 
7 COUNTRIES, 15 YEAR S= 105 OBSERVATIONS 
CARBON 
MONOXIDE 
GLS LEVELS 
QUADRATIC 
OLS LOGS 
QUADRATIC 
OLS LEVELS 
QUADRATIC 
Y 0.63047e-04 
(6.768) 
37.037 
(4.004) 
0.95703e-04 
(7.674) 
Y 
-0.31289e-08 (-7.993) -1.9961 (-4.048) -0.4245e-08 (-8.566) 
Dl 
W. Germany 
0.084724 
3.137 
0.46752 
(8.294) 
0.063569 
(6.553) 
D2 
Netherlands 
0.0052853 
(0.2776) -0.038853 (-0.7023) -0.004113 (-0.4333) 
D3 
Norway 
0.14203 
4.746 
0.89956 
(15.32) 
0.14472 
(14.44) 
D4 
Denmark 
0.045859 
25.12 
0.35333 
(6.283) 
0.042779 
(4.422) 
D5 
USA 
0.43489 
(25.12) 
1.7615 
(21.39) 
0.42718 
(30.0) 
D6 
France 
0.067419 
4.632 
0.46714 
(8.339) 
0.057734 
(5.988) 
CONSTANT 
UK 
-0.20746 (-3.685) -174.1 
-4.015 
-0.43272 (-5.545) 
Buse R/R 0.9261 0.916 0.8749 
D. W. 0.5491* 0.8638* 
B. P. 254.236 23 df* 163.043 23 df* 
B. P. G. 29.725 8 di 28.881 8 df* 
HARVEY 18.834 8 df* 19.076 8 df* 
GLEJSER 31.294 8 df* 34.788 8 df* 
7 COUNTRIES, 15 YEAR S= 105 OBSER VATIONS 
275 
CARBON GLS LOGS QUADRATIC 
MONOXIDE RANDOM EFFECTS 
Y 10.345 CONSTANT 
-49.843 (0.81) 
-0.83 
Y 
-0.557 R2 0.01 (-0.82) 
7 COUNTRIES, 15 YEAR S= 105 OBSER VATIONS 
NITROGEN 
DIOXIDE 
GLS LEVELS 
QUADRATIC 
OLS LOGS 
QUADRATIC 
OLS LEVELS 
QUADRATIC 
Y 0.80679e-05 
(4.943) 
26.532 
(4.523) 
0.12668e-04 
(4.1) 
Y 
-0.26678e-09 
-4.171 
-1.3881 
-4.445 
-0.44159e-09 (-3.653) 
D1 
W. German 
-0.0092725 (-1.983) -0.14526 
-3.291 
-0.0076604 (-2.718) 
D2 
Netherlands 
-0.010546 (-3.904) -0.23342 (-5.246) -0.01101 (-3.876) 
D3 
Norway 
-0.68834e-03 (-0.2079) -0.010597 (-0.2357) -0.0016903 (-0.5926) 
D4 
Sweden 
-0.011491 
-5.031 
-0.26573 (-5.98) -0.012899 
-4.546 
D5 
UK 
-0.0043921 (-1.549) -0.092727 (-2.067) -0.005269 (-1.838) 
D6 
USA 
0.035871 
(12.65) 
0.54449 
(9.763) 
0.036343 
(10.09) 
D7 
Finland 
0.006736 
(1.118) 
0.065263 
(1.47) 
0.0053541 
(1.889) 
D8 
France 
-0.022132 (-4.748) -0.62368 (14.13) -0.024292 (-8.618) 
D9 
Canada 
0.023866 
9.067 
0.40114 
(8.069) 
0.024533 
(7.735) 
CONSTANT 
Denmark 
-0.0082642 (-0.7731) -129.72 
-4.71 
-0.037049 (-1.859) 
Buse R /R 0.897 0.8878 0.8473 
D. W. 1.1181* 1.4809* 
B. P. 60.468 23 df* 32.357 23 df 
B. P. G. 16.034 11 df 11.037 11 df 
HARVEY 30.944 11 df* 36.784 11 df* 
GLEJSER 61.224 11 df* 47.471 11 df* 
10 COUN TRIES, 15 YEA RS = 150 OBSERVATIONS 
276 
NITROGEN GLS LOGS QUADRATIC 
DIOXIDE RANDOM EFFECTS 
Y 22.771 CONSTANT 
-112.3 (3.69) 
-3.88 
Y 
-1.1857 R 0.2509 (-3.61) 
10 COUNTRIES, 15 YEA RS = 150 OBSERVATIONS 
SULPHUR GLS OLS LOGS OLS 
DIOXIDE LEVELS QUADRATIC LEVELS 
TRANSPORT QUADRATIC QUADRATIC 
Y 0.42555e-06 30.458 0.60036e-06 
(2.622) (4.4) (2.763) 
Y 
-0.22752e-10 -1.6588 -0.29304e-10 (-3.154) (-4.45) (-3.251) 
D1 0.23 76e-03 
-0.15201 -0.17416e-03 W. German (0.6638) (-1.13) (-0.5442) 
D2 0.0012188 0.39097 0.6903e-03 
Netherlands (2.684) (2.988) (2.219) 
D3 0.0024231 1.0005 0.002435 
Norwa y (4.698) (7.379) (7.658) 
D4 0.0021622 0.92562 0.002377 
Denmark (3.35) (6.886) (7.436) 
D5 0.90140e-03 0.28989 0.48331e-03 
UK (2.539) (2.274) (1.604) 
D6 0.96483e-04 
-0.089637 -0.10766e-03 
Finland (0.3029) (-0.6897) (-0.3492) 
D7 0.7915e-03 0.34288 0.57535e-03 
France (2.097) (2.501) (1.799) 
D8 0.0034701 1.277 0.0033188 
Canada (10.37) (8.674) (9.845) 
CONSTANT 
-0.47144e-03 -146.24 -0.0013808 
Ireland (-0.5758) (-4.557) (-1.224) 
Buse R/ R 0.6281 0.7721 0.7902 
D. W. 0.8204* 0.8332* 
B. P. 130.057 140.143 
23 df* 23 df* 
B. P. G. 19.129 10 df* 24.565 10 df* 
HARVEY 22.029 10 df* 17.117 10 df 
GLEJSER 35.059 10 df * 40.623 10 df 
9 COUNTRIES, 15 YEARS = 135 OBSERVATIONS 
277 
SPM GLS OLS LOGS OLS 
TRANSPORT LEVELS QUADRATIC LEVELS 
QUADRATIC QUADRATIC 
Y 0.45984e-06 6.0208 0.39248e-06 
(5.795) (1.761) (4.101) 
Y 
-0.15332e-10 -0.28686 -0.10955e-10 (-4.285) (1.761) (-2.802) 
Dl 0.55799e-03 
-0.28686 0.70813e-03 
Netherlands (2.661) (1.555) (7.115) 
D2 0.0022374 1.3591 0.0023976 
Ireland (17.51) (20.13) (15.64) 
D3 0.0020182 1.1066 0.0019407 
UK (4.127) (24.23) (19.34) 
D4 0.0047677 1.6687 0.0045623 
USA (23.29) (28.15) (32.27) 
D5 0.12608e-03 0.12823 0.97011e-04 
W. Germany (0.7484) (2.852) (0.9813) 
D6 0.7044e-03 0.57379 0.70663e-03 
Norway 5.457 (12.49) (6.973) 
CONSTANT 
-0.0022817 -38.219 -0.0021894 
France (-4.954) (-2.413) (-3.622) 
Buse W1 R 0.9159 0.9605 0.9733 
D. W. 0.6598* 0.558* 
B. P. 189.408 280.644 
23 df* 23 df* 
B. P. G. 15.355 8 df* 30.474 8 df* 
HARVEY 36.69 8 df* 17.452 8 df* 
GLEJSER 34.445 8 df* 35.359 8 df* 
7 COUNTRIES, 15 YEARS = 105 OBSERVATIONS 
278 
NITROGEN GLS OLS LOGS OLS 
DIOXIDE LEVELS QUADRATIC LEVELS 
TRANSPORT QUADRATIC QUADRATIC 
Y 0.81929e-05 31.433 0.10342e-04 
(9.206) (7.38) (12.07) 
Y 
-0.27281 -1.6332 -0.35426e-09 (-7.267) (-7.199) (-10.56) 
D1 0.0085555 0.43631 0.0092286 
W. German (10.58) (13.77) (11.85) 
D2 0.0064873 0.34627 0.0071632 
Netherlands (6.479) (10.87) (9.148) 
D3 0.0062889 0.30275 0.0064817 
UK (10.95) 9.426 (8.201) 
D4 0.022396 0.82012 0.023362 
USA (16.78) (20.0) (22.97) 
D5 0.016311 0.67701 0.15931 
Finland (17.15) (21.28) (20.37) 
D6 0.0084184 0.42724 0.00945 
Denmark (4.89) (13.49) (12.14) 
D7 0.029057 0.99178 0.030264 
Canada (18.88) (27.31) (33.98) 
D8 0.021993 0.83472 0.022016 
Norwa y (12.17) (25.73) 27.8 
CONSTANT 
-0.042209 -155.24 -0.056221 
France 
-7.941 (-7.765) (-10.16) 
-ld Buse R/R 0.9195 0.9447 0.9611 
D. W. 1.363* 1.1225* 
B. P. 31.316 23 df 58.869 23 df* 
B. P. G. 32.036 10 df* 29.087 10 df* 
HARVEY 19.288 10 df* 35.925 10 df* 
GLEJSER 62.129 10 df* 48.609 10 df* 
9 COUNTRIES, 15 YEARS = 135 OBSERVATIONS 
279 
NITRATES GLS LEVELS OLS LOGS OLS LEVELS 
QUA RATIC QUADRATIC QUADRATIC 
Y 0.63998e-03 11.301 0.74768e-03 
(7.048) (1.206) (1.517) 
Y 
-0.20548e-07 0.55558 -0.24934e-07 (-6.458) (-1.1) (-1.293) 
D1 2.4616 2.9367 3.1249 
Spain (3.726) (9.833) 3.514 
D2 3.0431 2.8811 2.8297 
NV. Germany (5.098) (12.92) (4.325) 
D3 0.31205 0.74755 0.27501 
Norwa y (1.753) (2.843) (0.3585) 
D4 1.0368 1.818 0.99675 
Switzerland (2.328) (9.543) (1.797) 
D5 6.0931 3.559 5.5116 
UK (10.47) (16.01) (8.523) 
D6 0.97829 1.77 0.91055 
USA (5.699) (8.366) (1.464) 
D7 2.2282 2.6568 2.2059 
Italy (19.38) (9.281) (2.657) 
D8 4.2815 3.1075 4.0885 
Denmark (1.712) 13.86 (6.21) 
D9 0.61917 1.2184 0.61981 
Finland (6.343) (4.468) (0.7799) 
D10 2.8385 2.9203 2.961 
Greece (11.63) (7.531) (2.507) 
D11 3.997 3.199 3.6898 
Netherlands (16.09) (14.88) (5.84) 
D12 6.43 5.0296 6.9325 
Czech. (14.38) (7.048) 3.951 
D13 3.5471 3.4533 3.7783 
Hungary (6.877) (7.18) (2.697) 
D14 3.1955 3.0243 3.2042 
Belgium (6.151) (12.94) (4.691) 
CONSTANT 
-4.7062 
-59.016 -5.3282 Canada 
-7.171 (-1.357) (-1.67) 
Buse R/R 0.9033 0.8463 0.6617 
D. V. 1.3303* 1.2965* 
B. P. 61.691 23 df* 57.405 23 df* 
B. P. G. 36.943 16 df* 32.668 16 df* 
HARVEY 25.709 16 df 80.684 16 df* 
GLEJSER 45.268 16 df* 92.88 16 df* 
30 R IVERS, 4 YEARS 
=120 OBSERVATIONS 
280 
PHOSPH- 
OROUS 
GLS LEVELS 
QUADRATIC 
OLS LOGS 
QUADRATIC 
OLS LEVELS 
QUADRATIC 
Y 0.66417e-04 
(2.67) 
32.132 
(3.692) 
0.11973e-03 
(2.303) 
Y 
-0.33954e-08 (-3.165) -1.8343 (-3.793) -0.70288e-08 (-3.008) 
CONSTANT 0.22404 
1.538 
-141.19 (-3.612) 
0.089794 
(0.316) 
D. W. 0.6398* 1.0538* 
B. P. 97.085 23 df* 73.36 23 df* 
B. P. G. 1.145 2 df 2.346 2 df 
HARVEY 2.459 2 df 2.68 2 df 
GLEJSER 2.834 2 df 3.12 2 df 
Buse R/R 0.1261 0.1727 0.1435 
28 RIVERS, 4 YEARS =112 OBSERVATIONS 
CARBON GLS LEVELS OLS LOGS OLS LEVELS 
DIOXIDE QUADRATIC QUADRATIC QUADRATIC 
Y 0.25205e-03 4.1986 0.28167e-03 
(11.79) (15.99) (13.39) 
Y 
-0.50253e-08 -0.20934 -0.81351e-08 (-3.432) (-13.36) (13.39) 
Dl 0.0789 0.16831 0.051587 
Asia (2.641) (6.768) (1.113) 
D2 1.9272 1.1587 1.9147 
E. Europe (27.17) (23.29) (27.17) 
D3 2.5543 1.1834 2.9347 
N. America (9.773) (17.7) (26.35) 
D4 0.126 0.35812 0.23485 
Oceania (0.8974) 
_ 
(6.153) (2.479) 
D5 
-0.25222 -0.37002 -0.28756 
S. &C. Americ (-4.389) (-7.881) (-4.653) 
a 
D6 0.25222 0.40552 0.2951 
W. Europe (1.31) (6.879) (3.021) 
CONSTANT 
-0.023432 -20.536 -0.052139 
Africa (-1.028) 
-19.09 -1.32 
281 
CARBON 
DIOXIDE 
continued 
GLS LEVELS 
QUADRATIC 
OLS LOGS 
QUADRATIC 
OLS LEVELS 
QUADRATIC 
Buse R'/ R 0.9518 0.9925 0.9883 
D. W. 0.2333* 0.2353* 
B. P. 648.395 23 df* 657.894 23 df* 
B. P. G. 108.946 8 df* 113.096 8 df* 
HARVEY 68.075 8 df* 246.804 8 df* 
GLEJSER 119.935 8 df* 200.125 8 df* 
7 REGI ONS, 32 YEARS = 224 OBSERVATIONS 
CARBON GLS LOGS QUADRATIC 
DIOXIDE RANDOM EFFECTS 
Y 4.1986 CONSTANT 0.34323 
(16.21) (1.60) 
Y 
-0.20934 R 0.8254 (-13.54) 
7 REGIONS, 32 YEARS = 224 OBSERVATIONS 
TOTAL GLS LEVELS OLS LOGS OLS LEVELS 
ENERGY QUADRATIC QUADRATIC QUADRATIC 
USE 
Y 0.21177e-9 5.3516 0.26248e-9 
(10.92) (8.214) (6.745) 
Y 
-0.46992e-14 -0.25974 -0.6542le-14 
-5.011 (-7.327) (-4.239) 
D1 0.32697e-5 0.91146 0.30653e-5 
USA (12.84) (15.35) (20.12) 
D2 0.33553e-6 0.12845 0.11988e-6 
Japan (4.643) (2.217) (0.7906) 
D3 0.12757e-5 0.47099 0.1054e-5 
Australia (12.84) (7.999) (6.701) 
D4 0.84074e-6 0.3132 0.58268e-6 
New Zealand (3.955) (5.431) (3.89) 
D5 0.86326e-6 0.34779 0.66396e-6 
Austria (11.35) (6.025) (4.415) 
D6 0.15255e-5 0.55587 0.13006e-5 
Belgium (17.02) (9.582) (8.541) 
D7 0.76078e-6 0.29248 0.51659e-6 
Denmark (7.15) (4.997) 3.323 
282 
TOTAL GLS LEVELS OLS LOGS OLS LEVELS 
ENERGY QUADRATIC QUADRATIC QUADRATIC 
USE 
(Continued) 
D8 0.24085e-5 0.77001 0.21318e-5 
Finland (14.42) (13.23) (13.88) 
D9 0.58824e-6 0.23674 0.36789e-6 
France (7.709) (4.044) (2.362) 
D10 0.11242e-5 0.43433 0.92348e-6 
W. Germany (11.19) (7.413) (5.922) 
D11 0.14872e-6 0.02549 0.44704e-7 
Greece (2.749) (0.5758) (0.4906) 
D12 0.62216e-6 0.29285 0.48636e-6 
Ireland (11.87) (5.787) (4.286) 
D13 0.11392e-6 0.019555 
-0.85698e-7 
Italy (1.773) (0.3399) (-0.5754) 
D14 0.16023e-5 0.58527 0.14005e-5 
Netherlands (21.16) (10.08) 9.181 
D15 0.21165e-5 0.70429 0.19295e-5 
Norway 22.16 (11.96) (12.31) 
D16 
-0.62421e-7 -0.14394 -0.14919e-6 
Portugal (-1.794) (-3.57) (-1.799) 
D17 
-0.40145e-7 -0.11077 -0.19885e-6 
Spain (-0.7483) (-2.127) (-1.662) 
D18 0.19703e-5 0.6556 0.17203e-5 
Sweden (14.99) (11.14) (10.95) 
D19 0.69329e-6 0.28219 0.48643e-6 
Switzerland 7.9 4.764 (3.108) 
D20 0.39422e-5 1.0344 0.37148e-5 
Canada (29.93) (17.47) (24.05) 
D21 0.6383e-6 0.26243 0.43732e-6 
UK (9.516) (4.545) (2.901) 
CONSTANT 0.33781e-7 
-40.498 -0.11087e-6 
Turkey (0.6201) (-13.71) (-0.951) 
Buse R/ R 0.9906 0.9936 0.991 
D. W. 0.7604* 0.8288* 
B. P. 243.441 23 df* 202.543 
23 df* 
B. P. G. 77.625 24 df* 77.698 23 df* 
HARVEY 35.259 24 df* 103.88 23 df* 
GLEJSER 77.873 24 df* 144.403 
23 df* k--22 
COUNTRIES, 13 YEA RS = 286 OBSER VATIONS 
283 
CFCs AND 
HALONS 
1986 
OLS LEVELS 
QUADRATIC 
OLS LOG 
LINEAR 
OLS LEVELS 
LINEAR 
Y 0.1189e-06 
(2.825) 
1.6706 
(13.15) 
0.88314e-07 
(10.08) 
Y 
-0.18119e-11 (-0.7433) 
DNeth 0.0019282 
(7.079) 
1.1157 
(1.697) 
0.0019562 
(7.3) 
DUK 0.01116 
4.094 
0.79551 
(1.21) 
0.0011455 
(4.276) 
CONSTANT 
-0.17404e-03 (-1.309) -22.62 (-20.7) -0.93077e-04 (-1.228) 
R 0.865 0.8533 0.8627 
B. P. G. 3.974 2 df 1.6451 1 df 3.344 1 df 
HARVEY 8.611 2 df 1.797 1 df 6.721 1 df* 
GLEJSER 11.261 2 df* 1.712 1 df 11.945 1 df* 
38 COU NTRIES 
CFCs AND 
HALONS 1990 
OLS LEVELS 
QUADRATIC 
Y 0.86956E-07 
3.315 
Y 
-0.28268E-11 (-1.968) 
DNetli 0.62144E-03 
(3.398) 
DUK 0.71523E-03 
(3.913) 
CONSTANT 
-0.95833E-04 (-1.131) 
R 0.7488 
B. P. G. 9.658 2 df* 
HARVEY 6.389 2 df* 
GLEJSER 16.353 2 df* 
39 COU NTRIES 
284 
METHANE 
late 1980s 
OLS LEVELS 
QUADRATIC 
Y 0.28477e-05 
(0.7429) 
Y 
-0.26751e-11 (-0.01116) 
CONSTANT 0.046852 
4.989 
R 0.0833 
B. P. G. 3.759 2 df 
HARVEY 1.75 2 df 
GLEJSER 5.4352 2 df 
88 COU NTRIES 
ENERGY OLS LOGS OLS LEVELS OLS OLS 
CONSUAIP. QUADRAT QUADRATIC LOGS LEVELS 
TRANSPORT IC LINEAR LINEAR 
Y 2.113 0.67022e-10 1.2006 0.77008e- 
(0.7942) (1.237) (13.43) 10 
(6.45) 
yz 
-0.051428 0.51247e-15 (-0.3432) (0.189) 
Dl 0.64266 0.81673e-6 0.62729 0.82815e-6 
N. America 4.714 (5.203) (4.895) (5.747) 
D2 0.069717 0.51436e-7 0.070687 0.49384e-7 
Oceania (0.6719) (0.4547) (0.6848) 0.4409 
CONSTANT 
-29.408 -0.69293e-7 -25.374 -0.11232e-6 
W. Europe (-2.496) (-0.2638) (-30.9) (-0.8613) 
R 0.7452 0.5677 0.7449 0.5676 
D. W. 0.9086 1.1116 0.9087* 1.1083* 
B. P. 69.066 49.406 67.236 50.326 
23 df* 23 df* 23 df* 23 df* 
B. P. G. 0.437 4 df 5.077 4 df 0.16 3 df 4.72 3 df 
HARVEY 16.826 42.006 11.436 30.567 
4 df* 4 df* 3 df* 3 df* 
GLEJSER 4.993 4 df 17.512 4 df* 4.035 3 df 16.269 
3 df* 
24 COUNTRIES, 4 YEARS = 96 OBSERVATIONS 
285 
ENERGY GLS LEVELS GLS LEVELS 
CONSUAMP. QUADRATIC LINEAR 
TRANSPORT 
Y 0.66069e-10 0.64446e-10 
(7.647) (36.73) 
Y 
-0.72735e-16 (-0.1829) 
Dl 0.95916e-6 0.94582e-6 
N. America (4.741) (4.453) 
D2 0.19022e-6 0.18333e-6 
Oceania (3.369) (3.301) 
CONSTANT 
-0.45984e-7 -0.30891e-7 
W. Euro e (-1.179) (-1.208) 
Buse R 0.9463 0.9389 
24 COUNTRIES, 4 YEARS = 96 
OBSERVATIONS 
MUNICIPAL 
WASTE 
GLS LEVELS 
QUADRATIC 
OLS LOGS 
QUADRATIC 
OLS LEVELS 
QUADRATIC 
y 
-0.35046e-04 (-5.408) -19.671 (-3.126) -0.37065e-04 (-1.61) 
Y 0.22128e-08 
(8.892) 
1.0912 
(3.222) 
0.24023e-08 
(2.469) 
Dl 
W. Europe 
0.035754 
(1.034) 
0.48541 
(1.535) 
0.02796 
(0.4665) 
D2 
N. America 
0.2318 
(6.539) 
0.84862 
(2.776) 
0.20985 
(3.5) 
D3 
Oceania 
0.10468 
(2.59) 
0.70357 
(2.178) 
0.095709 
(1.515) 
CONSTANT 
E. Europe 
0.37807 
(10.18) 
86.844 
(3.0) 
0.38406 
(4.599) 
D. W. 1.102* 1.091* 
B. P. 16.729 16 df 19.117 16 df 
B. P. G. 3.678 5 df 1.558 5 df 
HARVEY 5.537 5 df 8.569 5 df 
GLEJSER 
- 
5.365 5 df 3.795 5 df 
Buse R/iF 0.7442 0.8198 
13 COU NTRIES, 4 YEARS = 52 OBSERVATIONS 7ý 
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TRAFFIC OLS LOGS OLS LEVELS OLS OLS 
VOLUMES QUADRATIC QUADRATIC LOGS LEVELS 
LINEAR LINEAR 
Y 7.4129 0.63027 1.2858 0.58188 
(2.012) (4.916) (7.875) (22.21) 
Y 
-0.33617 -0.20803e-5 (-1.665) (-0.3855) 
D1 1.0708 3761.4 1.3415 3861.2 
USA (3.105) (7.633) (4.399) (9.221) 
D2 0.34092 
-1414.6 0.6948 -1275.2 
Japan (1.022) (-2.892) (2.696) (-3.876) 
D3 0.43759 1238.7 0.77291 1379.5 
Australia (1.281) (2.42) (2.792) (3.851) 
D4 0.76246 758.78 1.1344 906.89 
New Zealand (2.266) 1.522 (4.495) (2.856) 
D5 0.66314 228.28 1.031 373.04 
Austria (1.986) (0.4643) (4.108) (1.177) 
D6 0.54329 
-477.14 0.90662 -331.44 Belgium (1.616) 
-0.9568 (3.533) (-1.02) 
D7 0.65017 48.793 0.99922 192.68 
Denmark (1.916) (0.09627) (3.733) (0.5626) 
D8 0.79373 955.6 1.1518 1100.1 
Finland (2.357) (1.912) (4.434) 3.331 
D9 0.66667 171.41 1.0186 316.64 
France (1.965) (0.3378) (3.829) (0.9323) 
D10 0.63231 
-56.435 0.97946 86.851 
W. Germany (1.863) (-0.1113) (3.648) (0.2524) 
D11 0.79575 655.69 1.1225 740.59 
Greece (2.985) (1.958) (6.205) (2.939) 
D12 1.2296 2604.6 1.5923 2715.4 
Ireland (4.144) 6.653 (7.883) (10.23) 
D13 0.5569 
-297.39 0.92676 -153.71 
Italy (1.674) (-0.6103) 3.731 
-0.4903 
D14 0.59509 
-192.01 0.95865 -44.938 
Netherlands (1.763) (-0.3821) (3.713) (-0.1376) 
D15 0.36799 
-1582.1 0.69921 -1446.8 
Norway (1.087) (-3.158) (2.544) (-4.051) 
D16 0.94975 866.87 1.2346 937.84 
Portugal (3.925) 2.802 (7.193) (3.776) 
D17 0.12295 
-1261.3 0.49714 -1141.2 Spain (0.3997) (-3.049) (2.361) 
-4.198 
287 
TRAFFIC OLS LOGS OLS LEVELS OLS OLS 
VOLUMES QUADRATIC QUADRATIC LOGS LEVELS 
(continued) LINEAR LINEAR 
D18 0.59976 
-269.77 0.93564 -128.83 Sweden (1.755) (-0.527) (3.381) (-0.36) 
D19 0.52374 
-964.49 0.81615 -840.08 Switzerland 1.522 (-1.902) 2.82 
-2.151 
D20 0.77962 730.6 1.0749 846.45 
Canada (2.276) (1.472) (3.657) (2.145) 
D21 0.60535 
-61.457 0.97059 83.644 
UK 1.806 (-0.1241) (3.818) (0.2601) 
CONSTAN 
-31.963 -1589.4 -4.4304 -1457.6 
T (-1.927) (-4.068) (-3.361) (-7.719) 
Turkey 
R 0.759 0.9343 0.7568 0.9343 
D. W. 1.9114 1.2995* 1.9131 1.3014* 
B. P. 12.825 109.051 13.257 107.555 
23 df 23 df* 23 df 23 df* 
B. P. G. 24.88 25.222 24.499 24.939 
23 df 23 df 22 df 22 df 
HARVEY 172.953 94.444 206.842 95.017 
23 df* 23 df* 22 df* 22 df* 
GLEJSER 184.264 108.164 186.617 108.32 
23 df* 23 df* 22 df* 22 df* 
22 CO UNTRIES, 15 YEARS = 330 OB SERVATI ONS 
TRAFFIC GLS LEVELS GLS LEVELS 
VOLUMES QUADRATIC LINEAR 
Y 0.56269 0.49364 
7.982 (33.78) 
Y 
-0.26014e-5 
-0.7924 
Dl 4722.5 4965 
USA (6.325) (7.793) 
D2 
-773.33 -539.13 
Japan (-2.34) (-2.064) 
D3 1722 1985.8 
Australia (1.978) (2.266) 
D4 1417 1671.4 
New Zealand (3.897) (5.655) 
D5 857.4 1097.9 
Austria (2.252) 3.299 
288 
TRAFFIC GLS LEVELS GLS LEVELS 
VOLUMES QUADRATIC LINEAR 
(continued) 
D6 145.61 398.46 
Belgium (0.5324) (2.396) 
D7 848.72 1107.2 
Denmark (2.564) (4.387) 
D8 1887 2130.8 
Finland (3.799) (4.471) 
D9 855.13 1114.3 
France (2.782) (5.077) 
D10 628.64 891.1 
W. Germany (2.209) (4.716) 
D11 909.14 1025.4 
Greece (1.856) (2.019) 
D12 2903.2 3080.5 
Ireland (11.08) (14.63) 
D13 356.94 602.49 
Italy (1.085) (2.392) 
D14 406.77 664.62 
Netherlands (1.435) (3.64) 
D15 
-727.63 -477.29 
Norway (-2.1) (-1.639) 
D16 979.56 1089.1 
Portugal (4.01) (5.901) 
D17 
-991.04 -801.24 Spain (-3.053) (-3.853) 
D18 811.58 1071.7 
Sweden (1.361) (1.895) 
D19 
-185.47 79.715 
Switzerland (-0.4597) (0.2354) 
D20 1696.9 1945.9 
Canada (3.639) (3.853) 
D21 820.48 1068.3 
UK (1.484) (2.046) 
CONSTANT 
-1355.1 -1167.1 
Turke (-5.499) 
- 
(-11.1) 
Buse R' 
ý 
0.9 0.9328 
22 COUNTRIES, 15 YEARS = 330 
OBSERVATIONS 
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Appendix J. 
A Forecast of Global Carbon Dioxide Emissions. 
The diagram below illustrates projected total carbon dioxide emissions for 
each of the two functional forms. 
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The projections were made by forecasting per capita income and then 
estimating per capita carbon dioxide emissions. These per capita emissions 
estimates were then multiplied by population for each region, and the regions 
were then aggregated. UN Department for Economic and Social Information 
and Policy Analysis (1993) population forecasts for 1992-2025 were used, and 
World Bank (1994) GDP growth forecasts for 1994-2003. These GDP growth 
forecasts were then extended, unchanged, to 2025 with the exception of the 
growth rate for Asia which, after 2003, was reduced from 6.5% to 5.5%. ' 
A GDP growth rate of 6.5% for 1992-2003 was used for Asia, following the World Bank 
(1994) forecast of 7.6% for East Asia, 8.5% for China and 5.3% for South Asia. This was 
then reduced to 5.5% for 2003-2025 since it was felt such high growth rates are unlikely to be 
maintained. 
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Appendix K. 
Alternative GLS and OLS Results. 
SULPHUR GLS LEVELS OLS LOGS OLS LEVELS 
DIOXIDE QUADRATIC QUADRATIC QUADRATIC 
Y 0.25204e-4 23.774 0.17213e-4 
(6.508) (5.018) (3.194) 
Y 
-0.91746e-9 -1.2359 -0.78351e-9 (-6.289) 
-4.757 -4.597 
k 
-0.0033709 -0.067746 -0.0024913 
-8.861 (-7.368) (-3.818) 
Dl 
-0.046862 -1.0328 
-0.020379 
W. Germany (5.143) (-5.031) 
-1.408 
D2 
-0.055986 -1.3822 -0.034517 
Netherlands (-6.841) (-7.745) (-2.758) 
D3 
-0.05527 -1.4534 -0.029158 Norway (-5.05) (-6.445) (-1.855) 
D4 
-0.0010787 -0.11699 0.016273 
UK (-0.1308) (-0.6943) (1.379) 
D5 
-0.020326 0.013097 0.057755 
USA (1.161) (0.0427) (2.673) 
D6 
-0.0051188 -0.17555 0.020739 
Finland (-0.4464) (-0.925) (1.554) 
D7 
-0.046517 -0.99287 -0.021558 France (-5.113) (-4.996) 
-1.539 
D8 0.094237 0.55387 0.12054 
Canada 4.477 (2.013) 6.22 
D9 
-0.020625 -0.40627 0.0054238 
Denmark 
-2.314 (-2.001) (0.3793) 
D10 
-0.033875 -0.65863 -0.015687 
Italy (-4.709) (-4.277) (-1.461) 
CONSTANT 
-0.039878 -115.74 0.35083e-3 
Ireland (-2.129) (-5.328) (0.01368) 
Buse R IR 0.8344 0.9332 0.9173 
D. W. 0.8136* 0.9704* 
B. P. 116.422 23 df* 86.207 23 df* 
B. P. G. 38.532 13 df* 40.297 13 df* 
HARVEY 21.233 13 df 32.37 13 df* 
GLEJSER 40.645 13 df* 96.649 13 df* 
11 COUN TRIES, 15 YEA RS = 165 OBSERVATIONS 
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SUSPENDED GLS LEVELS OLS LOGS OLS LEVELS 
PARTICULATE QUADRATIC QUADRATIC QUADRATIC 
MATTER 
Y 0.61607e-5 18.458 0.12906e-4 
(4.245) (5.012) (5.641) 
Y 
-0.21864e-9 -0.90889 -0.45645e-9 (-3.827) (-4.451) (-6.219) 
k 
-0.73265e-3 -0.070473 -0.001087 (-5.443) 
-9.512 (-3.798) 
Dl 0.0019114 0.42078 0.0032841 
Netherlands (0.7125) (6.585) (1.315) 
D2 0.030161 2.6718 0.041784 
Ireland (7.563) (14.84) (6.042) 
D3 0.0048221 0.78078 0.0067095 
UK 1.818 (11.14) (2.457) 
D4 0.033224 1.654 0.032889 
USA (7.677) (18.15) (8.989) 
D5 0.0039888 0.60638 0.0042815 
W. Germany (1.533) (12.22) (2.213) 
D6 0.65418e-3 0.1488 0.72157e-3 
France (0.2105) (2.843) (0.3528) 
CONSTANT 
-0.025763 -97.498 -0.06814 
Norwa 
--d -2.885 
(-5.837) (-4.156) 
Buse R/ W 0.7652 0.9742 0.878 
D. W. 0.6657* 1.3701 * 
B. P. 154.288 42.207 
23 df* 23 df* 
B. P. G. 11.537 9 df 25.238 9 df* 
HARVEY 25.913 9 df* 27.985 9 df* 
GLEJSER 22.819 9 df* 70.942 9 df* 
7 COUNTRIES, 15 YEARS = 105 OBSERVATIONS 
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CARBON 
MONOXIDE 
GLS LEVELS 
QUADRATIC 
OLS LOGS 
QUADRATIC 
OLS LEVELS 
QUADRATIC 
Y 0.10374e-3 
(12.74) 
25.63 
(3.154) 
0.13805e-3 
(11.58) 
Y 
-0.39199e-8 (-14.6) -1.2793 (-2.923) -0.46638e-8 (-11.35) 
k 
-0.006374 
-8.131 
-0.046821 (-6.041) -0.0088282 (-6.91) 
D1 
W. Germany 
0.051721 
(2.72) 
0.25433 
(4.26) 
0.023352 
(2.369) 
D2 
Netherlands 
-0.0087356 (-0.7325) -0.091148 (-1.897) -0.013973 (-1.765) 
D3 
Norway 
0.11247 
(6.301) 
0.57601 
(7.848) 
0.083816 
(6.955) 
D4 
Denmark 
0.019053 
0.6345 
0.15458 
(2.654) 
0.0053421 
(0.556) 
D5 
USA 
0.34163 
(16.97) 
0.95554 
(6.335) 
0.27563 
(11.09) 
D6 
France 
0.041871 
(3.359) 
0.2941 
(5.273) 
0.025081 
(2.723) 
CONSTANT 
UK 
-0.4743 
-8.712 
-129.39 (-3.425) -0.73206 (-9.472) 
Buse R/ R 0.9855 0.9393 0.9661 
D. W. 0.635* 0.9041 * 
B. P. 156.362 23 df* 105.461 23 df* 
B. P. G. 33.291 9 df* 28.184 9 df* 
HARVEY 39.289 9 df* 32.307 9 df* 
GLEJSER 47.601 9 df* 43.248 9 dfK 
7 COUNTRIES, 15 YEAR S= 105 OBSER VATIONS 
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NITROGEN GLS LEVELS OLS LOGS OLS LEVELS 
DIOXIDE QUADRATIC QUADRATIC QUADRATIC 
Y 0.86285e-5 27.534 0.94421e-5 
(4.026) (4.662) (2.634) 
Y 
-0.27316e-9 -1.4568 -0.3951e-9 (-3.386) (-4.606) (-3.213) 
k 
-0.10185e-3 0.006723 0.58526e-3 (-0.5198) (1.271) (1.739) 
Dl 
-0.0092068 -0.14331 -0.007483 
W. German (-2.052) (-3.252) (-2.673) 
D2 
-0.010538 -0.25381 -0.012794 
Netherlands (-3.122) (-5.377) (-4.264) 
D3 
-0.89801 e-3 0.00614 -0.22562e-3 
Norway (-0.3346) 0.1314 (-0.07637) 
D4 
-0.011881 -0.24667 -0.011236 
Sweden 
-5.288 (-5.27) (-3.777) 
D5 
-0.0040262 -0.12081 -0.0077199 
UK (-1.307) (-2.42) (-2.431) 
D6 0.034364 0.62691 0.043446 
USA (8.771) (7.337) (8.004) 
D7 0.0065942 0.048987 0.0039341 
Finland (1.575) (1.062) (1.343) 
D8 
-0.022059 -0.62722 -0.024594 
France 
-4.21 (-14.21) (-8.772) 
D9 0.022752 0.45921 0.029552 
Canada (6.989) (6.809) (6.919) 
CONSTANT 
-0.01272 -133.16 -0.012457 
Denmark (-0.9192) (-4.822) 
-0.5122 
Buse R/R 0.8053 0.8891 0.8506 
D. W. 1.0976* 1.4436* 
B. P. 66.085 23 df* 39.067 23 di 
B. P. G. 25.446 12 df* 23.772 12 df* 
HARVEY 29.328 12 df* 24.598 12 df* 
GLEJSER 61.032 12 d1* 51.836 12 df* 
10 COUNTRIES, 15 YEA RS = 150 OBSERVATIONS 
294 
SULPHUR GLS OLS LOGS OLS 
DIOXIDE LEVELS QUADRATIC LEVELS 
TRANSPORT QUADRATIC QUADRATIC 
Y 0.72062e-6 29.605 0.95019e-6 
(3.143) (4.247) (3.319) 
Y 
-0.28884e-10 -1.586 -0.36298e-10 (-3.507) 
-4.181 (-3.745) 
k 
-0.55211 e-4 -0.012635 -0.52653e-4 (-2.46) (-1.028) (-1.852) 
Dl 
-0.68035e-3 -0.40331 -0.001234 
W. Germany (-1.317) (-1.446) 
-1.886 
D2 0.37816e-3 0.1792 
-0.20361 
Netherlands (0.7735) (0.7346) (-0.3556) 
D3 0.001556 0.72392 0.0012742 
Norway (2.448) (2.404) (1.817) 
D4 0.0012861 0.6777 0.0013318 
Denmark 1.602 (2.456) (2.058) 
D5 0.20308e-3 0.092394 
-0.34996e-3 
UK (0.4375) (0.4009) (-0.6478) 
D6 
-0.59964e-3 -0.30827 -0.0010297 
Finland 
-1.304 -1.237 (-1.763) 
D7 
-0.38196e-4 0.10118 -0.44534e-3 
France (-0.06362) (0.3741) (-0.7007) 
D8 0.0023206 0.92826 0.0018751 
Canada 3.655 (2.511) (2.211) 
CONSTANT 
-0.001561 -144.23 -0.0028488 
Ireland (-1.453) (-4.487) (-2.08) 
Buse R"/ R 0.6559 0.7741 0.7958 
D. W. 0.8289* 0.8436* 
B. P. 127.944 23 133.606 23 
df* df* 
B. P. G. 24.797 11 df* 29.812 11 df* 
HARVEY 31.492 11 df* 32.294 11 df* 
GLEJSER 49.49 11 df* 56.141 11 di 
9 COUNTRIES, 15 YEARS = 135 OBSERVATIONS 
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SPM GLS OLS LOGS OLS 
TRANSPORT LEVELS QUADRATIC LEVELS 
QUADRATIC QUADRATIC 
Y 0.42738e-6 5.331 0.44872e-6 
(3.927) (1.479) (3.553) 
Y 
-0.1455e-10 -0.23804 -0.11655e-10 (-3.771) (-1.196) 
-2.876 
k 0.38194e-5 
-0.0048068 -0.10822e-4 (0.3101) (-0.6655) (-0.6849) 
Dl 0.55466e-3 0.56333 0.7359e-3 
Netherlands (2.793) (11.5) (6.831) 
D2 0.002157 1.4517 0.0026024 
Ireland (8.31) (9.38) (7.74) 
D3 0.0020049 1.1243 0.0019808 
UK 3.988 (21.24) (17.02) 
D4 0.0048084 1.607 0.0044206 
USA (19.44) (14.58 (17.63) 
D5 0.12573e-3 0.12428 0.87916e-4 
W. Germany (0.7652) (2.732) 0.879 
D6 0.71343e-3 0.55923 0.67291e-3 
Norway (5.446) (10.96) (5.959) 
CONSTANT 
-0.0020576 -35.795 -0.0026211 
France 
-2.932 (-2.196) 
-2.997 
Buse R/R 0.9173 0.9607 0.9734 
D. W. 0.6738* 0.5843* 
B. P. 181.606 23 275.644 23 
df* df* 
B. P. G. 16.536 9 df 31.642 9 df* 
HARVEY 40.304 9 df* 18.179 9 df* 
GLEJSER 34.925 9 df* 37.113 9 df* 
7 COUNTRIES, 15 YEARS = 105 OBSERVATIONS 
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NITROGEN GLS OLS LOGS OLS 
DIOXIDE LEVELS QUADRATIC LEVELS 
TRANSPORT QUADRATIC QUADRATIC 
Y 0.85311e-5 32.359 0.111le-4 
(8.268) (7.627) 10.9 
Y 
-0.282e-9 -1.7 -0.36566e-9 
-7.457 (-7.482) -10.62 
k 
-0.3524e-4 0.0078089 -0.14001e-3 (-0.4161) (1.906) (-1.38) 
Dl 0.0085402 0.44251 0.0091166 
W. Germany (10.57) (14.03) (11.68) 
D2 0.0066445 0.32714 0.0075104 
Netherlands (7.26) (9.891) (9.162) 
D3 0.0064114 0.27475 0.0069857 
UK (10.67) (7.847) 8.048 
D4 0.022137 0.91685 0.021636 
USA (13.85) (14.11) (13.44) 
D5 0.016374 0.66246 0.016193 
Finland (16.97) (20.45) (20.19) 
D6 0.0083812 0.43078 0.009388 
Denmark (4.643) (13.72) (12.08) 
D7 0.02883 1.0612 0.029023 
Canada (17.45) (20.74) 22.97 
D8 0.021955 0.85748 0.021604 
Norway_ (12.84) (25.03) (25.61) 
CONSTANT 
-0.044472 -158.15 -0.061946 
France (-6.723) (-7.97) (-8.98) 
Buse R/R 0.9298 0.9463 0.9617 
D. W. 1.2865* 1.1906* 
B. P. 36.975 23 df* 53.303 23 di 
B. P. G. 28.844 11 df* 30.593 11 df* 
HARVEY 20.886 11 df* 24.639 11 df* 
GLEJSER 52.816 11 df* 51.192 11 df* 
9 COUNTRIES, 15 YEARS = 135 OBSERVATIONS 
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NITRATES GLS LEVELS OLS LOGS OLS LEVELS 
QUADRATIC QUADRATIC QUADRATIC 
Y 0.16765e-03 7.7531 0.26645e-03 
1.63 (0.79) (0.3889) 
Y2 
-0.11021 e-07 -0.43314 -0.14371 e-07 (-3.722) (-0.8422) (-0.6555) 
k 0.28814 0.13324 0.27239 
6.885 (1.191) (1.011) 
Dl 1.4717 2.1443 1.4968 
Spain (1.854) (2.94) (0.8135) 
D2 2.34 2.6473 2.3362 
W. Germany (3.753) 8.921 (2.862) 
D3 
-0.16685 0.55845 -0.12135 
Norway (-1.323) (1.815) (-0.1408) 
D4 1.2352 1.813 0.99216 
Switzerland (6.563) (9.534) (1.789) 
D5 5.2701 3.1896 4.7287 
UK (8.211) (8.362) (4.687) 
D6 1.1697 1.8591 1.091 
USA (9.038) (8.299) (1.686) 
D7 1.2065 2.2237 1.2898 
Italy (6.116) (4.807) (1.05) 
D8 3.7243 2.8638 3.5745 
Denmark (1.464) (9.446) (4.297) 
D9 
-0.10391 0.92077 
-0.011111 
Finland (-0.7446) (2.492) (-0.011) 
D10 0.47555 1.7495 0.70062 
Greece (1.182) (1.656) (0.277) 
D11 3.3034 2.8981 3.0516 
Netherlands 11.69 (8.741) (3.416) 
D12 3.1915 3.1636 3.8178 
Czech. (4.99) (1.838) (1.077) 
D13 1.0953 2.0268 1.1583 
Hungary 1.718 (1.57) (0.3931) 
D14 2.5446 2.6959 2.5094 
Bel ium 4.804 7.464 2.59 
CONSTANT 
-0.53203 
-36.582 -1.2368 Cana da 
-0.6475 -0.7733 -0.24 
298 
NITRATES 
Continued H 
GLS LEVELS 
QUADRATIC 
OLS LOGS 
QUADRATIC 
OLS LEVELS 
QUADRATIC 
Buse R/R 0.9208 0.8484 0.6651 
D. W. 1.332* 1.2935* 
B. P. 62.612 23 df* 58.64 23 df* 
B. P. G. 37.583 17 df* 32.877 17 df* 
HARVEY 29.921 17 df* 98.499 17 df* 
GLEJSER 46.652 17 df* 96.87 17 df* 
30 RIVERS, 4 YEARS = 120 OBSERVATIONS 
PHOSPH- 
OROUS 
GLS LEVELS 
QUADRATIC 
OLS LOGS 
QUADRATIC 
OLS LEVELS 
QUADRATIC 
Y 0.72036e-4 
(2.579) 
41.846 
(4.593) 
0.15392e-3 
(3.008) 
Y 
-0.47001e-8 (-3.925) -2.3915 
-4.701 
-0.93432e-8 (-3.95) 
k 0.053339 
4.912 
0.28825 
(2.824) 
0.10877 
(3.139) 
CONSTANT 0.17713 
(1.097) -183.98 (-4.508) -0.24144 (-0.8242) 
Buse R/R 0.2816 0.2296 0.2151 
D. W. 0.6355* 1.0772* 
B. P. 102.42 23 df* 77.809 23 df* 
B. P. G. 2.049 3 df 6.507 3 df 
HARVEY 0.367 3 df 2.227 3 df 
GLEJSER 1.696 3 df 7.688 3 df 
28 RIVERS, 4 YEARS = 112 OBSERVATIONS 
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CARBON GLS LEVELS OLS LOGS OLS LEVELS 
DIOXIDE QUADRATIC QUADRATIC QUADRATIC 
Y 0.23745e-3 4.2557 0.32011e-3 
7.109 (15.64) (11.9) 
Y 
-0.3803e-8 -0.21023 -0.89855e-8 (-2.224) (-13.38) (-8.147) 
k 
-0.0012468 -0.0013591 -0.0053322 
-0.6278 (-0.7692) (-2.257) 
D1 0.098943 0.16901 0.050225 
Asia (0.834) (6.788) (1.094) 
D2 1.9524 1.0991 1.7968 
E. Europe (15.44) (11.92) (20.61) 
D3 2.4953 1.0767 2.6091 
N. America (9.32) (6.985) (14.36) 
D4 0.12921 0.27286 0.012822 
Oceania (0.7194) (2.179) (0.0943) 
D5 
-0.21843 -0.42056 -0.37362 
S. &C. Americ (-2.022) (-5.197) (-5.18) 
a 
D6 0.2672 0.31962 0.074505 
W. Europe (1.252) (2.531) (0.5417) 
CONSTANT 0.010275 
-20.87 -0.0056717 
Africa (0.1195) (-18.08) (-0.1283) 
Buse R/R 0.9413 0.9926 0.9885 
D. W. 0.2303* 0.2436* 
B. P. 637.39 23 df* 616.565 23 df* 
B. P. G. 140.104 9 df* 113.312 9 df* 
HARVEY 73.261 9 df* 107.655 9 df* 
GLEJSER 140.776 9 df* 170.368 9 df* 
7 REGI ONS, 32 YEARS = 224 OBSERV ATIONS 
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TOTAL GLS LEVELS OLS LOGS OLS LEVELS 
ENERGY QUADRATIC QUADRATIC QUADRATIC 
CON 
Y 0.22915e-9 5.5893 0.23434e-9 
(7.876) (8.466) (5.125) 
Y 
-0.51567e-14 -0.27845 -0.6129e-14 
-4.551 (-7.603) (3.874) 
k 
-0.20029e-8 0.0028765 0.53447e-8 (-0.6619) (1.9) (1.17) 
D1 0.31608e-5 1.0675 0.33322e-5 
USA (17.13) (10.55) (12.14) 
D2 0.24806e-6 0.24763 0.31595e-6 
Japan (1.803) (2.907) (1.398) 
D3 0.11774e-5 0.60232 0.12734e-5 
Australia 7.19 (6.648) (5.202) 
D4 0.75564e-6 0.42269 0.76e-6 
New Zealand (3.129) (5.198) (3.567) 
D5 0.77689e-6 0.45938 0.8454e-6 
Austria 5.799 (5.592) (3.914) 
D6 0.14364e-5 0.67135 0.14894e-5 
Belgium (9.943) (8.01) (6.712) 
D7 0.66528e-6 0.41691 0.72266e-6 
Denmark (4.175) (4.758) (3.076) 
D8 0.23201e-5 0.88888 0.23272e-5 
Finland (11.12) (10.43) (10.26) 
D9 0.49829e-6 0.35992 0.57159e-6 
France (3.468) (4.13) (2.447) 
D10 0.1029e-5 0.55994 0.11319e-5 
W. Germany (6.604) (6.353) (4.781) 
D11 0.11002e-6 0.076574 0.11839e-6 
Greece (1.488) (1.484) (1.069) 
D12 0.56787e-6 0.36367 0.5934e-6 
Ireland (6.421) (5.805) (4.072) 
D13 0.30084e-7 0.12924 0.92043e-7 
Italy (0.2378) (1.59) (0.4327) 
D14 0.1514e-5 0.70084 0.15895e-5 
Netherlands (11.09) (8.355) (7.155) 
D15 0.20168e-5 0.83793 0.21534e-5 
Norway (12.65) (9.154) (8.705) 
D16 
-0.94706e-7 
-0.099646 -0.85681e-7 
Portugal 
-1.652 -2.147 (-0.8648) 
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TOTAL 
ENERGY 
CON 
(Continued) 
GLS LEVELS 
QUADRATIC 
OLS LOGS 
QUADRATIC 
OLS LEVELS 
QUADRATIC 
D17 
-0.98115e-7 (-1.045) -0.034409 (-0.5247) -0.8217e-7 (-0.5277) 
D18 
Sweden 
0.18753e-5 
(10.28) 
0.78646 
(8.699) 
0.19388e-5 
(7.946) 
D19 
Switzerland 
0.58753e-6 
(3.592) 
0.42671 
(4.435) 
0.73134e-6 
(2.798) 
D20 
Canada 
0.38363e-5 
(20.46) 
1.1828 
(12.09) 
0.3967e-5 
(14.96) 
D21 
UK 
0.55098e-6 
(4.223) 
0.37576 
(4.538) 
0.62218e-6 
(2.85) 
CONSTANT 
Turkey 
-0.55178e-8 
-0.07357 
-41.217 (-13.91) -0.60965e-7 (-0.4914) 
Buse R/R 0.9865 0.9937 0.991 
D. W. 0.8002* 0.8609* 
B. P. 233.772 23 df* 191.801 23 df* 
B. P. G. 64.579 24 df* 75.842 24 df* 
HARVEY 27.273 24 df 92.49 24 df* 
GLEJSER 62.587 24 df* 142.203 24 df* 
22 COUNTRIES, 13 YEA RS = 286 OBSERVATIONS 
MUNICIPAL GLS LEVELS OLS LOGS OLS LEVELS 
WASTE QUADRATIC QUADRATIC QUADRATIC 
y 
-0.30774e-4 -19.312 -0.35536e-4 (-4.435) (-2.665) (-1.509) 
Y7. 0.19582e-8 1.0713 0.22935e-8 
(6.809) (2.732) (2.25) 
k 0.0060091 0.0026429 0.0030589 
1.523 (0.1036) (0.3978) 
DI 0.03226 0.47762 0.029942 
W. Europe (1.089) (1.455) (0.4933) 
D2 0.24225 0.84599 0.21783 
N. America (6.612) (2.728) (3.417) 
D3 0.10363 0.69531 0.0972 
Oceania 2.737 (2.069) (1.522) 
CONSTANT 0.34967 85.219 0.37189 
E. Europe 1(10.37) 1 (2.567) 4.148 
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MUNICIPAL 
WASTE 
(Continued 
GLS LEVELS 
QUADRATIC 
OLS LOGS 
QUADRATIC 
OLS LEVELS 
QUADRATIC 
Buse R/R 0.9919 0.7442 0.8205 
D. W. 1.095* 1.0607* 
B. P. 16.683 16 df 18.995 16 df 
B. P. G. 5.254 6 df 3.183 6 df 
HARVEY 7.305 6 df 10.676 6 df 
GLEJSER 7.154 6 df 5.552 6 df 
13 COUNTRIES, 4 YEARS = 52 OBSERVATIONS 
ENERGY CON 
TRANSPORT 
OLS LOGS 
QUADRATIC 
OLS LEVELS 
QUADRATIC 
OLS LOGS 
LINEAR 
OLS LEVELS 
LINEAR 
Y 1.7034 
(0.5732) 
0.58918e-10 
1.053 
1.2199 
(12.2) 
0.8089e-10 
(5.667) 
Y 
-0.027456 (-0.1628) 
0.11937e-14 
(0.4064) 
k 
-0.0019053 (-0.3158) -0.41549e-08 
-0.6151 
-0.0023474 (-0.438) -0.31201e-08 (-0.501) 
Dl 
N. America 
0.62886 
(4.373) 
0.77764e-06 
(4.578) 
0.61912 
(4.76) 
0.81021e-06 
(5.435) 
D2 
Oceania 
0.067773 
(0.6488) 
0.48514e-07 
0.427 
0.067734 
0.6519 
0.45141e-07 
(0.4002) 
CONSTANT 
W. Europe 
-27.65 (-2.113) -0.17902e-07 (-0.06475) -25.525 (-28.58) -0.11667e-06 (-0.8891) 
R 0.7455 0.5696 0.7454 0.5688 
D. W. 0.9066* 1.0986* 0.9057* 1.0957* 
B. P. 68.78 23 df* 50.261 
23 df* 
68.015 
23 df* 
51.84 23 df* 
B. P. G. 1.911 5 df 5.745 5 df 1.9 4 df 4.897 4 df 
HARVEY 14.152 5 df* 36.619 5 df* 12.673 4 df* 27.131 4 df* 
GLEJSER 8.214 5 df 20.118 5 df* 7.77 4 df 16.456 4 df* 
24 COUNTRIES, 4 YEARS = 96 OBSERVATIONS 
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ENERGY GLS LOGS GLS LEVELS GLS LEVELS 
CON QUADRATIC QUADRATIC LINEAR 
TRANSPORT 
Y 1.1185 0.63836e-10 0.72685e-10 
(1.96) (8.914) (24.73) 
Y 0.0066768 0.33399e-15 
(0.2068) (0.9643) 
k 
-0.0032888 -0.19754e-08 -0.24221e-08 (-3.771) (-2.584) (-3.858) 
Dl 0.62849 0.91097e-06 0.89366e-06 
N. America (5.161) (4.649) (4.354) 
D2 0.24375 0.19583e-06 0.17851e-06 
Oceania (2.008) (2.934) (2.71) 
CONSTANT 
-25.161 -0.4598e-07 -0.81773e-07 
W. Europe (-9.969) 
-1.594 (-4.749) 
Buse R 0.9794 0.9577 0.9786 
24 COUNTRIES, 4 YEAR S= 96 OBSERVATIONS 
TRAFFIC OLS LOGS OLS LEVELS OLS LOGS OLS LEVELS 
VOLUMES QUADRATIC QUADRATIC LINEAR LINEAR 
Y 7.4999 0.10683 1.3942 0.30702 
2.009 (0.6605) (3.261) (4.935) 
Y 
-0.34439 0.74134e-05 (-1.646) (1.341) 
k 0.0016063 80.609 
-0.0027768 73.213 
0.1539 (5.008) (-0.2745) (4.836) 
Dl 1.1671 8180.5 1.1635 7461.1 
USA (1.633) (8.165) (1.623) (8.808) 
D2 0.41398 1821.1 0.55354 1086.0 
Japan (0.7133) (2.278) (0.9614) (1.864) 
D3 0.51984 4952.8 0.61655 4169.2 
Australia (0.8192) (5.562) (0.9731) (6.199) 
D4 0.83257 3836.3 0.99749 3088.2 
New Zealand (1.469) (4.919) (1.784) 5.662 
D5 0.73271 3281.7 0.89522 2546.3 
Austria (1.303) (4.251) (1.613) (4.683) 
D6 0.6156 2717.5 0.76627 1966.2 
Belgium 1.065 (3.404) (1.339) 3.454 
D7 0.72794 3527.6 0.85005 2755.9 
Denmark 1.196 4.155 1.403 4.411 
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TRAFFIC OLS LOGS OLS LEVELS OLS LOGS OLS LEVELS 
VOLUMES QUADRATIC QUADRATIC LINEAR LINEAR 
(Continued) 
D8 0.86765 4234.9 1.0089 3479.6 
Finland 1.479 (5.212) (1.733) (5.935) 
D9 0.74362 3609.5 0.87068 2837.3 
France (1.23) (4.284) (1.448) (4.608) 
D10 0.71052 3446.6 0.8296 2674.6 
W. Germany 1.162 (4.041) (1.363) 4.246 
D11 0.82908 1930.8 1.0511 1546.8 
Greece (2.412) (4.7) (3.315) (5.245) 
D12 1.2746 4422.5 1.4992 3907.3 
Ireland 3.058 (8.451) (3.797) (10.99) 
D13 0.62521 2688.6 0.79305 1962.8 
Italy (1.127) (3.544) (1.45) (3.688) 
D14 0.66813 3039.5 0.81703 2280.5 
Netherlands (1.147) (3.769) (1.416) (3.966) 
D15 0.44948 2091.3 0.54436 1328.8 
. 
Norway (0.715) (2.382) (0.8671) (1.984) 
D16 0.97778 1929.3 1.1741 1608.7 
Portugal 3.225 (5.275) (4.2) (5.807) 
D17 0.17228 762.57 0.39605 199.21 
Spain (0.3876) (1.344) (0.9332) (0.5218) 
D18 0.68195 3439.6 0.77936 2656.0 
Sweden (1.075) (3.866) (1.231) (3.955) 
D19 0.61403 3161.2 0.65728 2391.4 
Switzerland (0.9026) (3.301) (0.9642) (3.117) 
D20 0.8705 4878.2 0.90528 4133.3 
Canada 1.275 (5.102) (1.323) (5.305) 
D21 0.6765 3073.2 0.83216 2329.3 
UK (1.184) (3.906) (1.473) (4.17) 
CONSTANT 
-32.154 -1180.9 -5.2634 -1632.9 Turkey (1.93) (-3.067) (-1.59) (-8.785) 
R 0.759 0.9393 0.7569 0.939 
D. W. 1.9148 1.39* 1.9069 1.3738* 
B. P. 12.407 24 df 76.602 24 df* 13.988 23 df 83.734 23 df* 
B. P. G. 28.496 24 df 29.226 24 df 28.49 23 df 27.834 23 df 
HARVEY 170.504 24 df 125.77 24 df* 187.755 107.597 
23 df* 23 df* 
GLEJSER 192.649 24 df* 146.865 24 df* 195.137 141.035 
23 df* 23 df* 
22 COUNTRIES, 15 YEARS 
= 330 OBSERVATIO NS 
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TRAFFIC GLS LEVELS GLS LEVELS 
VOLUMES QUADRATIC LINEAR 
Y 0.031378 0.18313 
(0.5376) (7.338) 
Y 0.6357e-05 
(2.799) 
k 100.17 93.059 
15.34 (14.67) 
Dl 9262.8 8882.9 
USA (11.5) (10.96) 
D2 2456.5 2013.1 
Japan (5.102) (4.611) 
D3 5347.3 4896.6 
Australia (5.1) (4.642) 
D4 4439.3 3958.2 
New Zealand (9.188) (9.088) 
D5 3861.9 3404.1 
Austria 7.319 (6.777) 
D6 3357.2 2886.3 
Belgium (6.772) (6.494) 
D7 4359.0 3886.6 
Denmark (8.419) (8.138) 
D8 5000.2 4540.6 
Finland (8.935) 8.376 
D9 4295.0 3818.5 
France (8.77) (8.586) 
D10 4147.5 3674.4 
W. Germany (8.417) (8.206) 
D11 2092.6 1842.8 
Greece (4.07) (3.954) 
D12 4659.7 4302.2 
Ireland 10.12 (10.21) 
D13 3364.9 2894.8 
Italy (6.471) (6.106) 
D14 3650.1 3169.1 
Netherlands 7.621 (7.376) 
D15 2897.6 2456.7 
Norway 1 (5.645) 1 5.133 
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TRAFFIC GLS LEVELS GLS LEVELS 
VOLUMES QUADRATIC LINEAR 
(Continued) 
D16 1979.3 1759.3 
Portugal 4.791 (4.567) 
D17 1044.3 664.57 
Spain (2.029) (1.442) 
D18 4498.8 4037.0 
Sweden (7.326) (6.673) 
D19 4050.3 3604.5 
Switzerland (7.478) (7.065) 
D20 5773.5 5362.0 
Canada 8.971 (8.695) 
D21 3998.7 3520.3 
UK (5.92) 5.437 
CONSTANT 
-1051.1 -1366.0 
Turkey 
-2.517 (-3.62) 
Buse R 0.9511 0.9366 
22 COUNTRIES, 15 YEARS 
= 330 
OBSERVATIONS 
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Appendix L: 
Summary of Francois. McDonald and Nordstrom (1995). 
Francois, McDonald and Nordstrom (1995) estimate the impact of the 
Uruguay Round on the pattern of world production and on the world level of 
income (GDP). Using a nineteen-sector, thirteen-region numerical model of 
the world economy, and incorporating imperfect competition and increasing 
returns to scale, Francois et al. use 1992 benchmark data and estimate how 
these data would differ if the final Uruguay Round agreement had been in 
place. The model also incorporates the medium run dynamic effects of the 
Uruguay Round, whereby static income gains lead to greater saving and 
investment, thus compounding the overall welfare gains. In one version the 
regional rate of savings is allowed to be endogenous. 
Whilst not reporting actual trade effects, Francois et al. estimate larger output 
changes with the imperfect competition, increasing returns to scale model 
compared with the perfect competition constant returns to scale model. The 
model estimates that, due to the liberalisation of the Multifibre Arrangement, 
there will be a contraction of textile and clothing production in the developed 
world, matched by an expansion in this sector in the developing world. As a 
result of these changes, the developing world is estimated to see a contraction 
in manufacturing sectors as resources are shifted into textiles and clothing, 
whilst the developed world is then likely to expand its manufacturing sectors. 
With regard to the agricultural sector, agricultural production is estimated to 
expand in all developing regions and also in Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand. The EU and EFTA are estimated to experience a reduction in such 
production. 
Income effects are largest in the increasing returns, imperfect competition 
model. As a percentage of 1992 GDP, the developing world, and particularly 
East Asia, South Asia and China, are estimated to experience the largest 
increases in income. The United States narrowly recieves the largest absolute 
increase in income, closely followed by East Asia. 
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Appendix M. 
Estimated Income Effects of the Uruguay Round. 
Francois. McDonald and Nordstrom (1995). 
Billions of 1992 US $ Dynamic IRTS: 
Monopolistic 
Competition (endogenous 
savings rate) 
CANADA 3.79 
UNITED STATES 36.62 
EFTA 1.69 
EUROPEAN UNION 31.85 
AUSTRALIA & NEW 
ZEALAND 
1.46 
JAPAN 14.23 
CHINA 17.64 
AFRICA 10.72 
EAST ASIA 31.02 
SOUTH ASIA 10.27 
LATIN AMERICA 20.26 
TRANSITION ECONOMIES 3.41 
REST OF WORLD 31.49 
TOTAL 214.46 
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Appendix N: 
New Regression Results. 
The total energy consumption, traffic volumes and transport energy 
consumption data of Chapters 5 and 6 have been used to generate regressions 
but the data have been aggregated into regions which are more compatible 
with those of Francois, McDonald and Nordstrom (1995). Sulphur dioxide and 
nitrogen dioxide regressions use data from UNEP (1994). Carbon monoxide 
and suspended particulate matter use income coefficients and the intercept for 
the USA from the regressions in Chapter 5, whilst the other intercepts have 
been estimated as explained in the main body of Chapter 7. The final table 
compares turning points from the new regressions with those from Chapter 5. 
TOTAL ENERGY GLS LOGS 
USE QUADRATIC 
Y 3.4461 
(5.72) 
Y2 
-0.16154 (-4.734) 
DI 0.45944 
European Union (7.58) 
D2 1.1722 
USA (14.57) 
D3 0.80422 
EFTA (1994) (11.99) 
D4 1.2953 
Canada (16.59) 
D5 0.44881 
Oceania (6.653) 
CONSTANT 
-31.52 
Turkey (-11.89) 
Buse (1973) R 0.9978 
6 COUNTRIES/ REGIONS, 13 YEARS = 
78 OBSERVATIONS 
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TRAFFIC GLS LOGS 
VOLUMES QUADRATIC 
Y 5.872 
(5.35) 
Y 
-0.24988 
-4.21 
DI 0.63447 
European Union (5.96) 
D2 1.091 
USA (10.26) 
D3 0.63747 
EFTA (1994) (5.567) 
D4 0.83324 
Canada (6.81) 
D5 0.46218 
Oceania (4.489) 
CONSTANT 
-25.151 
Turkey (-5.04) 
Buse (1973) R 0.9932 
6 COUNTRIES/ REGIONS, 15 YEARS = 
90 OBSERVATIONS 
TRANSPORT GLS LOGS 
ENERGY USE QUADRATIC 
Y 1.1073 
(50.82) 
DI 0.86778 
N. America (6.482) 
D2 0.44358 
Oceania (3.50) 
D3 0.199 
W. Europe (6.0) 
CONSTANT 
-24.716 
Turkey (-142.0) 
Buse (1973) R 0.9939 
24 COUNTRIES/ REGIONS, 4 YEARS = 
96 OBSERVATIONS 
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SULPHUR GLS LOGS 
DIOXIDE QUADRATIC 
Y 5.6356 
(6.92) 
Y 
-0.32942 (-6.7) 
D1 2.5989 
European Union 6.45 
D2 3.9652 
N. America (8.6) 
D3 1.5008 
Oceania (3.53) 
D4 2.2438 
East Asia (6.15) 
D5 1.7392 
China (4.53) 
CONSTANT 
-29.725 
South Asia (-8.87) 
Buse (1973) R 0.6755 
27 COUNTRIES/ REGIONS, 4 YEARS = 
108 OBSERVATIONS 
NITROGEN GLS LOGS 
DIOXIDE QUADRATIC 
Y 4.8626 
(8.79) 
Y 
-0.24512 
-7.45 
D1 1.5474 
European Union (11.09) 
D2 2.3908 
N. America (16.21) 
D3 1.002 
Oceania (5.29) 
D4 1.3664 
East Asia (14.31) 
D5 0.86275 
China (8.78) 
CONSTANT 
-18.959 
South Asia (-10.47) 
Buse (1973) R 0.9772 
26 COUNTRIES/ REGIONS, 4 YEARS = 
104 OBSERVATIONS 
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CARBON GLS LOGS 
MONOXIDE QUADRATIC 
Y 31.084 
(6.84) 
Y 
-1.6885 (-6.97) 
USA 
-143.5346 (13.33) 
EUROPEAN 
-145.0674 
UNION 
LOW INCOME 
-154.4900 
MIDDLE INCOME 
-147.1361 
SUSPENDED GLS LOGS 
PARTAIATTER QUADRATIC 
Y 31.449 
8.53 
2Y 
-1.7674 (-8.70) 
USA 
-142.0912 (13.47) 
EUROPEAN 
-144.11965 
UNION 
LOW INCOME 
-153.55628 
MIDDLE INCOME 
-146.24682 
Estimated Turning Points of the New Regressions, Compared to those 
from Chapter 5 (1985 US $). 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
INDICATOR: 
Turning Point: Chapter 5 
Turning Points: 
Total Energy Use $42,900 $34,700 
Traffic Volumes $126,700 $65,300 
Transport Energy Use No Tumin Point $4 million 
Sulphur Dioxide $5,200 $6,900 
Nitrogen Dioxide $20,300 $14,700 
Carbon Monoxide $9,900 
Suspended Particulate Matter $7,300 
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Data Appendix 
CARBON DIOXIDE AND INCOME DATA 
AFRICA ASIA 
YEAR per cap y per cap e YEAR per cap y per cap e 
1960 815.34 0.16 1960 747.68 0.21 
1961 818.25 0.16 1961 712 0.17 
1962 831.84 0.16 1962 711.1 0.15 
1963 867.83 0.16 1963 745.18 0.15 
1964 893.69 0.17 1964 790.17 0.16 
1965 905.3 0.19 1965 806.07 0.17 
1966 907.62 0.19 1966 812.09 0.18 
1967 905.01 0.2 1967 816.06 0.17 
1968 931.71 0.21 1968 822.43 0.18 
1969 982.53 0.22 1969 880.65 0.2 
1970 1034.58 0.22 1970 958.05 0.23 
1971 1106.84 0.25 1971 966.02 0.26 
1972 1107.67 0.25 1972 974.15 0.26 
1973 1128.31 0.27 1973 1014.99 0.28 
1974 1177.56 0.27 1974 1040.53 0.28 
1975 1191.64 0.26 1975 1077.31 0.3 
1976 1213.55 0.27 1976 1093.42 0.31 
1977 1247.82 0.27 1977 1141.37 0.34 
1978 1271.84 0.28 1978 1188.9 0.36 
1979 1270.66 0.29 1979 1230.81 0.37 
1980 1282.28 0.3 1980 1305.67 0.36 
1981 1320.88 0.3 1981 1316.21 0.35 
1982 1301.82 0.29 1982 1339.93 0.36 
1983 1262.91 0.29 1983 1396.41 0.38 
1984 1232.67 0.3 1984 1456.13 0.39 
1985 1220.88 0.3 1985 1524.85 0.42 
1986 1216.56 0.3 1986 1525.36 0.43 
1987 1192.74 0.29 1987 1566.72 0.45 
1988 1196.51 0.30 1988 1633.19 0.48 
1989 1206.33 0.29 1989 1684.54 0.5 
1990 1199.77 0.29 1990 1687.24 0.52 
1991 1205.3 0.29 1991 1735.03 0.58 
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CARBON DIOXIDE AND INCOME DATA 
E. EUROPE N. AMERICA 
YEAR per cap y per cap e YEAR per cap y per cap e 
1960 2186.39 2.23 1960 9657.17 4.29 
1961 2321.88 2.29 1961 9703.1 4.23 
1962 2415.79 2.38 1962 10108.21 4.33 
1963 2451.17 2.5 1963 10390.08 4.48 
1964 2608.01 2.62 1964 10813.24 4.63 
1965 2775.67 2.7 1965 11374.5 4.75 
1966 2962.95 2.79 1966 11879.76 4.94 
1967 3141.4 2.85 1967 12030.46 5.09 
1968 3385.23 2.92 1968 12428.77 5.25 
1969 3488.56 3.03 1969 12693 5.44 
1970 3704.17 2.54 1970 12695.57 5.55 
1971 3896.92 2.64 1971 12984.92 5.53 
1972 4041.22 2.73 1972 13500.07 5.74 
1973 4352.42 2.81 1973 14140.81 5.89 
1974 4609.68 2.88 1974 13902.57 5.65 
1975 4810.13 3 1975 13549.34 5.38 
1976 5031.26 3.1 1976 14142.98 5.68 
1977 5256.19 3.18 1977 14674.5 5.67 
1978 5460.43 3.26 1978 15267.14 5.71 
1979 5518.63 3.25 1979 15491.64 5.71 
1980 5566.03 3.26 1980 15184.05 5.48 
1981 5667.37 3.16 1981 15411.42 5.21 
1982 5782.3 3.2 1982 14786.37 4.91 
1983 5984.8 3.22 1983 15176.85 4.87 
1984 6167.81 3.24 1984 16130.96 4.98 
1985 6285.65 3.42 1985 16476.65 5.02 
1986 6447.24 3.41 1986 16770.23 5.03 
1987 6531.76 3.5 1987 17130.49 5.17 
1988 6800.94 3.52 1988 17666.92 5.41 
1989 6744.74 3.56 1989 18040.45 5.43 
1990 6778.68 3.28 1990 17969.61 5.28 
1991 6738.74 3.03 1991 17474.46 5.21 
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CARBON DIOXIDE AND INCOME DATA 
OCEANIA SOUTH & CENTRAL AMERICA 
YEAR per cap y per cap e YEAR per cap y per cap e 
1960 3484.38 0.84 1960 2435.46 0.4 
1961 3816.07 0.96 1961 2520.5 0.4 
1962 4038.71 0.99 1962 2554.98 0.41 
1963 4372.15 1.07 1963 2557.6 0.4 
1964 4824.32 1.17 1964 2687.1 0.42 
1965 4960.48 1.25 1965 2736.17 0.42 
1966 5370.88 1.31 1966 2790.74 0.44 
1967 5804.97 1.47 1967 2848.51 0.46 
1968 6442.81 1.65 1968 2974.37 0.48 
1969 6998.14 1.84 1969 3080.11 0.51 
1970 7579.88 2.01 1970 3215.37 0.52 
1971 7780.16 2.06 1971 3371.08 0.54 
1972 8245.91 2.18 1972 3509.01 0.55 
1973 8740.84 2.36 1973 3687.89 0.58 
1974 8533.94 2.27 1974 3851.78 0.6 
1975 8603.18 2.16 1975 3871.33 0.59 
1976 8878.27 2.21 1976 3998.2 0.63 
1977 9123.32 2.3 1977 4082.21 0.62 
1978 9466.14 2.27 1978 4150.16 0.66 
1979 9830.34 2.33 1979 4345.67 0.68 
1980 10124.87 2.29 1980 4522.04 0.7 
1981 10411.07 2.26 1981 4464.77 0.68 
1982 10563.27 2.22 1982 4239.7 0.7 
1983 10805.49 2.14 1983 4001.9 0.65 
1984 11200.62 2.32 1984 4056.03 0.63 
1985 11676.77 2.24 1985 4103.3 0.62 
1986 11871.3 2.19 1986 4192.23 0.63 
1987 12285.45 2.19 1987 4235.53 0.65 
1988 12953.99 2.34 1988 4186.59 0.65 
1989 13432.71 2.44 1989 4168.79 0.65 
1990 13892.76 2.53 1990 4136.58 0.66 
1991 14358.87 2.53 1991 4223.05 0.69 
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CARBON DIOXIDE AND INCOME DATA 
W. EUROPE 
YEAR per cap y per cap e 
1960 5184.18 1.6 
1961 5428.06 1.62 
1962 5616.85 1.7 
1963 5824.97 1.8 
1964 6108.05 1.84 
1965 6304.78 1.86 
1966 6495.94 1.88 
1967 6666.28 1.89 
1968 6960.14 1.98 
1969 7319.01 2.09 
1970 7637 2.14 
1971 7815.42 2.16 
1972 8086.77 2.2 
1973 8506.48 2.3 
1974 8621.72 2.22 
1975 8471.48 2.1 
1976 8816.8 2.24 
1977 9003.03 2.17 
1978 9197.68 2.23 
1979 9476.88 2.33 
1980 9551.88 2.23 
1981 9456.26 2.11 
1982 9487.89 2.01 
1983 9604.26 1.97 
1984 9790.3 1.95 
1985 9990.48 1.99 
1986 10275.89 1.96 
1987 10549.63 1.95 
1988 10939.43 1.92 
1989 11257.04 1.98 
1990 11540.18 1.99 
1991 11637.8 2.23 
Where per cap y= per capita income 
per cap e= per capita emissions 
Sources: Carbon dioxide data from Marland, Andres and Boden (1994) 
Income data from Summers and Heston (1991) 
317 
NITROGEN DIOXIDE AND INCOME DATA 
DENMARK NETHERLANDS 
YEAR per cap y per cap e YEAR per cap y per cap e 
1970 9670 0.02678 1970 9199 0.034972 
1975 10236 0.038933 1975 10255 0.035197 
1980 11342 0.053289 1980 11284 0.041272 
1981 11153 0.046661 1981 11079 0.0405 
1982 11526 0.05041 1982 10869 0.039335 
1983 11828 0.049472 1983 10983 0.0387 
1984 12419 0.051839 1984 11288 0.039725 
1985 12969 0.057489 1985 11539 0.039884 
1986 13474 0.061121 1986 11797 0.040351 
1987 13449 0.059294 1987 11858 0.040846 
1988 13571 0.057505 1988 12087 0.040718 
1989 13663 0.05377 1989 12591 0.039733 
1990 13909 0.052519 1990 13029 0.038456 
1991 14015 0.060341 1991 13196 0.038168 
1992 14091 0.051838 1992 13281 0.037291 
W. GERMANY NORWAY 
1970 9425 0.038664 1970 8034 0.041011 
1975 10094 0.040919 1975 9773 0.047916 
1980 11920 0.047529 1980 12141 0.044977 
1981 11806 0.046078 1981 12206 0.043171 
1982 11666 0.045705 1982 12177 0.044471 
1983 11956 0.046596 1983 12714 0.045488 
1984 12302 0.04778 1984 13449 0.049275 
1985 12535 0.047627 1985 14144 0.05177 
1986 12839 0.048095 1986 14683 0.054929 
1987 13017 0.046748 1987 14812 0.056604 
1988 13456 0.045174 1988 14674 0.054407 
1989 13837 0.042216 1989 14630 0.054885 
1990 14341 0.038906 1990 14902 0.05422 
1991 14746 0.038366 1991 15047 0.051854 
1992 14709 0.037254 1992 15518 0.05133 
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NITROGEN DIOXIDE AND INCOME DATA 
SWEDEN USA 
YEAR per cap y per cap e YEAR per cap y per cap e 
1970 10766 0.037548 1970 12963 0.092464 
1975 11958 0.037837 1975 13682 0.094132 
1980 12456 0.039952 1980 15295 0.094263 
1981 12370 0.039303 1981 15502 0.092618 
1982 12475 0.038559 1982 14897 0.08847 
1983 12682 0.03685 1983 15290 0.085039 
1984 13198 0.037663 1984 16255 0.086607 
1985 13451 0.039162 1985 16570 0.084997 
1986 13725 0.039427 1986 16848 0.083659 
1987 14128 0.038695 1987 17186 0.084832 
1988 14408 0.037459 1988 17710 0.087046 
1989 14681 0.045187 1989 18095 0.085803 
1990 14762 0.04393 1990 18054 0.085365 
1991 14363 0.043428 1991 17594 0.084056 
1992 13986 0.042406 1992 17945 0.082357 
UK FINLAND 
1970 8537 0.041217 1970 8108 0.02475 
1975 9312 0.039928 1975 9609 0.033963 
1980 10167 0.042517 1980 10851 0.05523 
1981 10017 0.041418 1981 10903 0.051667 
1982 10217 0.041168 1982 11228 0.050756 
1983 10625 0.041369 1983 11477 0.0486 
1984 10892 0.041002 1984 11746 0.047726 
1985 11237 0.042743 1985 12051 0.051408 
1986 11726 0.044184 1986 12261 0.052054 
1987 12283 0.046197 1987 12730 0.054733 
1988 12969 0.04742 1988 13377 0.055746 
1989 13241 0.048117 1989 14227 0.057235 
1990 13217 0.047569 1990 14059 0.058163 
1991 12818 0.045723 1991 12663 0.056472 
1992 12724 0.043977 1992 12000 0.130923 
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NITROGEN DIOXIDE AND INCOME DATA 
FRANCE CANADA 
YEAR per cap y per cap e YEAR per cap y per cap e 
1970 9200 0.026038 1970 10124 0.063965 
1975 10297 0.030513 1975 12287 0.077367 
1980 11756 0.030549 1980 14133 0.081479 
1981 11746 0.028515 1981 14555 0.078342 
1982 11970 0.028157 1982 13740 0.077167 
1983 11936 0.027353 1983 14105 0.076008 
1984 12034 0.026753 1984 14954 0.074906 
1985 12206 0.025376 1985 15589 0.07884 
1986 12507 0.025201 1986 16029 0.076283 
1987 12744 0.02531 1987 16602 0.079493 
1988 13259 0.025893 1988 17258 0.08158 
1989 13642 0.026366 1989 17524 0.080857 
1990 13904 0.02621 1990 17173 0.075371 
1991 13870 0.026907 1991 16368 0.072381 
1992 13918 0.026476 1992 16362 0.07065 
Where per cap y= per capita income 
per cap e= per capita emissions 
Sources: Nitrogen dioxide data from OECD (1993,95) 
Income data from Summers and Heston (1991) 
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